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My thesis is original in placing together Wittgenstein‘s ideas of how 
language works, and arguments for the philosophical significance of the 
embodied and relational figure of the mother. I both use and resist a 
Wittgensteinian therapy to overcome the problem of the forgetting of the 
mother in philosophy.   
 
I begin with the problem of essentialism, important to Wittgenstein and to 
feminist philosophy. My reading of Wittgenstein finds an ignored lacuna 
between language and (female) experience. I add in to the debate the type 
specimen approach from botany. Adopting this approach enables me to 
avoid a classification which requires a true inner essence to mothering, 
and provides a way for me to denote the significant place of the language 
games of mothering in language games about women.   
 
I argue for a different symbol of the mother. I agree with Wittgenstein‘s 
account of language, but add to it. I show the importance of Wittgenstein‘s 
insight that although meaning is not fixed independently of use, use does 
not fix meaning in that I create new meanings for the figure of the mother. 
I argue, through an exploration of Wittgenstein‘s concept of 
‘übersichtlichen Darstellung’, that Wittgenstein can help us to see the 
phenomena of our life differently, in a way that makes space for 
understanding female difference. His concept of a form of life provides 
such openings.  
 
As the Wittgensteinian agent seems distinctly un-female, I bring in the 
philosophy of Kierkegaard in my argument for a different relational self as 
mother. I argue for a Kierkegaardian flexible maternal self with mobile 
edges. I insert the language games of the mother into Kierkegaard‘s 
writing on women. My aim is a more adequate representation of a (true) 
reality.   
    
I use the work of John Wisdom to make a bridge between Wittgenstein 
and the narrative form, which I use throughout. Wisdom‘s strategy is to 
engage in unconventional reflection in looking for new ways of telling 
philosophical stories, and in finding new patterns of meaning in the 
familiar.  I claim that the narrative form enables me to express the shifting 
essence of the mother and the diversity of mothers; and to acknowledge 
the silences which are part of the mother‘s story. 
 
My aim in this thesis is creative. I use Wittgenstein to create a new kind of 
relation to philosophy. I do not offer a correct reading of Wittgenstein or 
Kierkegaard. Instead, aided by the insights provided by feminist 
philosophy, I write in the language games of the mother to their ideas. 
Thus, I bring into existence through utterance a different, feminist 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
I began this thesis because I was confronted by the problem of 
silence.  The philosopher whose work spoke to me most powerfully, 
Wittgenstein, is a philosopher of ordinary language, yet he confronted me 
with an absence of words relevant to my experience as a mother.  His 
silence generated a silence in me, indicative of the conflict that this thesis 
seeks to resolve.  As I am a mother, I wanted to adopt the strategy of 
reading and writing as a mother.  My concern is not with ontology but 
with language.  I could not discover the language, nor, in Wittgensteinian 
terms, the language games, nor the form of life of the mother in his 
writing.  So how could Wittgenstein both speak to me and not address me? 
My aim is to unravel both terms of the paradox by investigating the 
position of the concept ‗mother‘ in philosophy, and by investigating 
Wittgenstein as both part of the solution and part of the problem of 
silence.  My paradox raises various questions: is Wittgenstein part of a 
tradition of ignoring mothering, as a human (and not merely animal or 
biological) practice?  Why does the language of human mothering matter?  
It would be absurd to suggest that the language of the uncle, the cousin, 
the niece matters.  There seems to be more to the concept ‗mother‘ than a 
formal description of a relationship.  Why does it seem to be thinking 
against the grain to think of the mother as a participant in language games, 
rather than a material presence?  What is distinctive about language 
surrounding mothers? 
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I first diagnose the nature of the silence.  After this, my main aim 
is to illustrate the methodology I use in my thesis for ‗curing‘ this silence.  
I position my problem in the context of feminist philosophy.  My 
methodology is inspired by Wittgenstein, but I resist Wittgenstein in that I 
find that the figure of the mother cannot be mapped on to the 
Wittgensteinian agent.  Though I refer to other Wittgenstein texts, I focus 
mainly on the Philosophical Investigations, written between 1936 and 
1945 (Monk, 1990, p. 483); and on Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, 
partly written in 1931, and completed, ‗not earlier than 1936 and probably 
after 1948.‘ (Rhees, 1981, p. 119)  Through the work of John Wisdom, a 
pupil of Wittgenstein, I make a bridge between a Wittgensteinian 
methodology and the narrative form.  John Wisdom was inspired by 
Wittgenstein, but his more discursive writing differs in tone from 
Wittgenstein‘s remarks. The change of perspective on Wittgenstein, and 
on narrative, provides an opening for the language of mothering.  
In my view, the obscurity of the mother‘s place in the symbolic is 
rooted in both the history of philosophy, and in us, as women ourselves.  
Both sources bring about a forgetting of the mother.  I discuss both sorts 
of difficulties in writing of the mother. Drawing on Plato‘s Timaeus, 
(1961) Prudence Allen shows how the earth mother is placed in the 
Platonic scheme.  According to Allen, for Plato, the mother is matter, not 
active spirit:  
She is the natural recipient of all impressions, and is stirred 
and informed by them, and appears different from time to 
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time by reason of them.  But the forms which enter into 
and go out of her are the likeness of eternal realities. 
(Allen, 1985, p. 59) 
 The entry of the true immortal forms into matter is similar to the father‘s 
act of depositing seed during intercourse.  The actual mother generating 
children suffers from inclusion by likeness.  The mother receptacle is: 
stirred and formed by the forms which enter into and go 
out of her …. The cosmic male is superior to the cosmic 
female in that it is the source of all activity and is an 
‗eternal reality‘ that contains everything with enduring 
value for wisdom and virtue; while the cosmic female is a 
passive receptacle with no identity of its own, which would 
cease to be of use when no longer needed by the forms. 
(Allen, 1985, p. 60) 
Being seen as a passive receptacle is not conducive to speaking 
philosophically.1 
Adriana Cavarero adopts a polemical style in exploring the 
silencing of the mother.  She explores the trajectory of the Greek myth of 
the ‗Great Mother‘, Demeter. (Cavarero, 1995, Chapter 3)  Using as her 
starting point, Plato‘s reference to Demeter in Cratylus (Plato, 1977, 404b) 
‗named after the gift of food she gave as a mother‘, Cavarero suggests that 
                                                 
1
 Allen also contrasts Plato‘s cosmic view of women with his alternate view of women in 
the world. (Allen, 1985) 
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the ancient Goddess who held the ‗secret of life and fertility‘ has been 
erased by Plato and in post-Platonic philosophy.  The figure of the mother 
has been downgraded from a powerful life-giving creature to a mere giver 
of food.  This indicates that ‗the patriarchal symbolic order…has 
established itself precisely on the erasure of the symbolic order of the 
Great Mother.‘ (p. 58) However, the erasure is not complete.  Although 
the female symbolic order has been ‗defeated and effaced‘, clues to this 
distortion are to be found in the context, ‗thereby providing evidence of 
the crime‘. (p. 58) Cavarero shows that the mother is ensnared in 
materiality after her ‗erasure from the symbolic‘, in that the mother in 
patriarchy is concerned with the material, food, rather than with creation.  
Through analysing the myth, Cavarero shows the importance for the 
patriarchal symbolic order of casting the mother aside.  Like Allen she 
shows how the mother as a source of language, and as a symbolic figure, 
is occluded in Plato‘s cosmic system by the elision of the mother to the 
material. My view is that this elision casts a long shadow, so that within 
philosophical tradition the figure of the mother remained unspoken and 
unspeaking.  However, whilst I object to including the mother in the 
material, I insist that her embodied nature is crucial to her importance.  
Cavarero asks whether the mother has been entirely erased from the 
history of philosophy.   She offers a way forward in suggesting that 
feminist thinkers can work with the remaining traces of a once powerful 
female symbolic in order to re-project the embodied difference of the 
female.   
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Turning to sources of difficulty in approaching the figure of the 
mother in women, I suggest that the mother is both a potent symbol in a 
woman‘s life, and one with which she is apt to feel ill at ease.  The 
forward thrust of youth stands between the mother and the daughter.  
Thinking of one‘s mother may well arouse memories of an unwelcome 
dependency.  To illustrate these tensions, I draw on the reflections of the 
eighty year old Hazel Barnes, who addresses the issue with the candour of 
age.  She writes as an individual, but her words have a general relevance: 
I find it extraordinarily difficult to write about my mother 
.… I have never plumbed the depths of ambivalence that 
existed between her and me, though not for lack of trying 
… Tenderness, resentment, and pangs of guilt combine to 
prevent me from ever feeling that I am fair to her or to 
myself, whatever I may write. (Barnes, 1997, p. 16) 
Barnes also goes on to say: 
To be unlike my mother became for me, all but 
synonymous with realizing myself. (1997, p. 23) 
Barnes acknowledges the complexity of the mother/daughter relationship, 
the difficulty of articulating their importance to each other, and the part 
they played in each other‘s lives.  She acknowledges that the love between 
a daughter and a mother, stretched out over a lifetime, in which the 
mother‘s strength must wane and the daughter‘s will tend to grow, 
involves occasions for a variety of conflicting feelings.  In the final 
sentence quoted, she reveals her existentialist commitment to realising 
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herself.  Such a commitment requires a commitment to freedom.  De 
Beauvoir argues that the subject ‗achieves freedom (liberté) only through 
continually reaching out towards other freedoms‘.2 (Beauvoir, 1999, p. 
296, quoted Barnes, p. xiv).  For Barnes, such freedoms could only be 
reached by moving away from the unwelcome domesticity and 
constricting family life represented, whether fairly or not, by the figure of 
the mother.  
 For many women these tensions are ameliorated when the daughter 
becomes a mother herself.  The pattern of the relationship may well 
change. The experience of being a mother may bring a young woman a 
greater understanding of the hardships and joys integral to all motherhood.  
Seeing her daughter pregnant and caring for a child may remind a mother 
of her own experience.  Thus the generational distance between mother 
and daughter may be lessened in favour of a greater co-operation. 
 The mother has been under-theorised in feminist philosophy.  As 
feminism is, traditionally, a movement towards independence, the figure 
of the mother is bound to be problematic in that she is living with 
dependence.  For some feminists, it has been more urgent to write on 
abortion, which has a clear resonance with the ideal of the independent 
woman, than on mothering.  I contrast my position with that of Simone de 
Beauvoir. In The Second Sex, she begins her chapter entitled ‗The Mother‘ 
with a long (and moving) discussion of abortion. (Beauvoir, 1999, pp. 
                                                 
2
 My corrected translation 
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501-542)  I do not engage with the abortion debate, but rather focus on 
what the symbol of a shared body can reveal.  De Beauvoir‘s wary 
attitude to the female body is evident in the first chapter of The Second 
Sex. She describes menstruation as a ‗burden‘ which may cause the 
woman to display ‗serious psychic disturbance‘ (pp. 60-61) and the 
menopause as an ‗impoverishment of the individual‘s vital forces‘. (p. 63)  
De Beauvoir‘s downgrading of the female body led her to be unjust to the 
mother.  (Beauvoir, 1999, p. 513)3  For me, the pregnant woman is 
important  as a bodily symbol of the mother. For de Beauvoir, the 
transition to motherhood is a transition from being a ‗conscious and free 
individual‘ to an individual she associates with domesticated animals, 
whereas I intend to show that the relationality of the figure of the mother 
is philosophically significant.  
My intention of contributing to the rescue of the mother from 
philosophical obscurity carries a risk of idealising or sentimentalising the 
mother.  There is a danger that all mothers begin to shine with maternal 
goodness.  Although very many ordinary women and their children have a 
loving relationship, in our society expression of romantic love is far more 
acceptable than expression of mother love.  The latter form of love is 
often thought of as enfeebling, even crushing.  I am wary of these 
                                                 
3
 For de Beauvoir we are not trapped by our bodies, and freedom is exercised via a 
negation of the given of biology.  Nevertheless she regards women‘s bodies as more 
entrapping than those of men.  (Beauvoir, 1999) 
 14 
dangers, and avoid them by framing my ideas of the mother within the 
concept of the virtue of mothering. 
My understanding of the term ‗virtue‘ is indicated in the 
expression, that a woman loves her child by virtue of being her mother.  
My interest is to write of the ordinary mother in our society, who, in my 
view, normally exhibits to a greater or lesser degree, the virtues of 
mothering.  I draw on MacIntyre‘s After Virtue. (MacIntyre, 1981) 
MacIntyre here outlines a masculine tradition of thought, and exemplifies 
the concept of virtue with mainly masculine examples.  John Wisdom 
uses the phrase ‗altering the geometry‘ of a concept. (Wisdom, 1964, p. 
82)  I alter the geometry of the concept of virtue by bringing in the 
female. 
MacIntyre traces the concept back to heroic societies, which he 
characterises as ‗competitive‘,4 and primarily concerned with success in 
war.  In Homeric poems aretê is used for excellence of any kind; a fast 
runner displays arête of his feet. (Iliad 20. 411, Homer, 1973, referred to 
in MacIntyre, 1981, p. 1225)  Such an understanding of virtue rooted 
outside moral terms is not unhelpful to the idea of the virtue of the 
mother.  A virtue may be seen as a quality of character, not ‗given‘, but 
chosen and adhered to over a period of time.   
                                                 
4
 He acknowledges borrowing this term from Adkins (1960). Adkins divides the 
competitive virtues of heroic societies from the quieter virtues of the classical age. 
5
 MacIntyre does not indicate which edition of the Iliad he is using. 
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As being a mother is not a biological necessity, neither is exhibiting 
the qualities that in our society we associate with mothering.  In becoming 
a mother, a woman makes an embodied choice.  I see a woman‘s body as 
active, not passive.  For example, just as the runner displays arête of his 
feet, by placing his physical energy into running, by shaping his body so 
that it is light and speedy, so a mother might display the aretê of physical 
well-being in pregnancy, and stamina, both of which are advantageous in 
delivering and bringing up a child.   
In the Homeric poems a virtue is a quality the 
manifestation of which enables someone to do exactly what 
their well-defined social role requires. (MacIntyre,1981, p. 
184)  
Despite the fluidity of social roles in contemporary western society, the 
social role of the mother remains fairly well defined.6  Her role is to care 
for her child in such a way that the child thrives. Her identity as a mother 
depends on manifesting such care, as the identity of the Homeric hero 
depended on manifesting prowess in battle.  As a mother, a woman shows 
the qualities, such as vigilance, which enable the child to develop well.  
As a Greek soldier, a man showed the qualities, such as bravery, which 
enabled him to win battles.  The mother is a mother through her vigilance, 
as the soldier is a soldier through his bravery. 
                                                 
6
 I discuss the difficulty caused for mothers by combining their roles as mother with other 
roles in my critique of MacIntyre in Chapter 6.  Here, I am diverging from most 
contemporary Western mothers‘ life experience by cutting out the role of the mother as a 
separate activity, and therefore with distinct virtues.  
 16 
MacIntyre claims that although the concept of virtue changes 
through time as societies change, providing the necessary background to 
the concept, there is a ‗unitary core concept‘ of virtue.  Relevant here is 
his focus on the importance of practice: 
By a ‗practice‘ I am going to mean any coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended …. (MacIntyre, 1981, p.187) 
Entering a practice entails obeying the rules internal to that practice, and 
accepting the authority of the standards of the practice.  MacIntyre moves 
on to his definition of virtue: 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods 
which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.  
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 191) 
The primary good internal to motherhood is a reciprocal love 
between the child and the mother.  Another such good is enjoyment of the 
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work of mothering.  To distinguish between goods internal to a practice, 
and goods external to a practice, MacIntyre uses the example of a boy 
playing chess well for a bribe (an external good) and a boy playing chess 
well for the love of the game.  Analogously, a mother who brings up her 
children well for the sake of social approval, or has a baby as an accessory 
to her femininity, attains some external goods of mothering, whilst the 
mother who loves her child attains the internal goods.  Of course, the 
mother who does not, or cannot, love her child is debarred from these 
goods.7  MacIntyre‘s dignified words ‗trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence‘ may cause an ironic wince in the mother who, exhausted and 
hungry, gets up in the night to feed her baby, but in overcoming her own 
needs, she is moving towards the standards of excellence of the mother of 
a dependent child.  Mothers frequently relate desperate episodes: ‗I felt 
like throwing her out of the window‘ or ‗I felt like leaving the house and 
locking the door behind me‘ but, the wonder is, in general, they do not 
behave in these ways.  A mother learns the virtue of generosity towards 
the child, and the change in herself stays with her in her relation to the 
child.   
As the child grows and develops the mother‘s virtuous love is 
usually sorely tested by the youthful egoism of the child.  Mothers are as 
varied in their personalities as non-mothers, and engage in the tasks of 
mothering with varying degrees of patience and impatience, anger and 
                                                 
7
 The criminally abusive mother and the criminally neglectful mother lie outside the 
scope of this thesis.  
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acceptance.  I recognise that the ordinary virtuous mother may well resent 
her child‘s demands.  She may place a distance between herself and the 
child and focus back on her ‗own‘ life.  Yet only rarely does she withdraw 
her love for the child.  Her excellence may be very different from 
excellence at chess, or the excellence described in MacIntyre‘s other 
examples, but it is an excellence which she has chosen. 
Understanding the qualities of the mother in the framework provided 
by MacIntyre allows me to write of the practices which constitute a 
mother‘s identity, to which maternal love is significant. I write of the 
mother who embodies the virtue of loving her child in the society of 
which she is part. We are surrounded in our everyday life by evidence of 
maternal love.  It is difficult to deny that the virtue of maternal love is 
normatively built in to the idea of the mother.  Although there are, of 
course, both biological and adoptive mothers who do not, or cannot, love 
their children, normal maternal practices are impelled by love.  In Chapter 
4, I discuss the mother‘s place within the shifting practices in our society.  
I do not suggest that this is a simple or conflict-free love.  Although I do 
not make the suffering of mothers central to my thesis, I am well aware of 
the experience of very many women illustrated in Adrienne Rich‘s 
chapter on ‗Violence: The Heart of Maternal Darkness‘, in Of Women 
Born, (1984). Rich provides extreme examples not on the basis that these 
women are radically different from ‗ordinary mothers‘ but that these 
women are responding more dramatically to the harsh patriarchal 
conditions that very many mothers face.  She graphically describes the 
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wearisome nature of pregnancy, and the emotional conflict engendered by 
unwelcome pregnancy.  Rich presents contrasting images of motherhood 
–  the care provided by the ordinary mother ‗who hangs out the wash, or 
runs to pick up a tear-streaked two-year-old‘; Renoir‘s blooming women; 
and also darker pictures.  These include a young girl pregnant by her 
father; lesbians struggling to keep custody of a child; a woman struggling 
to keep working while pregnant; a woman forced to give up her baby for 
adoption for economic or social reasons.  Rich writes of the wintry 
loneliness of being trapped at home with small or sick children; and of the 
exhaustion of mothers who struggle to provide an income, and 
simultaneously care for children.  Yet she affirms the passion, tenderness 
and courage of maternal love despite these hardships. (1984, p. 279) 
Let me return to the problems of absence and silence using a 
Wittgensteinian ‗therapy‘.  Wittgenstein writes: 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of 
stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that 
gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by 
questions which bring itself in question. Instead, we can 
now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of 
examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved 
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. 
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There is not a philosophical method, though there are 
different methods, like different therapies. (P.I.133)8 
Wittgenstein is not building a philosophical system, his method is 
focused on the individual reader, and the individual reader‘s problems.  
My method is to follow Wittgenstein in working from examples, but to 
choose my examples from female lives.  In working through such 
examples I find that the series does indeed break off, in that they reveal 
the attraction of moving from Wittgenstein to different frameworks for 
approaching the mother. 
Within the web of philosophical language, the ordinary language of 
the mother subsists, but a new way of looking is needed in order to see it 
aright.  The sheer ordinariness of the ordinary mother poses a challenge.  
Like a constant feature of the landscape, because she is always seen, she 
remains unseen. Wittgenstein provides guidance here: 
Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up—to see 
that we must stick to the subjects (den Dingen) of our 
everyday thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we 
have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are 
after all quite unable to describe with the means at our 
disposal.  We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider‘s web 
with our fingers.  (P.I.106) 
                                                 
8
 P.I.133 indicates the number of the remark in Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2000) 
Philosophical Investigations. 
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Anscombe‘s translation slightly alters a helpful strand of meaning in the 
German. ‗Es ist uns, als sollten wir ein zerstörtes Spinnennetz mit unsern 
Fingern in Ordnung bringen.’  A more helpful translation is: ‗It is to us, as 
if we should bring into order with our fingers a wrecked, vandalized 
spider‘s web.‘  All the thread of the spider‘s web is there, but it has been 
vandalized so that it no longer works properly.  We should keep to our 
everyday thinking, and recognise that the web of language is complete, but 
out of its proper order.  If the significance attached to ordinary female 
practices, such as the meaning of the terms ‗woman‘ or ‗mother‘,  is 
diminished and overlooked, then language is not ‗in Ordnung’.  I suggest a 
different use of the concept ‗mother‘ taken from an analysis of the virtues 
attendant upon the practice of mothering. 
As an authoritative precedent for the project of using a 
Wittgensteinian method in areas in which the historical Wittgenstein did 
not engage, let me make an analogy between my project and Alice Crary‘s 
examination of whether Wittgenstein‘s vision of the way language works 
enables his readers to use him for political purposes. The main part of 
Crary‘s chapter, ‗Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Relation to Political 
Thought‘ (Crary, 2000) challenges what she terms ‗inviolability‘ 
interpretations of Wittgenstein.  Such interpretations hold that the claim 
that the meanings of our language games derive from agreement in the 
form of life we inhabit entails that there is no point outside a form of life 
which can be used to criticise that form of life.  Such interpretations lead 
to a ‗quietist‘ understanding of Wittgenstein in that there can be no 
 22 
argument from, for example, a principle of justice which stands outside a 
form of life, enabling criticism of that form of life. (pp. 119-20) Crary 
agrees with the interpretation insofar as there is no fixed point outside our 
language on which we can stand to criticise a form of life.  But she still 
thinks that Wittgenstein can be used in a critical way.  
 She points out that although Wittgenstein attacks views which 
stipulate that ‗meaning is fixed independently of use, he should not 
therefore be understood as claiming that use fixes meaning‘. (p. 131) 
Working out the uses of a word is like seeing if a chess piece has more 
than one role.  We can see new uses of words, not by standing outside the 
game, but by examining their roles within the game.  I am suggesting 
different uses of the concept ‗mother‘ by examining her partly hidden role 
in various texts.  As, for example, the sideways attacking move of the 
pawn is not immediately apparent in the outline of the chess game, the 
meaning which I find for the mother is not immediately apparent in the 
texts with which I engage.  But as the move comes to light as the game is 
played, so do the female meanings come to light in my dialogues with 
philosophical texts. 
Crary shows through a series of Wittgensteinian arithmetic 
examples that we can persuade others of our meaning if we can persuade 
them to perceive the regularities in our practice. (p. 137) We can persuade 
a tribe of the correctness of a method of calculating which always results 
in the same answer for our calculations, only if we can persuade them that 
our answers are regular in a way that they had not previously found useful, 
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but which they can find useful.  Such persuasion is the only proof of the 
correctness of our practices.  So in suggesting a different use of the 
concept ‗mother‘ my task is to persuade the reader that such a use has 
regularities, that the features I pick out can be aligned with, though not 
absorbed into, the traditional understanding of the term.  Differences 
between the figure of the mother and the standard male figure are ignored 
in the majority of philosophical discussions of identity.  I intend to 
establish the philosophical usefulness of an understanding of the mother 
which recognises the distinctness of her body, and of her relationality. 
In insisting on investigation of words that is internal to practice, 
Crary writes that in investigating the meaning of a term we should be 
aware of connections with other uses of the term.  Human agency is thus 
employed not, or not only, in fixing meaning, but in further developing 
meaning in line with ‗sensitivities we learned when learning language‘. (p.  
138) In suggesting a different use of the term ‗mother‘ I note connections 
with uses of the term in everyday language, and in philosophic and literary 
texts.  As I have already suggested, the sensitivities acquired when 
learning the term ‗mother‘ are complicated precisely because we normally 
learn the term from our mothers.  Such complications are better recognised 
than overlooked, as they are part of the requisite sensitivity. 
The work of Naomi Scheman is significant for my thesis. Scheman 
uses Wittgenstein to produce a relation to philosophy which questions 
ways of defining and of excluding, and creates a new form of ‗diasporic‘ 
identity. I am influenced by the creativity in her approach.  Like Scheman, 
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I do not provide a faithful reading of Wittgenstein, but a reading that aims 
to create a space – in my case, a space for the mother.    
Scheman both appreciates the value of Wittgenstein‘s ideas, and 
the value of resisting his ideas.  She focuses on experiences which elude 
Wittgensteinian language-games.  She brings in narratives as a better way 
of approaching such experiences.  In an interview with Miranda Fricker, 
Naomi Scheman made clear that Wittgenstein‘s affirmation of the 
importance of a community is helpful to those of us working in the 
community of feminist philosophy. (Scheman and Fricker, 2000)  She 
expresses Wittgenstein‘s idea that our agreement in our form of life is 
integral to the reality of our form of life. She calls this a ‗notion of reality 
that is context-dependent.‘(p. 7) She does not take this agreement to be 
static, but capable of change as our practices change. She raises the 
question of one‘s intelligibility to oneself and others, examining the 
Wittgensteinian idea that a person can only be made intelligible within a 
form of life.   
Scheman‘s writing makes problematic the Wittgensteinian close fit 
between language and experience.  She makes clear the predicament of 
those who have a choice between not expressing themselves, and 
expressing themselves and not being understood.  She refers to her attempt 
to ‗articulate that sense of not-at-homeness‘ (p. 18) which she finds in 
Wittgenstein despite his insistence on the importance of community.  She 
questions the position of those who are not at home in a form of life, who 
do not agree in the form of life which they inhabit.  (p. 18) In the 
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interview, her case in point is Wittgenstein himself who, as a Jew and a 
homosexual, is, in her view, a figure alien in his society.  Elsewhere in her 
work she considers the positions of transsexuals, homosexuals and her 
own identity as a ‗Diasporic Jew.‘ (Scheman 1996b, Scheman 1997, 
Scheman 2002) Her method is to makes full use of Wittgenstein‘s idea of 
intelligibility within a form of life, while questioning such intelligibility 
through short narratives which expose the seams and ruptures within the 
agreement.   
In my thesis, I show the significance of a ‗blurred‘9 concept of a 
female form of life, and a maternal form of life, which underlie and hold 
together our language games; but, like Scheman, I contest the idea of 
agreement in a form of life as crucial to self-understanding.  I suggest that 
not all female nor all maternal experience finds expression in language, 
and that the language that is used to describe such experience can be 
distorting.  I place mothers – ironically so often associated with the home 
– among those whose place in the symbolic is one in which it is easy to 
feel ‗not at home‘. Like Scheman, I struggle to articulate that sense of 
‗not-at-homeness‘.  I suggest that some female experience does not simply 
find expression in language but struggles towards expression, haunts 
language, shadows language, and resides in lacunae in language. 
                                                 
9
 Wittgenstein writes ‗One might say that the concept ‗game‘ is a concept with ‗blurred 
edges‘. —— ―But is a blurred concept a concept at all?‖—―Is an indistinct photograph a 
picture of a person at all?‖ Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture 
by a sharp one?  Isn‘t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?‘ (P.I.71)  Scheman 
and I both adopt Wittgenstein‘s idea of a blurred picture for some female concepts.  
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Scheman is also helpful to me in her pervading attitude to 
Wittgenstein.  Fricker asks her about the conflict between her ‗political 
intellectual purposes‘ which differ from Wittgenstein‘s purposes.  
Scheman replies: 
‗I don‘t see myself as getting Wittgenstein right, as being 
in that sense a ‗good reader.‘ … I resist occupying the 
constructed reader position.  I read philosophical texts that 
way, and that precludes certain kinds of ‗good 
interpretation‘, because I refuse to be what is in some sense 
that text‘s ideal reader. What I want to do instead is find 
ways of bringing Wittgenstein into my world, but without 
being held to his consenting in any way!‘ (Scheman and 
Fricker, 2000, pp.18-19) 
Similarly I do not see myself as in the constructed reader position, 
grappling with the same questions as those with which Wittgenstein‘s 
male interlocutor grapples.  My resistant reading of Wittgenstein does not 
make a truth claim, but aims to change how Wittgenstein is seen in 
philosophy.   
For me, Wittgenstein is both a foil and a resource for my more 
pressing interest in the language of women and mothers.  I too attempt to 
bring Wittgenstein into my world, but I do not enclose myself in a 
Wittgensteinian framework. I both use Wittgenstein‘s ideas, and contest 
such ideas from a perspective that it is unlikely that the historical 
Wittgenstein considered, or would embrace.  Having used Wittgenstein as 
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a starting point, I move away from him into philosophical questions that 
he would probably not have seen as philosophical.  This difference of 
worlds was illustrated for me when I asked in a Paris bookstore for books 
on Wittgenstein and was directed upstairs to the logic section.  When I 
asked for books on feminist philosophy I was directed to sociology and 
psychology.  Booksellers are, of course, not employed to make 
discriminations between the subjects of books, but the physical distance 
between the two shelves, and the dismissive certainty of the bookseller, 
brought home to me strongly the accustomed rift between Wittgenstein‘s 
thought and the areas of concern to me, to Scheman and other feminist 
‗Wittgensteinians.‘ 10   
Like Scheman, I do not offer a ‗good interpretation‘ of 
Wittgenstein.  I claim that language is important, and that language is 
differentiated.  Language gives access to the world, and different people 
use language differently. So far, Wittgenstein would agree in that he uses 
the concept of a variety of language-games to capture the meaning of our 
engagement with the world.  I part company from Wittgenstein on the 
question of the relation between language and experience.  I follow 
Christine Battersby in averring that  ‗all our experience is mediated 
through language‘ (1998, p. 36), and I investigate the nature of this 
mediation.  I suggest that different experiences are differently mediated.  
                                                 
10
 Scheman has co-edited Feminist Interpretations of Wittgenstein, which aims at 
bringing the two worlds closer together. (Scheman, Naomi, and O'Connor, Peg,  2002). 
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For the Wittgensteinian agent, experience is expressed in language without 
gap or residue.  Influenced by Scheman‘s reservations about the 
expressibility of experience, I ask whether maternal experience is so 
expressed, and thus raise the question of the distinctiveness of human 
maternal experience.  I argue that the relation of language to experience is 
a relation of incompleteness, vagueness and fluidity.  I find that the sense 
of self arising from discursive practices that Wittgenstein suggests does 
not take into account either the embodied nature, or the psychological 
interiority of the mother. 
In that I use narrative to remedy omissions from the Wittgensteinian 
agent, I use it as a corrective.  Michael Bell reminds us that the twentieth 
century has invoked narrative as a corrective to the ‗paucity and 
abstraction‘ of analytic philosophy.11 (2004, discussed below) I follow 
Adriana Cavarero in showing how narrative moves us from the question 
‗What am I?‘ which leads to the masculine abstraction, ‗I am a man‘, to 
                                                 
11
 In a paper entitled ‗Hannah Arendt‘s Narrative Philosophy: The Political Relevance of 
Story-Telling‘, Veronica Vasterling made a similar point with regard to Arendt and 
Nussbaum: ‗Arendt and Nussbaum are two philosophers inspired by the practical 
philosophy of Aristotle, who both defend the use of narratives in philosophy on the basis 
of a critical diagnosis of philosophical discourse as it is usually practiced.  Whereas 
Arendt emphasizes the political significance of Aristotle‘s work and Nussbaum its 
implications for ethics, their interest in his practical philosophy is motivated by a similar 
concern.  Both Arendt and Nussbaum are dissatisfied with the usual philosophical 
approach to ethics and both are convinced that the use of narrative would help a lot to 
improve practical philosophy.‘  (2004,Unpublished) 
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the corrected question ‗Who am I?‘ which leads to narrative. (Cavarero, 
2000, Chapter 1) Once the question ‗Who am I?‘ is posed, the 
distinctiveness of the maternal body can be recognised, in stories deriving 
from the experience of such a body.  Narrative bespeaks a viewpoint, and 
thereby provides an opportunity for consideration of the viewpoint, that is, 
consideration of interiority. 
John Wisdom‘s witty and humane lectures Philosophy and Psycho-
analysis present and discuss ‗curative‘ philosophical narratives. (Wisdom, 
1964) The lectures show the influence of Wittgenstein, but also move 
away from him to present a distinctive philosophical position.  John 
Wisdom shows how a process of discovery in philosophy can resemble 
the therapy of psychoanalysis in that new discoveries are made not by 
observation or deduction but by finding a new way of looking. (1964, p. 
248) This brings me to the paradoxical figure of the mother as a forgotten 
emblem.  The mother is significant, but she is not seen.  Although I do not 
adopt a psychoanalytic framework, it is helpful to recognise that writing 
about the mother carries particular habitual patterns, and that there might 
be other patterns of significance which are missed.  The dominant patterns 
of the language surrounding the figure of the mother are, as I have 
suggested above, compromised by being too heavily invested with 
materiality, and by particular tensions in the mother/child relationship.  I 
offer a new way of looking from which a new pattern of meaning may 
emerge.  This method is necessarily tentative.  It relies on suggestions 
which are held together not as the building blocks of an argument, but 
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rather as pieces in a pattern.  John Wisdom writes: ‗It is possible to have 
before one‘s eyes all the elements of a pattern and still to miss the 
pattern.‘ (1964, p. 153)  The familiarity of the topic under discussion 
increases rather than reduces the likelihood that there is a pattern of 
meaning which is being missed.  Such a method does not require new 
information, but a different way of seeing what is already familiar.  Thus I 
do not suggest new information about the mother, but I simply ask my 
reader to look again, to look differently, at the mother.  I try various 
avenues to persuade the reader to see the figure of the mother differently.  
I do not claim to have discovered any novel talents or deficiencies.  
Instead I show her in her everyday being.  This approach is to offer a 
different projection of the phenomenon being studied: 
the process of argument is not a chain of demonstrative 
reasoning.  It is a presenting and re-presenting of those 
features of the case which severally co-operate12 in favour 
of a conclusion, in favour of saying what the reasoner 
wishes said, in favour of calling the situation by the name 
by which he wishes to call it.  The reasons are like the legs 
of a chair, not the links of a chain. (Wisdom, 1964, p. 157) 
This method will only work if the reader or listener is persuaded.  
  Perelman discusses the importance of the philosophical distinction 
between persuasion and convincing in his study of argumentation, which 
                                                 
12
 All italics in original. 
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he describes as intellectual contact aimed at the adherence of minds. 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.14) My discussion here aims to 
elucidate the question of to whom my thesis is addressed. Perelman 
provides Kant‘s distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason:  
 Taking something to be true is an occurrence in our 
understanding that may rest on objective grounds, but that 
also requires subjective causes in the mind of him who 
judges.  If it is valid for everyone merely as long as he has 
reason, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and in that 
case taking something to be true is called conviction.  If it 
has its grounds only in the particular constitution of the 
subject, then it is called persuasion. (Kant, 2000, 
A820/B848)  
 Both convincing and persuading are rhetorical techniques, which are 
relevant to the subject, but the difference lies between a universal and a 
non-universal subject.  For Kant arguments which convince will convince 
anyone, but arguments which persuade will persuade a sub-set of the 
universal audience.  Conviction is associated with understanding, and is 
characteristic of the universal audience. Perelman associates persuasion 
with action.  Persuasion acts on a particular audience.  
 
 Philosophy, traditionally, works with universals, not on a universal 
audience; and with truth, not conviction, which is assigned to rhetoric.  
However, Perelman‘s strategy is to treat philosophy as a particular kind of 
rhetoric, a rhetoric to which universals are important.   Argumentation 
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addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the 
reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident, 
and possess an absolute and timeless validity, independent of local or 
historical contingencies. (p. 32) In argumentation before a single hearer, 
the single hearer, after hesitation and questioning ‗yields to the evidence 
of truth.‘  The single hearer may be seen as the incarnation of the universal 
audience.  The idea here is that if one person may be convinced by the 
argument, then anyone may be convinced by the argument.  It is ‗valid for 
all reasonable beings‘. (Perelman 1969, p.110) The single hearer, or 
interlocutor, may be replaced by a second voice within the self in self-
deliberation.   
In practice, the universal audience is absent.  The universal audience 
is a mental construct of the writer or speaker who actually addresses 
herself to a specific group, or to a single individual.  Perelman makes clear 
the significance of the practical effects of argumentation, which are 
distinct from knowledge claims.   Argumentation is ‗oriented toward the 
future, it sets out to bring about some action or to prepare for it by acting, 
by discursive methods, on the minds of the hearers.‘ (Perleman,1969, p. 
47)  
 
Let me indicate how my thesis fits into this discussion.  I work not 
with universals, but with limited universals.  The figure of the mother is an 
absolute and timeless figure, a limited universal, which Wittgenstein 
forgets, and in so doing forgets certain kinds of reader.   I find ways to 
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address such readers.  In writing of the figure of the mother, I direct my 
arguments to the understanding of my reader, and so seek to convince her, 
but I do not present a truth, but a variety of truths.  The action I seek is to 
create a more adequate representation of the mother, whilst not insisting 
that any specific representation need have absolute validity. In working 
with the concept of limited universals I move towards convincing, but I 
retain the dynamism and fluidity of outcome associated with the language 
games of persuasion.  I address a universal rational female reader as 
Perelman‘s ‗reasonable being‘ whilst also addressing a wider 
philosophical audience.  My primary aim is to bring into existence 
philosophical language games of mothering.   
Wittgenstein recognises the importance of persuading as I have 
indicated in my section on Crary above.  In the Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein addresses himself to an imaginary interlocutor, 
in a form of self-deliberation.  In the Preface to Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein alludes to his audience: 
 I make them [my remarks] public with doubtful feelings.  
It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, 
in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light 
to one brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely. (p. 
vi) 
 In this sad, modest and poetic statement he does not address the universal 
audience but the solitary thinker.  Perelman suggests that, ‗written 
dialogue, even more than spoken dialogue assumes that the single hearer 
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incarnates the universal audience.‘  (Perelman, 1969, p. 37)  In my view, 
Wittgenstein‘s approach is to take himself as an incarnation of a restricted 
universal, a solitary thinker, not a philosopher working with universals.  
He allows himself to be convinced not by a philosophical method, but by 
different methods, like different therapies. (P.I.133) Similarly 
Wittgenstein asks his reader to be so convinced.  I place myself in a 
dialogue with Wittgenstein, different in kind from Wittgenstein‘s dialogue 
with his interlocutor; and in dialogue with differing philosophical texts, as 
a way of creating the philosophical significance of the language games of 
the mother.     
Female hearers or readers have not formed part of the specific group 
to whom philosophy is in practice addressed.  Cavarero has engaged with 
this difficulty.  Braidotti writes of the importance to Cavarero of the 
‗question of the relevance and range of social and political applications of 
philosophy itself. (Braidotti, Foreword to Cavarero, 1995, p. ix) My aim is 
to make the maternal relevant to, and within the range of, philosophy.  I 
create a way of doing philosophy in which the figure of the mother 
becomes significant to the reader.  The movement of becoming is what 
matters. 
Although I do not restrict myself to feminist philosophy, in my thesis 
the figure of the mother becomes important via feminist philosophy, 
through the differences made to the reception of texts by feminist 
philosophers.   
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Between the feminist woman reader and the woman in the 
text there is a relation of identification and recognition: 
both are caught in a masculine conceptual universe. 
(Braidotti, Foreword to Cavarero, 1995, p. xiii)   
Such identification and recognition makes a difference to the way texts are 
understood.  This does not imply an essentialist understanding of 
‗woman‘, but an ‗affirmation of the difference that women can make.‘ (p. 
xv) For me, as for Cavarero, the female, feminist reader has a powerful 
transformative presence.   Addressing the universal rational female reader 
is part of the task of philosophy.  Philosophy narrows itself if it deals 
solely in abstract truths.   
In beginning with the question of silence, which is much discussed 
in psychoanalytic literature, and in drawing on John Wisdom‘s Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis, I raise the question of the relation between my project 
and feminist critiques of psychoanalysis.  I differ from such critiques in 
not adopting a psychoanalytic framework.  In the following brief outline 
of some differences, I have selected from the influential writings of Luce 
Irigaray and of Julia Kristeva.  Sexuality is a very important theme in both 
of their writings, whereas I have chosen to write without recourse to 
Freudian-inspired ideas of the pervasiveness of sexuality in all areas of 
human relationships.13   
                                                 
13
 For reasons of space I consider a selection of the ideas of Irigaray and of Kristeva 
mainly as they are presented in exegeses in Grosz, Elizabeth (1989) Sexual Subversions.  
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Grosz shows how Irigaray uses Freud‘s idea of the unconscious to 
suggest: 
a close resemblance between the unconscious in its relation 
to consciousness and women in relation to patriarchal 
social relations. She [Irigaray] accepts Freud‘s 
identification of the repressed with femininity but goes one 
step further: if what is repressed is the feminine, she 
claims, it is possible to regard women not as having an 
unconscious, but as being it (for men, for the phallic, for 
patriarchy).  (Grosz, 1989, p. 107) 
For Freud, the unconscious is structurally inaccessible to consciousness, 
so the male silence which Irigaray sees as indicative of the 
repression/oppression of women is seen only in its effects, or symptoms in 
the male psyche.  For Irigaray, the male silence can be countered by a 
female remembering.  The analogy of the female with the unconscious is a 
major part of her challenge to the masculine nature of psychoanalysis, and 
simultaneous challenge to masculine representations of femininity.  
According to Grosz, Irigaray: 
 actively affirms a project challenging and deconstructing 
the cultural representations of femininity so that it may be 
capable of representation and recognition in its own self-
defined terms. (p. 101)  
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 For both Freud and Irigaray, in different ways, the unconscious is 
a necessary causal factor in the production of silence.  For me, neither 
female meanings in philosophy nor female silences are analogous with the 
unconscious in psychoanalysis.  For me, such meanings and such silences 
are not unconscious, but just not attended to.  My aim is to bring to notice 
meanings that are in principle possible to be noticed.  I shape my questions 
from within what Wittgenstein termed the ‗labyrinth of language‘, as used, 
rather than searching to elicit the unconscious.  Yet Irigaray has an 
indirect influence on my questions as I follow Cavarero‘s approach in 
seeking the traces of female resistance residual within some male 
philosophical texts.  
Underlying the texts that comprise Western philosophy, 
we have a phallocentric system of representation, but 
there are within it also some traces of resistance—which 
are the traces of the data, resisting this false/inadequate 
representation. (Cavarero and Richardson, 1999, p. 13)   
The influence of Irigaray on Cavarero is mentioned in the Foreword by 
Rosi Braidotti to In Spite of Plato. (1995, pp. xiv-xvi). My aim is to seek 
out such traces, and to move them away from an inadequate phallocentric 
representation.  My method also has a resemblance to Irigaray‘s (and to 
Cavarero‘s) in that I make a strategic and combative use of the 
psychoanalytic technique of storytelling. 
 My strategy of (re)discovering the female does not require what 
Grosz terms Irigaray‘s ‗profound and difficult reorganisation of language 
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itself‘. (Grosz, 1989, p.109)  Grosz shows that Irigaray is concerned to 
‗place phallocentrism on trial‘, while I am concerned to discover the 
forgotten, but discoverable, maternal.   Irigaray writes of ‗woman‘ in the 
western post-matriarchal stage of civilisation making clear that what she 
writes is not necessarily true of ‗woman‘. Grosz explains:  
Prerequisite to the attainment of an autonomous position (if 
not identity) as a woman is the representation of woman as, 
and beyond, her maternal function … Maternity has 
functioned to elide the specificity of women‘s identities 
and social positions by equating femininity always and 
only with reproduction and nurturance. (Grosz, 1989, p. 
119) 
As I will demonstrate in my thesis, I do not see an autonomous position or 
identity as more desirable for a woman than a relational position or 
identity.  For me, in our stage of civilisation, maternity is a particular 
virtue or strength of women that stands in need of revaluation.  I agree 
with Irigaray, that, in the interests of both women who are and who are not 
mothers, the female should not be elided with the maternal. But for me 
reproduction is a remarkable ability of women, which has profound 
philosophical implications; and the work of nurturance is valuable labour.   
For Irigaray, the contemporary mother exists in conditions of 
‗severe limitation ‘, ‗subjection‘, ‗renunciation‘, ‗cut off from social and 
sexual recognition‘, either giving too much of herself and thus suffocating 
the child, or giving too little and being ‗selfish‘.  (Grosz, 1989, p.121)   
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Irigaray‘s prevailing suggestion here is of the mother in our society is of a 
woman whose female sexuality, female sexual pleasure, is of prime 
significance, while her identity as a mother far less significant. By 
contrast, I write of the ordinary mother for whom, motherhood, even 
within a patriarchal society, for all its pains, is a worthwhile part of her 
identity.    
For Julia Kristeva, as for Irigaray, the unconscious impacts on 
consciousness.  However, Kristeva works primarily within a Lacanian 
framework.14  In her adaptation of this framework the symbolic is the 
domain of language, and the feminine becomes the pre-symbolic.  For 
Kristeva the pre-symbolic is the semiotic which is a space rather than a 
subject.  To characterise this space she draws on the idea of the chora in 
Plato‘s Timaeus. (Kristeva, 1986, pp. 93-98)  For Kristeva, the feminine 
semiotic is associated with the maternal chora and occasionally erupts into 
                                                 
14
 ‗In opposition to both [Descartes and Freud], Lacan stresses that the concept of the 
unconscious subverts the primacy of consciousness, the immediacy of truth and the 
transparency of communication.  The subject is irremediably split, a being located in a 
conscious agency (which takes itself as master and knower) and in an unconscious 
agency (which is in fact the ‗true‘ locus of the absence of identity.)  Freud, Lacan claims, 
demonstrated the subject‘s inability to know itself.  Its self-certainty is a defensive ruse.  
The subject‘s identity is not given in consciousness nor in the form of an ego, but comes 
from being positioned in language as an ‗I‘.  The subject is not the master of language, its 
controlling speaker, but its result or product.‘  (Grosz, Elizabeth 1989, p. 19) For Lacan, 
love comes from the separation between the infant and the mother and is thus a search for 
a lost other.  
 
 40 
the symbolic, which is paternal, masculine.  Kristeva discusses avant-
garde artists and writers in whose work the [feminine] semiotic is traced 
on to the [male] symbolic in a way that is productive.  She writes mainly 
of male writers and artists but does consider some females, but in terms 
that are, in the early to mid-works at least, not always positive.  
As I have indicated above in my discussion of Plato‘s idea of the 
chora , for my purposes, which differ from Kristeva‘s, it is damaging for 
women if the mother is seen in terms of the chora.  My interest is to 
provide an alternative to Kristeva‘s notion of the mother as that which can 
be traced onto the social and psychic order and never directly be spoken.  
For me, the mother can be spoken.  Part of my task is to search out ways 
in which mothers can appear and be read into philosophical texts.  
Kristeva is in favour of the mother but not in favour of the female, so 
motherhood becomes detached from female bodies.  In exploring the 
language games of mothers, and the form of life of the mother, I insist on 
an embodied female identity.   
Iris Marion Young‘s use of Kristeva enables me to clarify my own 
position in relation to Kristeva‘s on the question of pregnancy and split 
subjectivity.  Young finds helpful Kristeva‘s Lacanian idea that the unity 
of the self is itself a project. She starts her analysis of her own pregnant 
body by quoting Kristeva‘s remark: 
 Pregnancy seems to be experienced as the radical ordeal of 
the splitting of the subject: redoubling up of the body, 
separation and coexistence of the self and another, of 
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nature and consciousness, of physiology and speech. 
(Kristeva, 1996, p. 76) 
Without entirely endorsing Kristeva‘s psychoanalytic framework, Young 
confirms Kristeva‘s notion of pregnancy as split subjectivity.  My own 
position is that the mother and the fetus engage in a movement of 
becoming together – thus there is no radical ordeal.  Moreover Young 
agrees with Kristeva that the ‗pregnant and birthing woman renews 
connection to the repressed, preconscious, presymbolic aspect of existence 
…‘ and thus ‗recollects a primordial sexual continuity with the maternal 
body …‘. (2005c, p. 53).  For me, the pregnant woman engages differently 
with the symbolic rather than entering the presymbolic, and her sense of 
continuity with her own mother‘s body is not sexual, but simply female, 
and is engendered by the female bodily practices of pregnancy and 
birthing.  
Let me present an overview of my thesis with brief examples 
indicative of my technique.  The overview is not so much a diagram of 
structure and connections; it is more like the pictorial print on a square of 
tapestry netting before the stitches are filled in.  My technique is to keep 
the wider picture in mind while focusing on the part of most interest to 
me.  Thus throughout I draw on the position of the female in philosophy, 
as a means of reaching the maternal position.  I do not see the maternal 
position as the female, but I do see being female as a necessary condition 
of being a mother. My female examples make clear that the female 
‗everyday‘ differs from the male ‗everyday‘. I exemplify female cultural 
 42 
and social practices.  I highlight the differing understandings of feminist 
and female communities existing alongside male communities. 
In writing as a mother, I recognise that in my society with its 
emphasis on the autonomous individual, and on economic success, being a 
mother causes tensions and difficulties for women.  Equally, not being a 
mother is problematic in that the particular opportunities for love and 
fulfilment accorded to the mother are absent.  I do not define myself 
against women who are not mothers. I make no claim that all women are 
potentially, or should be, mothers.  
In Chapter 2, I engage with the debates over essentialism and anti- 
essentialism in order to build towards the concept of the mother which is 
vital to my thesis. This chapter demonstrates my critical employment of a 
Wittgensteinian therapy.  My reading of Wittgenstein here is rooted in the 
antecedent thinking of Naomi Scheman.  Her ideas create a different 
context for understanding both Wittgenstein‘s problem with essentialism, 
and the problem of feminist philosophy in this area.   
I begin by explaining how Wittgenstein came to view essentialism as 
a ‗sickness,‘ and I show the strength of his family resemblance approach, 
which is important to my own position. Such an approach finds 
resemblances between language games without insisting on a common 
factor.  I critique the (masculine) Wittgensteinian agent through Naomi 
Scheman‘s ‗Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground‘ (Scheman, 
1996a). Like Scheman, I attend to the problem of those who cannot 
 43 
express their experience in the language games available.  Scheman‘s 
analysis of this problem raises the difficulties of those who are not ‗at 
home‘ in the forms of life that underlie language games.  Her solution is to 
offer a more fluid ‗diasporic‘ concept of home for words. 
I change the context of the debate on Wittgensteinian anti-
essentialism in moving it into the feminist debate on whether there is an 
essence to the female.  Thus, I examine the effect of a new context on 
perceptions of a traditional philosophical problem.  I trace the history of 
some moments in the feminist debate to show the importance of this 
question in the context of the emergence of contemporary feminist 
philosophy.  I show how a Wittgensteinian approach allows ‗sameness-in-
difference‘ which helpfully avoids the dichotomies of the essentialist/anti-
essentialist positions, which feminist philosophers have found damaging.  
The new context of debate reveals new similarities.  I find useful 
Scheman‘s exploration of the meaning of being a woman which sets the 
case of those she terms ‗women-born-women‘, as she describes herself, in 
the context of debates on the status of transsexuals.  (Scheman, 1997)  By 
highlighting her own uncertainty as to what makes her a woman, she 
indicates the fluidity of the idea of being a woman.  Being a woman is not 
defined in terms of properties but is a concept with ‗blurry‘ edges.  Her 
idea of herself as a woman has a Wittgensteinian family resemblance to a 
transsexual‘s idea of being a woman.  Setting the claim of ‗women-born-
women‘ to be women in the context of the transsexual claim, makes 
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clearer the claim of ‗women-born-women‘ to be women.  John Wisdom 
exemplifies the value of a change in context: 
Certain features … are made to stand out and are 
assembled and ordered and the whole case set in a context 
of like and different cases in such a way that at the end we 
have a grasp, an understanding, an apprehension of the 
case before us which we lacked when we started. (Wisdom, 
1964, p. 263) 
This describes Scheman‘s method, and also mine, as I show below. 
Chapter 3, though brief, I have kept separate in order to clarify my 
position vis à vis the concept ‗mother‘. This concept underpins my thesis.  
I add to both Wittgenstein and Scheman in introducing the type specimen 
method from botany.  Through employing this method I suggest that 
through a qualified family resemblance approach the term ‗mother‘ can 
emerge from its philosophical obscurity.   My position on the concept 
‗mother‘ avoids the exclusions which bedevil essentialist positions, and 
the threat of multiplication of voices which enfeebles anti-essentialist 
positions.  I acknowledge and welcome diversity amongst women both 
those who are mothers, and those who are not.  My approach is 
Wittgensteinian in that it depends on the family resemblance approach, 
but, crucially, I am able to insist on the mother‘s significance.   
I place the term ‗mother‘ in a context which illuminates new 
features. My strategy is to retain the importance of the mother‘s body, 
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seen as active, not passive, while arguing for a blurred border around the 
concept ‗mother‘. I move towards an exploration of the paradox of the 
mother as forgotten emblem.   Such an emblem does not determine rules 
for treating individuals in a rigid way, decided in advance, but rather 
provides a Wittgensteinian changing norm for handling instances.  
I close this discussion by turning to Adriana Cavarero.  Cavarero 
insists on the embodied sexually differentiated individual.  She introduces 
the uniqueness of the individual. Such uniqueness is, for Cavarero, best 
expressed in the fluidity of the narrative form, which plays an ever-
growing part in my thesis as it develops.   
 In Chapter 4, Absence in Wittgenstein: Difference in 
Wittgenstein, I begin by examining Wittgenstein‘s account of language 
learning.  I throw a new light in showing that women are silenced in his 
examples of everyday language games by countering Wittgenstein‘s 
examples with contrasting examples drawn from feminist thinking.  Two 
points noted by John Wisdom are: 
[There is] a close connection between discovery by 
reflection and discovery by investigation.  The second is 
the difference between conventional reflection upon lines 
already laid down and unconventional reflection, in which 
it is necessary to introduce a new notation or remould an 
old one in order to express that new awareness of the 
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known which this reflection brings. (Wisdom, 1964, p. 
253) 
The change of viewpoint may be all that is needed to allow the 
significance of what is discovered by investigation to be recognised.  
Whereas conventional reflection keeps coming back with the same 
answers to the same questions, unconventional reflection is hospitable to 
new ways of asking questions, and hence new answers; or new 
appreciations of traditional phenomena which express different facets of 
what is familiar.  I hope to engender a Gestalt shift in the reading of 
Wittgenstein. To demonstrate such a change in perception, John Wisdom 
uses as an example Socrates‘ dialogue Meno. (Plato, 1964) Socrates is 
questioning a boy about the measurements of a square.  ‗The boy said at 
first that a square twice the size of another would have sides twice as 
long.‘ (Wisdom 1964, p. 249)  On reflection, the boy sees that this answer 
is wrong.  Socrates draws out the new perception without supplying new 
information.  The slave-boy changes from seeing the square as a collection 
of lines that need to be doubled in length, to seeing the square in terms of 
its area.  The square remains the same, but the boy has a new perception of 
it.  This powerful example works from the notion of the Gestalt shift in 
which one perception blocks out the other.  The error of the slave‘s first 
answer to Socrates‘ question became apparent to him as the area of the 
square dawns on him.  Wittgenstein‘s own examples in Part 2 of 
Philosophical Investigations include the duck/rabbit. (P.I. p.194)  He uses 
several geometrical examples (P.I. pp. 200, 203) of aspect-dawning. 
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The aspect that I wish to dawn on my readers is the masculine 
nature of Wittgenstein‘s language games, as exemplified at the start of 
Philosophical Investigations.  Here, I replace the ‗primitive‘15 language 
game of builders that Wittgenstein outlines in the opening remarks with 
the language game of female cleaners.  This shows the builders not as 
neutral participants in Wittgenstein‘s demonstration of a language game, 
but as participants in a masculine form of life.  Wittgenstein‘s point about 
‗primitive‘ language still stands.  I agree with Wittgenstein‘s idea of how 
language works, but once the builders have been seen as male builders, 
they can no longer play the purely technical role that they supposedly 
played before.  The dawning of the masculine aspect of the example 
replaces the prior neutral aspect. 
Although the Wittgensteinian agent seems distinctly un-female, 
Wittgenstein can help us to see the phenomena of our life differently, in a 
way that makes space for understanding female difference.  Since 
Wittgenstein‘s concept of language games is underpinned by his idea of a 
form of life, I explore what Wittgenstein meant by a form of life. I move 
on to introduce female forms of life, thus making an opening for female 
and maternal language games.   I counter Wittgenstein‘s forgetting of the 
mother by interposing Cavarero‘s resymbolisation of Demeter.  Although 
Wittgenstein does not engage with female difference, I show that his 
thinking can welcome difference, and help us understand difference 
                                                 
15
 This language game is primitive in that it is composed of only a few words such as 
‗slab‘ or ‗beam‘.  
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through examining Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough.  This is 
especially helpful as here Wittgenstein takes his subject matter from 
outside the Western patriarchy that he inhabited.  I draw on a selection of 
the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough in which Wittgenstein places 
together the form of life of ‗primitive‘ communities and our form of life in 
order to change a view of both which may have been induced by Frazer‘s 
study.  Wittgenstein forces a reassessment of the power of magic and 
ritual as a challenge to our conventional ways of understanding the world.  
I focus on his resymbolisation of the practices of ‗primitive tribes‘, and I 
highlight the female practices that he discusses.   
Wittgenstein here employs the concept (der Begriff) of 
‘übersichtlichen Darstellung’ (R.F. p. 132).16  I now provide a detailed 
explanation of this phrase, which is complex to translate, as it is important 
to my strategy of offering a different pattern for understanding the figure 
of the mother. A Darstellung is not a representation, but rather an 
exhibition or performance. The word does not imply a mimetic 
representation but a sense of display, of placing so that the exhibited item 
can be viewed.  Whereas representation supposes a vantage point from 
which what is represented can be mimetically displayed to the viewer, 
Darstellung, in Wittgenstein‘s usage, implies that there is no privileged 
place to present from, that the viewer and what is seen are both already 
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‗embarqué‘, already part of the language game.  Furthermore, 
‗übersichtlichen’ does not bring in the sense of a superior overview, but 
rather of a clear or transparent view.  Equally ‗übersichtlichen‘ does not 
convey that there is a correct perspective, as does the English, 
‘perspicuous‘, nor the idea of a detached overview.  ‘Über’ translates as 
‗across‘ as well as ‗over‘.  An ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ helps us find 
our way about in way that becomes clearer as we do find our way about, 
rather as a mathematical formula becomes clearer as we operate with the 
formula.  The performance is integrated with the meaning. 
An ‘übersichtlichen Darstellung’ depicts relationships.  As he 
introduces the phrase Wittgenstein writes: ‗It is just as possible to see the 
data in their relation to one another and to embrace them in a general 
picture… (Es ist ebensowohl möglich, die Daten in ihrer Beziehung zu 
einander zu sehen und in ein allgemeines Bild zusammenzufassen  ... ’ 
(R.F. pp. 130-1). The emphasis on relationality might be thought to 
suggest the hidden influence of Kierkegaard given that Wittgenstein 
stressed the ‗importance of finding connecting links.‘ [Zwischengliedern] 
to reach an understanding of phenomena. (R.F., p. 133) Wittgenstein 
disaggregates language to investigate the working relationships within, 
whereas Kierkegaard‘s related personae indicate the fracturing of the self; 
Kierkegaard‘s interior view shows the relationality between individuals 
which forms the individuals (as I demonstrate in Chapter 5).  
Wittgenstein‘s uses the concept of ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ to show 
the relationality between language games, gestures, rituals and practices 
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which form our overlapping lives.  This conception of philosophy shows a 
desire for clarity: 
 linking its content to the idea of exposing new aspects of 
systems of expression in order to break our bondage to 
analogies absorbed into the forms of our language. (Baker, 
1991, quoted in Clack 1999, p. 45) 
In Chapter 5, Difference in Kierkegaard: Spaces for the Mother, I 
move on to a feminist interpretation of Kierkegaard‘s idea of a relational 
‗self‘.  I begin by focussing on part of Either/Or (Kierkegaard, 1987) 
which juxtaposes three existence spheres.  Kierkegaard indicates the 
importance of viewpoint by his use of pseudonym authors, with 
contrasting world-views.  In placing Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard in 
consecutive chapters, I do not so much illustrate commonalties between 
them, as think them together, thus focusing attention on the point of view 
of each philosopher.  This consecutive placing indicates how the 
Wittgensteinian agent lacks the interiority which fascinates the reader in 
Kierkegaard‘s ‗narrative portraits‘.  Kierkegaard‘s vivid tracing (through 
the words of his pseudonyms) of the thoughts and feelings, the differing 
subjectivities, of his individuals makes more evident contrasts between the 
Wittgensteinian agent and the Kierkegaardian individual.  The 
Wittgensteinian agent speaks, gestures, employs tools, occupies himself 
with his customary practices and expresses originality by changing such 
practices.  Unlike the characters in Kierkegaard‘s ‗narrative portraits‘, his 
‗inner‘ life is not subject to Wittgensteinian scrutiny.   
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The theme of shadows is important to my work on Kierkegaard.  I 
attempt to conjure up the shadows of females within the gaps in these 
philosophical texts.  There are shadowy females troubling the subjectivity 
of the males, unvoiced but suggested, changing the meaning of his 
‗narrative portraits‘.  My technique is to attend to these shadowy females, 
often on the edge of the main beam of philosophical argument, in order to 
conjure a different symbol of the self from that prevalent in masculine 
philosophy.  In this my starting point is Battersby‘s re-reading of 
Kierkegaard in her account of feminist metaphysics in The Phenomenal 
Woman (Battersby, 1998).  Battersby provides a feminist re-reading of 
Kierkegaard‘s In Vino Veritas, which is itself derived from Plato‘s 
Symposium.  
My project is to bring together the figure of the pregnant woman 
and the imaginary rounded creatures from Aristophanes‘ tale in Plato‘s 
Symposium. Aristophanes relates: 
 the shape of each human being was a rounded whole with 
back and sides forming a circle. Each one has four hands 
and the same number of legs, and two identical faces on a 
circular neck. (Plato, 1999, 190a)  
 They are imagined by Plato‘s character Aristophanes to create a bizarre 
picture of human beings who are physically dependent on each other as a 
consequence of their love for each other.   The old habit of apprehension 
which I challenge is that of seeing the rounded creatures as part of a 
Platonic downgrading of physical love.  In inserting the mother into this 
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tale, I continue Cavarero‘s approach of seeking the remaining traces of the 
mother who has been so largely forgotten in philosophy.  
John Wisdom demonstrates how a new analogy can make us see an 
object differently, even if the object of comparison does not completely 
physically resemble the object under discussion. (1964, p. 248)  
Aristophanes‘ ‗rounded whole‘ and the figure of the pregnant woman are 
not hugely similar, but the shapes suggest each other.  Through drawing 
the analogy with the pregnant woman, I insert a new perception of 
physical love. All the features of Aristophanes‘ creatures are apparent 
now, as before, but the analogy with the pregnant woman makes them 
appear differently.  This presentation raises an alternative symbol of the 
mother.  I insist on the bodily relation between mother and child.  Such a 
symbol shows not autonomy but interdependence, not a strict division 
between inert matter and a moving spirit, but an active body which can 
give birth and nourish.  Such a body is illustrated in Kierkegaard‘s 
evocation of the biblical figure of Sarah in Fear and Trembling. I close 
this chapter by suggesting that the text is not enough.  The figure of the 
mother is not comprehended in a skein of words.   
Throughout my thesis, I interject and interpolate narratives as a 
means of mediating the experience of mothers.  Towards the end of his 
lectures John Wisdom notes that a problem for psychoanalysis, and for 
metaphysical reflection, is that ‗there exists already a way of telling the 
story which selects, emphasises and assembles things in certain 
constellations.‘ (1964, p. 262)  He writes of a ‗determined attempt‘ to 
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change the story of a person‘s experience in such a way that the new 
narrative is more acceptable than the accustomed one.  I end, in Chapter 6, 
Narrative Identity?, by examining narratives of mothers, thus 
simultaneously examining a form which I have used constantly.  In a 
paper entitled ‗Narrative and Meaning in Primo Levi‘s The Periodic 
Table’ (2004) Michael Bell explored the searching analysis of narrative in 
relation to experience in Levi‘s ‗life-story‘.  I select from his paper points 
relevant to my presentation of the mother.17 
  My approach resembles that outlined by Bell in that I see the 
‗supreme significance of narrative‘ and yet I am ‗suspicious of it‘.  Bell 
notes that the concept ‗narrative‘ overlaps ambiguously with myth, fiction 
and poetry. I use examples from all three genres.  Expressing his suspicion 
of narrative, Bell moves against the tendency to read life teleologically.  
Stories may form a whole, but not a whole of beginning, middle and end.  
Whilst I have found MacIntyre‘s concept of virtue helpful, I have resisted 
his idea that a narrative teleology is necessary for the intelligibility of 
one‘s life. (MacIntyre, 1981, Chapter 15) I contest MacIntyre‘s claim in 
countering it with the disjunctions of female narratives.  I do not 
presuppose that the intelligibility of one‘s own life is a problem.  I show 
women and mothers using narrative in their endeavour to understand the 
situation in life in which they are placed.  Bell refers to the unstable 
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 In the first two paragraphs of this section  quotations are taken from a conference paper 
by Bell, Michael (2004) ‗Narrative and Meaning in Primo Levi‘s The Periodic Table‘. In 
the final 2 paragraphs my ideas were stimulated by questions put after the presentation of 
the paper by Christine Battersby and by Georgina Paul.   
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‗alchemy‘ of narrative.18  Through engaging with Levi‘s practice of 
storytelling, Bell discusses the idea that the meaning of the events will not 
be captured in the narrative of them.  The reality of narrated events is over 
before they can be written:  ‗Perfection belongs to narrated events, not 
those we live.‘ (Levi, 1984, p. 180) As a character is written, that character 
becomes a representative figure, a distilled substance, whose reality eludes 
writer and reader.  My aim in the stories I choose is to re-present, re-
project the mother, not to capture her reality. 
In finding the narrative form useful to approach the figure of the 
mother, I recognise that the ambitions of narratives are necessarily modest.  
The therapy provided by narrative is not a stripping away of outer skins to 
attain the truth.  It lies in the transformational power of the story which 
                                                 
18
 In Literature, Modernism and Myth Bell also  refers to Levi‘s The Periodic Table.  Bell 
states that Levi‘s ‗image of the Scheidekunst, the separating of the gold from dross, 
applies to his (Levi‘s) own combined activity as protagonist and story-teller running time 
through his fingers with an eye constantly alert to the precious grains of significance to 
be won from it.‘ (Bell, 1997, p. 177) Such alchemical activity is seen in Levi‘s  
presentation of Müller who was, either in fiction or in reality, his former director in the 
laboratory at Auschwitz.  Within the narrative of The Periodic Table, the ex-prisoner, 
Levi, is nervous of meeting  Müller again after the war as he knew the ‗real person will 
be incommensurate with his own significance.‘ (p. 177) Although Levi does pursue 
Müller, this is a feint. ‗The historical Müller does slip through his fingers, but Levi 
retains his meaning in the secret substance of fiction disguised as history.‘ (p.  178)  The 
meaning of the pursuit is the transformation of the historical Müller into ‗a fiction, a 
representative case‘ of those who committed evil acts, and yet had all the petty worries 
and ordinary vanities of any man. (Bell, 1997) 
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enables us to accept experiences, even as we recognise that the stories set 
the truth free rather than capturing it.  Barnes writes introducing her 
autobiography: 
words distort even as they reveal, what is lived can never 
be the same as what is told.  The most I can claim, and this 
I do affirm, is that the fictional character portrayed here, at 
least in my eyes, is a true reflection of what I reflectively 
see. (Barnes, 1997, p. xix) 
Both Barnes‘ caution and her affirmation speak of the value of telling 
narratives. 
The meanings of narratives are not restricted to the stories told.  
The silences in the stories of mothers, whether ineffable, or the willed 
silences of secrets, and the gaps in between narratives, contribute to the 
meaning I present.  I place these female silences in the context of how 
mothers are perceived or overlooked, in the majority of the narratives of 
philosophy.  I show how the male framework imposed, quietens, but does 
not extinguish, the female voice, the mother‘s voice.  
I begin with a debate of fundamental importance, in different ways, 
both to Wittgenstein and to feminist philosophy: the problem of 
essentialism.   
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Chapter 2:  Difference, Essence and Essentialism 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the philosophical problem of essentialism. I 
accompany my work on the large problems of essentialism with developed 
examples, which narrow the focus of my discussion.  I argue for a 
significant place for the language games of mothering in language games 
around women.   To use a phrase from Scheman, I bring Wittgenstein into 
my world. (Scheman 2000, p.18) In order to highlight the power of a 
Wittgensteinian approach, I draw on his ideas in a context which is 
relevant to my philosophical problems, and find his ideas helpful, despite 
his lack of interest in the content of my concerns.  
This chapter is structured into two parts.  In my first part, 
Essentialism as a Sickness, I work through the positions taken by 
Wittgenstein, and by Naomi Scheman, drawing elements from each to 
create my own position.  I begin by outlining Wittgenstein‘s early 
essentialism, and his later reaction to his position.  I demonstrate 
Wittgenstein‘s ‗family resemblance‘ approach, which is crucial to my 
argument.  However, like Scheman, I have problems with Wittgenstein‘s 
idea of a form of life which acts as a ‗given‘, ‗underlying‘ language 
games. From Wittgenstein, Scheman takes the idea of language games in 
‗family resemblance‘ to each other; but she highlights the dilemma of 
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those who are unable to ‗match‘ their experience to language, whose form 
of life does not underlie the language games available.  I bring together 
Scheman‘s ideas, and Luntley‘s contention that the Wittgensteinian agent 
is capable of being the ‗author of patterns of similarities‘. (Luntley, 2000, 
p. 9)   Thus I establish the usefulness of employing the family resemblance 
approach, and signal potential problems of employing it in describing the 
language of mothering, which I address in the following chapter.    
 In the second part, The Feminist Debate on Essentialism, I move on to 
argue for both the usefulness of Wittgenstein‘s ideas in the feminist debate 
on essentialism, and their lack of fit with the feminist debate. This leads to 
an acknowledgement of the dilemma of feminist theory in this area of 
thought, and of the desirability of a model of which goes beyond the 
same/different binary. I consider and critique Wittgenstein‘s concept of 
‗family resemblances‘ as a theoretical model providing ‗sameness-in-
difference‘.  Here I introduce Scheman‘s Wittgensteinian notion of a 
shifting centre to language games.  Scheman employs this idea to explore 
how we can understand the term ‗women‘ via an exploration of what the 
term could mean for transsexuals and ‗how they were able to mean it.‘ 
This example introduces reading resemblance theory into language games 
of embodied sexual difference. Again my position is influenced by 
Scheman here, as I agree with her argument for a shifting centre (and 




Essentialism as a Sickness 
Wittgenstein‘s engagement with the ‗great question‘ (P.I.65) of 
essence pervades the Philosophical Investigations. For him it was a great 
question as the error of essentialism arose from misguided Platonic idealist 
metaphysical assumptions and from the characteristics of logic. (P.I.107-
8). Below I discuss Wittgenstein‘s position, drawing on Hallett‘s 
Essentialism: A Wittgensteinian Critique.(Hallett, 1991) Although 
Hallett‘s book was published at the height of the feminist debate, women 
are not mentioned in his text, except as housewives (in 1991!), who are 
listed with those who are happy to use language inexactly. 
Hallett views essentialism as a cancer, to use his own frequent, rather 
chilling metaphor, in philosophical thinking.  It has many causes, varying 
aetiologies, varying symptoms and may be latent rather than evident.  His 
aim is to identify this cancer, to explain it and to provide a therapy for it.  
Wittgenstein acts as both a patient and a therapist in that he suffered from 
the disease of essentialism in the Tractatus. He wrote on Moritz Schlick‘s  
copy, ‗Every one of these sentences is the expression of an illness.‘ 
(quoted in Hallett 1991, p. 147)  Wittgenstein provided a therapy for 
essentialist thinking in the Philosophical Investigations.  I select from 
Hallett aspects of his exegesis of Wittgenstein‘s critique which are 
relevant to the discussion of essentialism in questions of sexual difference.  
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 Moving rapidly between epistemological questions of the nature of 
knowledge, and ontological questions of universals, Hallett begins by 
spelling out the traditional Platonic sense of essences as: 
 core properties of clusters of properties present, 
necessarily, in all and only those things which bear the 
common name.  Knowledge is one thing; language is one 
thing; beauty, meaning, humanity, life, law, justice – each 
is a single invariant reality, present in the most varied 
instances, or in a separate realism of forms. (Hallett, 1991, 
p. 2) 
Wittgenstein uses Plato‘s dialogue Thaetetus (1992) as an example of the 
epistemological and ontological views he is opposing.19  Socrates rejects 
the varied instances of knowledge cited by Thaetetus insisting that he 
(Socrates) did not ask for many things, but for one thing ‗knowledge.‘  
Hallett uses an image of colour to clarify the meaning of Socrates‘ 
question: 
It is as though justice, or the word justice, were a coloured 
bit of glass that might be placed here or there in different 
mosaics without affecting its hue: … If it is not – if one 
notes any variation of shade from one spot to another, one 
can be sure that the two bits are not the same.  They cannot 
both be justice – or knowledge. (Hallett, 1991, p. 47) 
                                                 
19
 Plato (1992)Thaetetus appears in P.I.46, P.I.48, P.I.518. 
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The mosaic piece of the true colour is analogous to the Platonic Idea, the 
universal against which the instances are measured.  Essentialism thus 
relies on the idea of universals, which exist in the realm of ideas and are 
entirely different from the instances of these universals that we find 
around us.  Meaning is a mental act by which we check the instances 
against the ideal.  
 By the time that he wrote the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein regarded this metaphysics as mistaken: 
When philosophers use a word—‗knowledge‘, ‗being‘, 
‗object‘, ‗I‘, ‘proposition‘, ‗name‘—and try to grasp the 
essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the 
word ever actually used in this way in the language-game 
which is its original home? (seine Heimat20)— 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical 
to their everyday use. (P.I.116) 
Wittgenstein‘s focus on use challenged the traditional idea of 
meaning as something beneath or beyond language, an abstract idea in a 
separate intellectual realm.  His criticism is that the language of essence 
and universals had wrenched words from where they belonged, and placed 
them in alien surroundings.  We understand ‗knowledge‘ not through a 
metaphysical quest, but in seeing how the term ‗knowledge‘ is used – 
where the term is at home, where it belongs. 
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 The term ‗Heimat’ is discussed below.  
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His most famous remark on essence is: P.I.371 Das Wesen ist in der 
Grammatik ausgesprochen. The English translation ‗Essence is expressed 
by Grammar‘ does not quite capture the sense of ausgesprochen — 
meaning ‗spoken out‘: ‗Essence is spoken out in grammar‘ is clumsy but 
more exact.  ‗Grammar‘ may be interpreted as rules of language-games.  
As concepts are used in language-games so their essence appears.  There 
is no a priori essence; there is only an essence made up from, ‗spoken out‘, 
in use.  This instantly places the idea of ‗essence‘, and the essences of 
‗knowledge‘, ‗being‘, ‗object‘ in a shifting linguistic pattern. ‗The 
meaning of a word is whatever we learn or explain when we learn or 
explain the word‘s meaning; but what we then learn or explain is not an 
object, say, but the word‘s use in language‘. (Hallett, 1991, p.63) We do 
not need a reflective understanding of our language in order to use 
language.  Essences disappear from use, since we use words without 
needing to know their essences.   
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein sought essences, for example he 
writes:   
 It is clear that only what is essential to the most general 
propositional form may be included in its description—for 
otherwise it would not be the most general form. (T. 4.5)  
His later reaction was to emphasise differences.  As shown in his example 
of games, he demonstrates that here is no single similarity common to all, 
which can account for the common label ‗game‘. (P.I.66) There is no 
essence to games or to justice against which to measure instances of 
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games or justice.  There are instead resemblances between uses of the 
word ‗game‘ or uses of the word ‗justice‘.  He writes in the Lectures on 
the Foundations of Mathematics,  ‗An internal relation, one might say, lies 
in the essence of things.‘ (Wittgenstein, 1976, p. 76) 
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein criticises his own 
earlier stress on the purity and exactness of thought in the Tractatus, as for 
example in T. 5.5563: 
In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they 
stand, are in perfect logical order.—That utterly simple thing, which 
we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but the truth 
itself in its entirety. 
(Our problems are not abstract but perhaps the most concrete there 
are.) 
His later view is that: 
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, 
essential, in our investigation, resides in trying to grasp the 
incomparable essence of language. That is, the order 
existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, 
truth, experience, and so on. This order is a super-order 
between—so to speak—super-concepts. Whereas, of 
course, if the words ‗language‘, ‗experience‘ ‗world‘ have 
a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words 
‗table‘,  ‗lamp‘, ‗door‘. (P.I.97) 
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Here we see how the later Wittgenstein refuses the search for essences, 
and moves away from searching for purity and exactness.  He looks at 
everyday language and finds it functioning without the need for essences. 
Hallett discusses sources of essentialism in the history of philosophy.  
The first is the deceptive analogies in language.  He writes: ‗No surface 
parallel is closer, more evident, or more universal than that between 
instances of one and the same word and its repeated occurrences.‘ (Hallett 
1991, p. 127)  We see many leaves and to each attribute the label ‗leaf‘, as 
if it were a proper name:  
This roughly means, we are looking at words as though 
they all were proper names, and we then confuse the bearer 
of a name with the meaning of a name. (Wittgenstein, 
1969a, The Blue Book, p. 18) 
 Proper names designate single referents and this use stands out more 
clearly than use of general terms.  Hallett points out that philosophers have 
a ‗penchant for generalisation‘ and prefer sharp and univocal terms.  If the 
question posed in the Thaetetus had been ‗What are knowledges?‘, the 
corresponding answer would have signalled variety and diversity rather 
than univocity. Hallett notes William James‘ remark that the philosopher 
is temperamentally attracted to the ultra abstract. (Hallett 1991, p. 160). 
The desire for a unified systematic understanding favours essences on 
which a rigorous and exact structure can be built. There is contagion from 
the prestige of the exact sciences such as mathematics to philosophy.  The 
early Wittgenstein, in common with Frege and Russell, was steeped in 
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mathematics and logic.  He had to step outside the Cambridge climate, in 
which the weighted question ‗What exactly do you mean?‘ was all-
important.  The austere Wittgenstein also had to abandon his own early 
passion for simplicity21  to realise that ‗Only in the stream of thought and 
life do words have meaning.‘ (Wittgenstein, 1967, Zettel 173)  The 
meaning in the stream of thought and life is not clear-cut, but has ‗blurred 
edges‘.  Instead of a crystalline structure of ideas there is a diversity of 
concepts, criss-crossing over each other. 
The following remark expresses Wittgenstein‘s anti-essentialism, but 
it also poses a problem for those whose experience is not wholly (or even 
partly) captured in language: 
Es ist uns, als müßten wir die Erscheinungen 
durchschauen: unsere Untersuchung aber richtet sich nicht 
auf die Erscheinungen sondern, wie man sagen könnte, auf 
die ‚Möglichkeiten’ der Erscheinungen.  Wir besinnen uns, 
heißt das, auf die Art der Aussagen, die wie über des 
Erscheinungen machen. (P.I.90) 
We feel as though we had to see through,22 phenomena: our 
investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, 
but towards the possibilities of phenomena.  We remind 
                                                 
21
 ‗The solution to all my questions must be extremely simple.‘ (Wittgenstein (1979) 
Notebooks 1914-1916,  p.7) 
22
 In the sense of grasp. 
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ourselves, of the kind of statement that we make about 
phenomena. (P.I.90) 
In focusing on the kind of statement, what is said out (Aussagen) about 
phenomena, Wittgenstein blends language into phenomena without gap or 
residue.  Experience of phenomena emerges in language. Thus, there can 
be no acknowledgement of difference in experience which is ‗written out‘ 
of the language used.  Keeping and seeking words in their original home 
allows no space for resistance by female language users whose experience 
may match ill with the language used, whose experience is suppressed, 
rather than being socially mediated through language.  
 Naomi Scheman explores difficulties with the concept of a form 
of life, which is important to Wittgenstein‘s resemblance model.  She 
describes ‗unease‘ in language, focusing on internal diversity in forms of 
life. (Scheman, 1996, discussed below) She links the incapacity to say 
what one means to powerlessness.  The language game does not measure 
up to differentiated experience. Scheman writes of differences within the 
form of life through a narrative of grieving, showing the different 
locations of a homosexual and a heterosexual.  This sense of a 
differentiated relation between language and experience, which I develop 
below, is lacking in Wittgenstein.  I examine Wittgenstein‘s resemblance 
theory to see whether because of this resemblance theory entails 
conservatism about social concepts.  If I accept resemblance theory as a 
sound alternative to essentialism, have I made any space for change and 
evolution which are important to the feminist project? 
 66 
A problem with resemblance theory is what might be termed a 
ripple outward effect.  If there is no essence at the centre, what is there to 
hold a language game together? Although Wittgenstein does not spell out 
the relation between language games and forms of life, a good candidate 
for the task of holding language games of phenomena together, is the form 
of life of the language-user. I ask whether the form of life of the language-
user is an unquestioned pre-theoretical given, or whether this would be an 
excessively quietist understanding of Wittgenstein‘s idea of a form of life. 
As part of his attack on essentialism, Wittgenstein advises us to ask 
‗is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is 
its original home? (seine Heimat).’ (P.I.116)  The word ‗Heimat’ has 
many layers of meaning. The idea of the ‗home‘ of words may seem to be 
returning words to the form of life to which they belong in a way that 
takes a step in the conservative direction.  Wittgenstein‘s phrase ‗seine 
Heimat’ carries a more intense sense than the phrase ‗his home‘.  The 
word ‗Heimat’ carries a sense of belonging, a sense of affiliation. For 
everyday use, the phrase for going home is ‗gehen zu Haus’. A ‗Heimat‘ 
might be a home country thought of from abroad, or a native land.  It 
carries very much the English idea of ‗home‘ as contrasted with ‗house‘, 
but this is more marked in German.  The idea of a ‗Heimat’ is linked to 
notions of ‗homeland‘ and to the German Romantic tradition.  It also 
contains the sense of environment, for example, plants thrive best in the 
correct ‗Heimat’.  ‗Heimlich’ also means ‗concealed‘ or ‗secret‘, whereas 
its opposite ‘unheimlich’ is generally translated as ‗uncanny’. (I explore 
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the connections between the home and secrets in my chapter on narrative 
identity.)  The little acknowledged tensions in our ideas of ‗home‘ and 
‗homely‘ are built into the term ‗Heimat’.  
Wittgenstein‘s criticism is that the language of essence and 
universals had wrenched words from where they belonged, from their 
proper environment and placed them in alien surroundings. Wittgenstein‘s 
attachment to the idea that words are best used where they are at home 
creates a problem.  The original home may not be the cottage with roses 
round the door, but may be a restricting environment.  Like many women I 
am suspicious of ideas of ‗house and home‘ as being inherently 
traditionalist, and of nostalgia for home concealing nostalgia for an 
authoritarian order.23 The artificially restricted environment that is the 
                                                 
23
 In her essay, ‗House and Home: Feminist Variations on a Theme‘, Iris Marion Young 
provides an excellent philosophical discussion of the ambiguous value of home, drawing 
on, inter alia, Heidegger, Irigaray and de Beauvoir.  She discusses experiences and 
values of the home, exploring how the home is part of the cultural condition of the 
feminine. She concludes ‗Home is a complex ideal …. I agree with those critics of home 
who see it as a nostalgic longing for an impossible security and comfort, a longing bought 
at the expense of women and of those constructed as Others, strangers, not-home, in 
order to secure this fantasy of a unified identity.  But I have also argued that the idea of 
home and the practices of home-making support personal and collective identity in a 
more fluid and material sense, and that recognising this value entails also recognising the 
creative value of the often unnoticed work that many women do.  Despite the real dangers 
of romanticising home, I think there are also dangers in turning our backs on home.‘ 
(pp.153-4) Throughout the essay Young demonstrates understanding of the female at 
home, but she focuses mainly on the home as a site of the interaction between a man and 
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‗home‘ of the concept ‗woman‘ might well be a traditionalist female 
biology or ‗female nature‘. My problem is to avoid conservatism while 
still retaining the usefulness of resemblance theory as an alternative to 
essentialism.   
Scheman  
Naomi Scheman‘s ‗Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground‘ 
(Scheman, 1996a) addresses the question of changes in meanings, and the 
possibility of a worrying conservatism in resemblance theory.  She 
explores ‗unease‘ in language, focusing on internal diversity in forms of 
life.  Scheman asks: 
If it is only against the background of shared practices and 
shared judgements that doubt can be intelligible, (how) can 
we register, let alone argue for, disapprobation of a form of 
life, whether it be one in which we are enmeshed (making 
our attempted critique self-refuting) or one to which we are 
alien (making our critique, referentially, off the mark)? 
(1996a, p. 384) 
As Scheman notes, feminist theory, in particular the work of Elizabeth 
Spelman (1996), has taught wariness of a generic ‗we‘, such as she herself 
                                                                                                                         
a woman, or a woman and the house in which she dwells.  Although she is herself a 
mother, in her autobiographical interlude, Young writes as a daughter, telling of her 
mother‘s difficulties in maintaining a family home, rather than on herself as a mother at 
home.  (Young, 2005, pp.123-154) 
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uses in the quotation above, as the generic ‗we‘ has often disguised the 
generic masculine.  Those marginal to the dominant tradition in 
masculinity are not included.  As she points out in a cogent criticism, this 
‗we‘ means little to ‗those who stand little chance of being heard or who 
have to choose between saying what they mean and saying what those in 
power can understand.‘ (Scheman, 1996a, p. 389) Her crucial phrase is the 
idea of disapprobation of a form of life.  On the reading of Wittgenstein 
that a form of life is an unquestioned pre-theoretical given, patently it is 
impossible to register disapprobation of it.  Scheman‘s essay investigates 
dis-ease, or unease in language games, and inquires whether such 
discomfort can fall within a Wittgensteinian approach.  She writes: 
 We can come to identify our sense of dis-ease with what 
we do as calling not for a repudiation of human practice in 
favour of something independent of it, but for a change in 
that practice, a change that begins with a politically 
conscious placing of ourselves within, but somewhere on 
the margins of, a form of life. (p. 387)  
 She now makes clear that the work of expressing disapprobation of shared 
practices and shared judgements is a political task, but one that 
Wittgenstein did not see it as his duty to undertake.  Although, Scheman 
states, Wittgenstein may be considered a marginal figure in that he was 
Jewish and homosexual,24 and also self-exiled from his native Austria, he 
                                                 
24
 Perhaps Scheman is missing a more complex picture. Monk‘s biography gives a more 
nuanced version, including an account of his romantic friendship with Marguerite 
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did not explore the viewpoint of the marginalised. (Perhaps he did not 
regard this as part of his philosophical work.)  Whereas privilege and 
marginality are often opposed, Scheman‘s strategy is to create an 
alternative ‗we‘ by creating a position of privileged marginality, in order 
to consider changing the ‗homes‘ to which words need to be brought back.  
Thinking from the margins of a form of life enables one to take a critical 
attitude to the ‗homes‘ of words within that form of life. Her approach of 
finding different locations in a form of life aims at acknowledging 
sameness-in-difference without invoking essence.  I am in sympathy with 
Scheman‘s emphasis on the dis-ease or unease that we often feel in forms 
of expression.   
As an example, Scheman investigates the form of life which 
includes grieving for the dead from such a privileged marginal position.  
Drawing on Harvey Fierstein‘s film Torch Song Trilogy (Fierstein, 1988), 
she explores the grief of a mother and her homosexual son.  In the film, 
the wife grieves for her husband.  In the same cemetery, with the same 
ritual words and gestures, her son, Arnold, grieves for his homosexual 
partner, Alan, but  his  mother is ‗furious‘ at the son and ‗at what she 
correctly perceives to be his sense of commonality in their losses.‘ 
(Scheman, 1996a, p. 392)  The film points up the similarity between a 
heterosexual character grieving for a lost partner, and a homosexual 
                                                                                                                         
Respinger. (Monk 1990, pp. 238-40) As Wittgenstein did not describe himself as 
homosexual, I am reluctant to agree with Scheman‘s description.    
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character, grieving for a lost partner, against the background of the 
mother‘s lack of acceptance that this is the same grief. 
The film illustrates the internal diversity of the form of life of 
grieving.  This internal diversity is not evident in the spoken or acted ritual 
of grieving but is evident in Arnold‘s practice.  Arnold ‗parses marriage 
and family differently, and, in so doing sees the same.‘ (Scheman, 1996a, 
p. 395)  He follows different grammatical rules for the meaning of 
‗marriage‘ and ‗family‘, but in so doing still sees the same relationship 
between himself and his lover, as between his mother and her husband.  
Scheman suggests that to recognise what Arnold feels as grief, the pattern 
we need to attend to is not the pattern of the ritual at the cemetery, but the 
pattern created by the background, history, context, and the ‗stage-setting‘ 
of his grief.  The space of the form of life which includes grieving for 
one‘s partner has margins from which the observer can see the pattern 
which emerges through the mother‘s practice, but also a differentiated 
pattern emerging from Arnold‘s practice.  Wittgenstein brings us to see 
that ‗Grief describes a pattern which repeats (wiederkehrt), with different 
variations, in the tapestry of our life (Lebensteppich)‘.25 (P.I., p. 174)  
Scheman accepts that there are different variations on the pattern of grief, 
but she insists that there is more to grief than variations.  
                                                 
25
 My translation, ‗Teppich‘, tapestry or carpet, relates to the verb ‗steppen‘ to stitch or to 
quilt.  Anscombe‘s translation, ‗a pattern that recurs in the weave of our life‘ conveys the 
activity of stitching, but loses the technical sense of a pattern-repeat in a piece of 
material. 
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 But there are occasions on which it can be important not to 
accept that we differ, but to argue about which set of 
attitudes is in some way better or more appropriate.  The set 
of attitudes the film presents as to be preferred is that which 
does not require a minimising of differences as the price for 
a recognition of commonality. (Scheman, 1996a, p. 396)   
For Scheman, it is inappropriate to seek consensus on this – rather from 
her position of privileged marginality she wants to unsettle the sense that 
there is a ‗we‘, a consensus which may or may not recognise Arnold‘s 
grieving.  She does not want to bring the idea of grieving for one‘s partner 
home, rather she wants to disrupt the home to which grieving is brought.  
Her political solution is to recommend a ‗diasporic conception of home‘: 
There are no other homes for our words than the ones we 
create in and through our practices, nor any predetermined 
ways of specifying what it is to have gotten those practices 
right, but that does not mean that there is no sense to the 
idea that we might not be going on as we should be. 
(Scheman, 1996a, p. 402) 
If we think of ourselves as ‗outsiders within‘ our forms of life we 
can engage in the ‗work of world repair‘, and make new diasporic homes 
for our words.  In bringing in the idea of the outside and inside of a form 
of life, she introduces the notion of a central usage of words in a form of 
life.   But, importantly for Scheman, a centre can be a shifting, diasporic, 
centre. Such a notion may involve a notion of ‗essence‘, but such an 
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‗essence‘ could be a shifting essence. Thus, Scheman claims that her 
political reading is responsible to the later Wittgenstein, but is not 
identical to that which she finds  in Wittgenstein.   
Luntley‘s paper, ‗Patterns, Particularism and Seeing the 
Similarity‘, provides a reading of resemblance theory which is helpful 
here. 26 (Luntley, 2002)  I explore some points from this paper before 
reconsidering Scheman‘s problem of grief.  Luntley begins by 
acknowledging that there are patterns in language use. (Luntley, 2002, p. 
3) The patterns form when we see similarities between phenomena which 
appear in language.  The seeing of similarities does not entail a ripple 
outward effect because there is normativity to patterns of word use.  The 
normative patterns of correct use of words emerge from the activity of 
seeing similarities.  There is a correctness about use of words but this 
correctness does not come from a transcendental standard, but is 
immanent in our practices which underpin our use of words.  Engaging in 
practices and seeing similarities are integral to each other.  We cannot 
articulate the patterns which drive the seeing of similarities, but ‗this is 
not ignorance‘, what we know is, for example, that these and similar 
things are called games.  We create the pattern for the use of the word 
‗games‘ as we play games and use the word ‗games‘. (Luntley, 2002, pp. 
5-6) 
                                                 
26
 All further quotation from Luntley is taken from this paper.  The paper I have used 
precedes a shorter published version of these ideas, in a section entitled ‗Spontaneity in 
Particular Circumstances‘, pp. 83-88, in Luntley (2003) Wittgenstein: Meaning and 
Judgment.  
 74 
Since there is no general rule, the seeing of similarities in particular 
instances must be self-authenticating.  How do we know that what we see 
as similar is, in reality, similar?  Wittgenstein undercuts the question by 
averring that ‗to use a word without justification does not mean to use it 
without right.‘ (P.I.289)  So the normativity drawn from the practices 
which make up the form of life of the agent holds the pattern together, but 
holds it as a web which can be spun into different shapes, not a 
gladiatorial net which entraps us: 
the language user is in charge, for it is the language user 
with the capacity to see similarities, to make wise 
discriminations and find saliences in things that is the 
source of the patterns of language use. This is still realism 
about patterns, but the condition for the possibility of 
patterns of correct use is not the existence of transcendent 
patterns, it is the existence of active language users, judges 
with the capacity to see similarities in things. (Luntley, 
2002, p. 10) 
The agent within her form of life may judge that two things are 
similar and create an addition to the pattern.  She is not simply responding 
to established practices, obeying set norms; she is also creating the norms 
in her practices.  We think of Wittgenstein as being opposed to the idea of 
interpretation,27 but this opposition is to the form of interpretation that is 
                                                 
27
 P.I.201 concludes ‗But we ought to restrict the term ‗interpretation‘ to the substitution 
of one expression of the rule for another.‘ 
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akin to measurement against a rule.  If we free the idea of interpretation of 
reality from the measure, and think of it more as seeing similarities which 
are not given in advance of our practice, then there is still a place for 
interpretation.  Language does not dictate how we see reality.  To use 
Luntley‘s expression, we ‗couple with‘ our form of life, our environment, 
our practices.28 (p. 12) As beings with will, we couple with an 
environment without will.  The next step in the argument is to make a 
division between ‗acquiring a technique‘ which implies stasis and 
conservatism, and learning correct judgements which is more malleable 
and open-ended. (p. 13) Wittgenstein writes:  
what one acquires here is not a technique; one learns 
correct judgements.  There are also rules, but they do not 
form a system and only experienced people can apply them 
right. (P.I., p. 277) 
 Learning to make judgements is a cognitive virtue that does not come 
from learning how to follow a rule.  Making judgements brings experience 
to bear on patterns that exist in a form of life.  This will be shown in my 
continuing example of grief. 
 Wittgenstein says: 
‗Grief‘ describes a pattern which repeats, with different 
variations in the tapestry of our life.  If a man‘s bodily 
                                                 
28
 Luntley‘s phrase ‗couple with‘ has perhaps connotations of sexual coupling, and 
mastery, that are not helpful to his argument. 
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expression of sorrow or joy alternated, say with the ticking 
of a clock, here we should not have the characteristic 
formation of the pattern of sorrow or of the pattern of joy. 
(P.I. p.174 corr.)   
When I grieve, or identify someone else as grieving, there are patterns of 
words that I use, expressions I adopt, practices in which I engage.  I am 
not at a loss to make this identification in my own case, or somebody 
else‘s, because in my society there is a normal way of behaving, of 
speaking, of acting from which emerges my understanding of the term 
‗grieving‘.  I could point out to a child who was unfamiliar with the 
pattern, features of grieving – but there would always be more 
manifestations of grief that I did not cover, more varieties of the pattern 
which emerged as society changes.  If the child did not understand me, I 
might say she was too young to understand, that she was too young to 
catch on to what is meant by grieving.  Equally I would know that the 
child had caught on to the meaning, if she did not expect instant 
cheerfulness, a change as rapid and automatic as the ticking of a clock, 
from someone recently bereaved.  Once the child has caught on, she 
knows what is normal and can make a pattern of meaning from various 
aspects of behaviour, which is all I can do.  The instances are self-
authenticating to anyone who has caught on to the pattern.  
  Yet the child‘s learning is not an automatic response.  As a human, 
she has a purposeful will, and already is attuning her agency to her 
experience.  The pattern is not fixed.  This is not a process of correction in 
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which expressions of grief are first at home, and then change as a result of 
criticism.  We cannot desire a new pattern of language use before it 
emerges from our experience.  Expressions of grief are always potentially 
changing, but this capacity for transformation may be ignored.  Patterns of 
grieving may sediment and become familiar. The process of sedimentation 
is not however a process of solidification.  Expression is fixed only 
temporally, as the conventions making up a form of life are intrinsically 
arbitrary. 
The problem which faces Arnold in Scheman‘s filmic example of 
Torch Song Trilogy is precisely the problem of justification.  His mother 
does not think that he is justified in the language he uses.  She says ‗I‘m 
reciting Kaddish [the important Jewish prayer for the dead] for my 
husband; you‘re blaspheming your religion.‘ (Scheman, 1996a, p. 392)  
When the son replies that he is doing what his mother is doing, she does 
not see the similarity that he sees.  For Arnold, the heterosexual 
community has enabled him to develop the learned responses of grieving, 
he has caught on to what it is to grieve, but the community is not 
constitutive of his responses. Arnold engages in a transformative activity.  
A new pattern emerges as he mourns, in what he says and does.  He is 
empowered as a speaker-agent.  His decision to recite the Kaddish is not a 
result of training in the form of life of his community.  He is attuning his 
agency as a language-user to a new context of public Jewish mourning for 
a homosexual lover.  As he makes his willed judgement the practice itself 
transforms.  He exercises a more discriminative form of attention to his 
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own situation.  His perception is honed so that he can attend to similarities 
between his grief and his mother‘s.  He makes a judgement against that of 
the heterosexual community of the time, and, for most of us, in the 
distance since 1988, when the film was made, the son‘s judgement is right.  
  Yet in the film, Arnold is unable to justify himself before his 
mother.  The mother is measuring her activity against a scale of ‗true 
grief‘.  She is applying a technique, rather than exercising judgement, not 
in that she is adopting a ritual, but in that she is not looking at the history, 
the context, the background of Arnold‘s grief. She is not looking at the 
loving practices in which he has been engaged, she is simply measuring 
him against the heterosexual norm of acceptable religious practices of 
grief.  She is seeing him, and indeed herself, as markers within the 
environment in which they exist, rather than looking at the practices of 
their lives from which their griefs emerge. 
For Arnold, as for Wittgenstein, ‗to use a word without 
justification does not mean to use it without right.‘ (P.I.289)  He places 
himself as ‗author of patterns of similarities‘.  He does not accept a 
passive role towards the criteria of grieving. His self-authenticating novel 
practice of reading Kaddish for his homosexual lover is bringing in what 
Luntley calls ‗the activity of interpretation‘ (Luntley 2000, p. 9) to the rule 
of what constitutes grief, of what are the appropriate grieving practices.  In 
failing to recognise this, the mother places herself as lacking in 
experience, or of deriving less meaning from her experience.  She has 
taken the rules to form a system, a system which excluded the real grief of 
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her son for his lover.  By contrast, Arnold demonstrates the ability to draw 
from his experience.  His experience leads him to extend the range of the 
rule.  In Luntley‘s terms, the son is keeping the community at bay, trusting 
his judgement of similarities.  Patterns of grieving are part of our form of 
life.  Learning through experience to make judgements is all that we have 
to enable us to discriminate between expressions of grieving.  Arnold 
extends the practice of grieving beyond what is accepted by his mother.  
Once the rule is malleable and open-ended there might be the objection 
that any minor loss could be described as grieving.  The answer is to 
return to practice.  The agent herself, who makes discriminations in her 
affections, is the brake on endless open-ness.  The task of the agent is to 
pay attention to word use so that meaning does not sediment becoming 
either too narrowly fixed, or too widely applied. 
To return to the problem of disapprobation that Scheman poses.  In 
my reading influenced by Luntley, expressing unease with or 
disapprobation of patterns of language is part of the activity of using 
language.  The concept of attunement is important.  The better-judging 
agent is more attuned to her own and others‘ experience.  Norms of use 
are not fixed.  They are immanent to use, but the use is changing, as 
experience changes.  A form of life is an evolving set of practices.  
Integrally, our use of words is elastic enough to evolve.  The agent is not 
trapped in the similarities that others see, nor trapped in a conservative 
given.  The agent who may make more or less creative judgments, who 
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may be discriminating and perceptive, who is more or less attuned to her 
experience, is integral to resemblance theory. 
Still, there is an inversion here.  Scheman writes from her position 
of ‗privileged marginality‘ to offer a space for those who are not so much 
at home in language, whose inchoate experience cannot and does not 
always find a home in language.  In her version she places Arnold as less 
at home, and the mother as occupying the ‗home‘ of language, acting 
within convention.  Arnold is unable to explain his mourning to her, 
unable to explain his sameness-in-difference, but he is able to mourn 
through reciting the Kaddish.  My new reading changes their positions so 
that Arnold becomes the well-judging agent, evolving language use, and 
the mother becomes the weaker agent, deludedly taking arbitrary rules to 
form a system which she cannot contravene.  She is the one barred by a 
sense of difference from sympathy for her son.  Maybe now the inchoate 
experience is hers.  The practices of her family life and her religion are 
rocked by the sight of Arnold reciting the Kaddish.  Her role has been to 
maintain these familiar practices (to safeguard the sedimentation) and her 
response to the transformation is anger.  In focusing on Arnold‘s changing 
use of language, we should not lose sight of the form of life of the mother, 
to whom stability and well-worn practice may be valuable.  In virtue of 
her many years as a mother, her attunement to her society is, in this 
instance, at odds with her son‘s.  She wills continuity of mourning 
practices whereas he wills change. 
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My position follows Scheman in that I agree that patterns of 
language use are as fluid and shifting as the sets of (normative) practices 
which give rise to them. Her ‗political‘ reading introduces a problem of 
speechlessness within forms of life, which Wittgenstein overlooked, but 
which is important to my re-instatement of the language games of 
mothering.  I continue my engagement with Scheman in my exploration of 
the language games of embodied difference later in this chapter.   
The Feminist Debate on Essentialism 
I move on to trace some moments in the essentialism/anti-
essentialism debate within feminist thought, before explaining a 
Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach, and showing how Scheman 
makes use of such an approach.   
For some time feminist theory has seemed caught on the 
horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, there are those who – 
recognizing differences amongst women – end by denying 
any form of female identity.  On the other hand, there are 
those who – supposing male/female difference overrides 
other differences – look for a female ‗sameness‘ or 
‗essence‘ based either on nature or on shared work or life 
practices. (Battersby, 1998, p. 16) 
The role of the consciousness raising groups in the early stages of 
what Shulamith Firestone (Firestone, 1970), in an essentializing move, 
called Second Wave Feminism, may be seen as an insistence on the 
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universal female, and an emphasising of the contrast of this universal with 
the universal male.  The political, legal and educational recognition of the 
different experiences and desires of the newly articulate women reinforced 
the sense of the universality of their experiences, placed in opposition to 
male experiences.  The white middle-class feminist is (unfairly) portrayed 
by anti-essentialists as projecting her experience of her conflict with 
patriarchy and her desires for liberation as essential to women.  Some of 
the great texts of Second Wave Feminism, Betty Friedan‘s The Feminine 
Mystique (Friedan, 1963), Mary Daly‘s Gyn/Ecology (Daly, 1978) were, 
in a sense, offering an answer to the question, ‗What is a woman?‘, 
understood on Platonic lines as requiring an answer revealing essence.  As 
DiQuinzio points out, although feminist writers of the 1960s and 1970s 
rely on different theoretical frameworks, their critiques of mothering are 
similarly essentialist, based on the viewpoint of the white middle-class 
mother seeking more individual ‗freedom‘. (DiQuinzio, 1999, p. 63)  
Cavarero criticises this move:  
 Adding woman to Man, however, means duplicating the 
representation of the universal without freeing oneself 
whatsoever from its abstract valence, without abandoning 
whatsoever the ancient error of metaphysics … woman 
can still be nothing but all women precisely because it is 
none of them. (Cavarero, 2000, p. 49) 
  The 1970s also saw the birth of ‗difference feminism‘ which 
changed the emphasis of difference while keeping within the essentialist 
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paradigm.  It explained the meaning of differences between men and 
women in terms of the depths of women‘s oppression.  For example, Carol 
Gilligan showed how female responses to moral dilemmas were ignored 
and unheard in male evaluations of moral development, and how this led 
to an undervaluing of ‗female‘ moral qualities such as the ability to care 
for others. (Gilligan, 1990)29  In addition, a further variety of feminism, 
standpoint feminism suggested that a woman‘s viewpoint gave her a 
privileged and valuable insight into society.30  This form of feminism 
emphasised the value of local, situated knowledges. 
As ever with essentialism the problem was exclusions.  Lesbian, 
working class, women of colour felt silenced by a theory of themselves as 
women to which they felt alien.  The accusation was that the experiences 
of privileged white women were taken as normative and universal thus 
repeating the gesture of the universal man who actually told the story of 
the ‗straight, white, Judeo-Christian, heterosexual man of property 
…‘.(Spivak 1997, p. 19)  bell hooks (hooks, 1984) raised issues of 
exclusion and marginality in her critique of Friedan‘s (1963) The 
Feminine Mystique.  (cited in Heyes, 2000, p. 21)  Her telling example 
was the American white women‘s enthusiasm for abandoning childcare in 
favour of employment, which involved the continuing subordination of 
black women, and prevented them from fulfilling their desire to spend 
                                                 
29
  Carol Gilligan first published In a Different Voice in 1982.  She produced a revised 
edition in 1990.  She changed from use of the term ‗female‘ to ‗feminine‘, indicating that 
the term ‗feminine‘ can include men.  
30
 Standpoint feminism is also discussed in Chapter 6. 
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time with their children.  Another important voice for the differing history 
and experience of North American black mothers is Patricia Collins.  She 
insists on the neglected importance of the mother‘s struggle for her 
survival and that of her children, emphasising social structures of racial 
domination and economic exploitation. Her intention is to shift the 
predominantly white context of feminist theory so that feminists become 
more aware of the history from which feminist theory emerges, and so as 
to prioritise accommodating diversity. (Collins, 1994, pp. 49-62) 
Elizabeth Spelman‘s Inessential Woman (1988) offered a critique 
of earlier feminism, and engaged with anti-essentialism.  The anti-
essentialist position espouses recognition of internal differentiation 
between women.  It disowns the idea of core properties and sees identity 
as shifting and fluid.  Inessential Woman made clear that the concept of an 
essence to the female, to which were added attributes such as that of class 
or race, was a failure of the philosophical imagination.  For Spelman, 
gender is always inflected by other differences among women.  She 
satirised identity politics as ‗pop bead‘ metaphysics, in which individual 
identity was seen as a composite of the separable elements of gender, 
race, class, sexuality. (cited in Heyes, 2000, p. 23) Anti-essentialism is 
against uniting on the basis of shared identity, whatever that identity 
might be.  Anti-essentialist feminism is a feminism which claims to 
displace ‗woman-as-different-from-man‘ by the notion of internally 
differentiated and historically instantiated women. (Schor and Weed, 
1994, p. 45)  Some feminist theorists, such as the lesbian theorist, Shane 
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Phelan, have responded to this by insisting on their marginal identity. 
(Phelan, 1989) This is itself controversial as other writers, such as Simone 
de Beauvoir, were publicly heterosexual, but privately lesbian. There is a 
danger of an endless multiplication of voices so that feminism as a 
widespread movement is deprived of political force. 
 An influential example of anti-essentialist critique is Lugones and 
Spelman‘s ‗Have We Got a Theory for You! Cultural Imperialism, and the 
Demand for ―The Woman‘s Voice‖.‘ (Lugones and Spelman, 1986)  They 
agree with the feminist contention that women are systematically silenced.  
But they think that only those women who feel secure in other aspects of 
their identity such as their race or class are likely to conceive of their 
voices as expressing ‗woman‘s voice‘.  In her Hispana voice, Lugones 
asserts that feminist theory does not account for the split she feels between 
a concern for herself as a woman and concern for herself as Hispanic, a 
displaced person.  For her, theory is only useful if it relates to the location 
the subject finds herself in, and only if it offers opportunities for resistance 
and change.  She emphasises that white/Anglo feminist theorists need to 
learn the text of the many different cultures they have disrupted, criticised 
and scrutinised; need to understand varying  lives in diverse communities 
of which they are not part.  The feminist theorist needs to abandon her 
ready-made theories in order to ‗have a stake in us and in our world‘. 
(Lugones and Spelman, 1986, p. 19) The importance of this article lies in 
its stress on the multifariousness of identity, the differences between 
women, and diversity of contexts for learning about women.  Heyes 
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describes this as looking ‗for commonalties and differences from within 
our own socially situated frameworks of understanding‘. (2000, p. 29) 
Instead of thinking of ‗woman‘ as a powerful concept with which to attack 
patriarchy, theorists are urged to see the value of a ‗humble use.‘ (P.I.197) 
Feminism became seen by post-modernists as an outdated 
‗modern‘ project to end the oppression of a human subject.  This same 
would-be autonomous subject was critiqued as phallocentric or 
logocentric, and women had the doubtful privilege of being placed as 
‗other‘ to the subject.  Woman became thus the negative of a discursively 
constructed and multiple, fragmented subject. 
‘Family Resemblances’ 
As described above, through encountering diversities of thought and 
life, feminist theory had to take stock and reform itself.  I make a parallel 
here between Wittgenstein‘s reform of his views, and the reform of 
feminist theory. Both changes were stimulated by noticing how language 
is used in the ‗stream of thought and life.‘(Wittgenstein, 1967, Zettel, 173)  
For Wittgenstein the abstract, general ideas of the Tractatus gave way to 
the emphasis on differences which marks his later work.  In his ‗family 
resemblance‘ approach he changed our understanding of the logical 
relationship between universals and particulars.  
 Whereas nominalists claimed that only words are universal 
and that things themselves are singular and individual, 
Wittgenstein got rid of the notion that words and names 
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function as universals – at least in the majority of cases. 
(Battersby, 1998, p. 32)  
The universal ‗woman‘ is one such synthesised universal formed from a 
series of family resemblances.  Anti-essentialist thinking took account of 
diversity at the cost of a dispersed de-politicised concept of woman; and 
failed to express any sense we might have of ourselves as women leading 
female lives.  To address this problem there is a need for a theoretical 
model which welcomes diversity but acknowledges a sameness: a model 
which enables thinking beyond the same/different binary. The aspiration is 
towards thinking which recognises the strength of the idea of essence, but 
is sensitive towards, and pays attention to differences between and 
‗within‘ women.  Neither the sameness nor the diversity is more 
fundamental.   
The fact of difference amongst women is not, as such, 
grounds for denying essence, since what ―essence‖ 
provides is a model of thinking sameness through 
difference. (Battersby 1998, p. 32) 
  Battersby advocates a fluid essence, and a morphic identity which 
emerges from changes in essence. 
Wittgenstein does not write on men and women.  The debate on 
Wittgenstein‘s anti-Platonic critique of essentialism takes place in 
malestream philosophy with little recognition of the feminist debate on 
essentialism.  Yet Wittgenstein is useful to the feminist debate in that he 
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provides an alternative to the language of universals and particulars, i.e. an 
alternative to the idea that all phenomena share a universal essence of 
which the varying particulars are instances.  In an ontological shift, he 
replaces this classic framework with the language of ‗family 
resemblances.‘  The empirical world is replaced by a real world of 
resemblances ‘vorstellt’, represented in a non-mimetic way, in language.  
He thought that empiricism suppressed the differences of particulars 
which resemble each other but are not identical.  Thus through using 
Wittgenstein we may find  an alternative to the idea that all women share a 
universal essence, a necessary and sufficient condition for membership of 
the class ‗women‘ of which individual women are instances.  In 
Wittgensteinian terms, what we can learn about essence we can learn from 
seeing how such concepts as ‗ female‘ or ‗mother‘ are positioned in 
language. 
Wittgenstein weaves together images of games, of colours, of ropes, 
of boundaries.  Wittgenstein writes: 
 Here we come up against the great question that lies 
behind all these considerations.—For someone might 
object against me: You take the easy way out! You talk 
about all sorts of language-games but you have nowhere 
said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of 
language, is: what is common to all these activities, and 
what makes them into language or parts of language. So 
you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that 
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once gave you yourself the most headache, the part about 
the  general form of propositions and of language. 
And this is true.—Instead of producing something common 
to all that we call language, I am saying that these 
phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us 
use the same word for all,—but that they are related to one 
another in many different ways.  And it is because of this 
relationship or these relationships, that we call them all 
‗language‘. (P.I.65)  
Here Wittgenstein‘s interlocutor makes the move of seeking 
something in common to language-games, supposing that whatever he 
finds in common will be the desired essence.  Wittgenstein changes the 
way of seeing in his reply.  He uses the example of games.  He 
immediately substitutes the idea of relationship between language games 
for the idea of a series of distinct features of phenomena.  He moves on to 
suggest that the interlocutor has a mistaken attitude to the problem.  He is 
thinking, not looking (denk nicht, sondern schau P.I.66).  Wittgenstein 
adopts the voice of a friendly adviser.  He seeks to persuade the reader as a 
child or friend is persuaded.  The interlocutor is supposing there ‗must be 
something common (gemeinsam) or they would not be called ‗games‘.  
Wittgenstein says the interlocutor must look and see (schau) that there is 
nothing in common but a series of similarities, relationships.  
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  This seemingly simple instruction to the interlocutor actually 
carries a weight of meaning.  Wittgenstein is remarking that we impose on 
games a universal essence which is not apparent in the phenomena 
themselves.  Because the same word is used for various games we think 
that there must be something the same about them.  Our habits of thought 
lead us away from what we see.  Wittgenstein offers instances of very 
many different games. He writes of classes of games: board-games, card-
games, ball-games, round-games; and also reminds us of instances such as 
chess and noughts and crosses.  He says that looking will not reveal 
anything in common.  What we find instead, if we change our way of 
looking, is a ‗complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.‘ 
(P.I.66) 
In P.I.67 he introduces the new image of the family: 
I can think of no better expression to characterise those 
similarities than ‗family resemblances‘; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap 
and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say ‗games‘ 
form (bilden) a family. 
The verb ‘bilden’ is important here.  ‗Bilden‘ means to shape or form, as 
an education, ‘Bildung’ might shape or form a person‘s mind.  So in 
Wittgenstein‘s image of the family resemblance one point is that the 
resemblance forms, shapes itself as we see the family members.  There is 
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no essence to the family features; there is not a physical or psychological 
trait which can be sought out.  Rather in looking at the family members 
the resemblance which denotes the relationship emerges, as it were, before 
our eyes.  Wittgenstein wants to extend the way we might ‗pick up‘ a 
similarity between a niece and her aunt to our way of ‗picking up‘ 
language-games.  We have no preconceived idea of the similarity.  It 
strikes us, as we say, as we see the two together.   
Stern explains this as ‗sporadic resemblances‘ or a ‗polythetic 
method‘ in which members of the same class share a number of common 
characteristics, without any of these being essential for membership of the 
group or class in question. (Stern, 1992, p. 368) Wittgenstein moves on to 
the image of a rope: 
 in which the strength of the thread does not reside in the 
fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but 
in the overlapping of many fibres. (P.I.67)  
There is nothing holding together the various uses of the word ‗games‘, 
except the overlapping and criss-crossing between the various uses.  
Wittgenstein thus makes a case for understanding the relationship between 
universals and particulars differently.  Our error is to seek out particulars 
in order to create a universal out of what the particulars have in common.  
Classes of games are limited universals in the sense that particular games 
can be grouped under them, but the grouping comes from resemblances, 
not common properties.  
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In looking for resemblances we make redundant the idea of sharp 
boundaries (Grenzen) between concepts.  The concept of a boundary has a 
significant place in the language games of feminist theory.  Feminists have 
attempted to change the boundary between men and women (Friedan, 
Firestone); have insisted on this boundary (Gilligan); have felt themselves 
excluded by the boundary of white middle-classness (bell hooks); have 
insisted in the boundary of themselves as black (Hill Collins) or lesbian 
(Phelan); have opposed the idea of a boundary of the self (Spelman, 
Schor). 
  Wittgenstein attacks the presupposition that boundaries are fixed in 
advance and rigid.  If we need a definition of something like a game we 
can make one, for a ‗special purpose‘. (P.I.69) We are able to use the word 
‗game‘ quite well without a sharp definition.  We are able to continue a 
series; judge what counts as a game and what does not; have a rough and 
yet adequate sense of the meaning of the term.  We do not pin the word 
‗game‘ exactly edge to edge to the concept ‗game‘, we see likenesses 
(Ähnlichkeiten) between phenomena and use the term ‗game‘.  It is a 
concept ‗with blurred edges‘. (P.I.66)  We do not ‗know the boundaries 
because none have been drawn.‘ (P.I.69) The lack of exactness does not 
deprive the language of meaning.  There is no deeper level of exactness, 
though we may be exact for a special purpose.  Being exact for a special 
purpose might be part of an empirical investigation.  The danger of the 
empirical investigation is that it deals in generalisations and has a 
‗contemptuous attitude towards the particular case.‘ (Stern, 1992, p. 369)  
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Wittgenstein thought that the empirical denied differences between 
particulars, and that it also occluded resemblances in favour of an 
exactness desired for the purpose of empiricism. 
In P.I.72 Wittgenstein returns to the idea of ‗Seeing what is 
common’, using the image of colours: 
Suppose I shew someone various multi-coloured pictures, 
and say: ‗The colour you see in all these is called ―yellow 
ochre‖ ‘.—This is a definition, and the other will get to 
understand it by looking for and seeing what is common to 
the pictures.  Then he can look at, can point to, the 
common thing. 
Compare with this a case in which I shew him figures of 
different shapes all painted in the same colour, and say: 
‗What these have in common is called ―yellow ochre‖ .‘ 
And compare this case: I shew him samples of different 
shades of blue and say: ‗The colour that is common to all 
these is what I call ―blue‖.‘ 
These examples are teaching us about different ways of seeing.  In 
the first instance Wittgenstein teaches the meaning of ‗yellow ochre‘ by 
ostensive definition.  The interlocutor casts her eye all over the picture and 
is guided to the labelling of one colour by Wittgenstein.  After this she can 
pick out yellow ochre.  In the second example, which differs only slightly 
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from the first, the yellow ochre is not distinguished from other colours, but 
is a constant feature of changing shapes.  Here the interlocutor‘s eye is 
directed not at making differences between one colour and another, but at 
noticing the aspect of colour and ignoring the aspect of shape.  Here the 
interlocutor is instructed in what not to notice.  In the third example, 
Wittgenstein is showing how we form the idea of a universal.  
Wittgenstein shows the interlocutor various particular shades of blue.  He 
points out that what they have in common is that they are called blue.  In 
P.I.73 he goes on to show how having made this step, we are inclined to 
mislead ourselves.   
 One is now inclined to extend the comparison: to have 
understood the definition means to have in one‘s mind an 
idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or a picture.  
  We create for ourselves an abstract idea of blue, or an essence of 
blueness.  Language places the particulars of the world under general 
terms, shades of blue into blue, different leaves into leaf.  We invent for 
ourselves the idea of a pure green for a leaf, an essence of green, an 
abstract idea of leaf.  There might indeed be a pure green, but the point is 
the use of this imagined sample of green, or of leaf.  
  In response to an imagined critic who uses the (Kantian) notion of 
schemata to explain what is going on, Wittgenstein replies that the sample 
could ‗be understood as a schema’ which provides a rule for dealing with 
instances of green or of leaves.  But, for Wittgenstein rules are not 
invented but come out of practice.  Kantian schema are rules for the 
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application of images in such a way as to bring them in line with our 
concepts. However, in P.I.73, Wittgenstein insists that ‗schemata‘ do not 
provide the solution.   
When someone defines the names of colours for me by 
pointing to samples and saying  ‗This colour is called 
―blue‖, this ―green‖…..‘ this case can be compared in 
many respects to putting a table in my hands, with the 
words written under the colour samples.—Though this 
comparison may mislead in many ways.—One is now 
inclined to extend the comparison: to have understood the 
definition means to have in one‘s mind an idea of the thing 
defined, and that is a samples or a picture.  
 We choose to regard or treat certain abstract images as rule-
guiding schema.   We then mistakenly attribute an abstract idea of essence 
to these images.  Wittgenstein makes clear that this is not his idea in 
continuing his discussion by insisting on blurred contours.  
 If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not 
acknowledge it as the one that I too wanted to draw, or had 
drawn in my mind. (P.I.75) 
 The green in the sample is not sharply divided from other shades of green, 
as it would be if it contained the essence of ‗green-ness.‘  We do not check 
an instance of green against an abstract idea of green, but see 
resemblances between greens.  Such practices of employing samples are 
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so common and so obvious that they go unremarked, but the relationship 
becomes clear when there is a misunderstanding.  We see the relationship 
but we move from one practice to another without noticing the 
resemblance.  
  In the Preface31 to the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
writes: 
Und dies hing freilich mit der Natur der Untersuchung 
selbst zusammen.  Sie nämlich zwingt uns, ein weites 
Gedankengebeit, kreuz und quer, nach allen Richtungen 
hin zu durchreisen.  
And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of 
the investigation.  For this compels us to travel over a wide 
field of thought criss-cross in every direction.  
The German perhaps conveys more the sense of ‗travelling through‘ 
(durchreisen) and of the untracked nature of the quest over a daunting 
space (ein weites Gedankengebeit).  The English manages to convey a 
sense of command over the route, while the German suggests more a long 
travail.  Wittgenstein provides a sense that there are many more examples 
not given, that there are many paths left untaken.  Some resemblances 
appear even as the differences seem to cancel them out. An understanding 
cannot be reached by a process of eliminating differences, but rather by 
seeing relationships between differences in aspects of practice. 
                                                 
31
 The Preface pages are not numbered.  
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 Wittgenstein‘s ‗family resemblance‘ approach is useful in 
changing the schema for relating universals and particulars.  An 
essentialist approach to my problem might place the figure of the mother 
as the abstract idea of women, and particular women would be measured 
against this essence, to see if they had a common feature of likeness to the 
mother to allow them to be classed as women.   This schema would lead to 
invidious comparisons and exclusions.  A Wittgensteinian schema allows 
me to retain the (limited) universal ‗mother‘, but rather than measuring 
particular women or mothers against an abstract idea, to find resemblances 
amongst them.  This schema offers sameness-in-difference.  
I now provide a Wittgensteinian re-reading, or undermining, of an 
example of influential language games about women.  Such language 
games play into essentialist thinking about women.32  My example is the 
language game by which female bodies are distinguished from male 
bodies, which leads to the essentialist idea that women can be defined as 
women by a biology which opposes our bodies to male bodies.33 
As men and women are so diverse, a sense of shades of difference 
and similarity is more helpful than a search for opposites. If we allow 
                                                 
32
 The changing history of the demarcation of humans into two sexes is explored in Allen 
(1985). 
33
 Foucault sees the legal action over hermaphrodites as important evidence in the 
construction of the sexual binary. By the nineteenth century individuals were assigned 
one of two sexes.  Hermaphrodites were no longer tolerated. (Foucault, 1980) 
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Wittgensteinian ‗blurred boundaries‘ between the sexes we avoid the  
search for opposites that is of a piece with the essentialist gesture of 
exclusion.  In Wittgensteinian terms women are not essentially sexed as 
women, but one of the webs of resemblance which humans bear to each 
other is the web of sexuality.  Wittgenstein uses the notion of ‗webs of 
resemblance‘ in language games metaphorically.  The ‗web of 
resemblance‘ concerning sexuality has a more uncertain ontological status.  
The web of resemblance leaves the question of sexual demarcation open 
and fluid.  I examine the predicament of transsexuals as described by 
Scheman.  Her work blurs the boundaries between language games of sex, 
gender and sexual preference. 
Scheman uses a Wittgensteinian approach to question ‗privileged 
selfhood‘ in ‗Queering the Center by Centering the Queer‘ (1997).  She 
presents a challenge to ‗the stable cartographies of center and margin.‘ (p. 
127) As explained above, for Scheman, the centre is not stable, but 
shifting, so a fixed way of mapping centre and margin is inappropriate. 
The essay demonstrates the truth of Wittgenstein‘s remark, P.I.108: ‗The 
pre-conceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning 
our whole examination around.‘  Scheman explores her difficulty in 
understanding the claim of male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals to be 
women: 
My inability to understand seemed to come from the fact 
that, despite my own unshakeable sense of being a woman, 
there was nothing I could point to as constituting my 
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gender identity when I abstracted from a lifetime of 
unambiguous gender ascription on the part of others and an 
unambiguously female body …. if there was something 
independent of social role and body that male-to-female 
transsexuals could recognise as their gender identity, I 
should be able to find whatever it was in my own sense of 
identity – but there simply didn‘t seem to be anything like 
that here … .Whatever they meant when they said they 
were women, it didn‘t seem to be what I meant.  What, 
then, did they mean? And how, to put a Wittgensteinian 
spin on the question, were they able to mean it? (Scheman 
1997, p. 134) 
Scheman reminds herself that Wittgenstein points out that a 
reason we find other people puzzling is that we assume that we, 
who are doing the puzzling, are clear to ourselves. 
Because Scheman felt secure in her female identity she did not 
originally question it. When she started to question herself as a ‗woman-
born-woman‘, the advantages of a non-essentialist understanding of the 
concept ‗woman‘ emerged. She shifted the question from the meaning of 
being a woman to the question of who gets to decide who is a woman, and 
on what grounds.  
 Meaning cannot be a private matter: A word means what it 
does not because I have joined it in my mind to an idea or 
image … but because there exists a set of social practices 
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in which I participate, in terms of which I can get the 
meaning right or wrong. (Scheman,1997, p. 139). 
This shift enables us to see meaning as a practice, not something to be 
discovered by introspection.  She claims that she knows she is a woman 
from ‗natal assignment‘ – being named female around the time of birth; 
by chromosome testing or ultrasound visualisation beforehand; by visual 
inspection at birth, or by surgical correction shortly after birth. (p. 141). 
Thus the born-body is normally a permanent marker of female or male 
ascription.  
 Viewing our identities as ineluctable, as constitutive of 
who we are, as something about ourselves we cannot 
change, is to say something about how certain experiences 
are socially constructed; it is not to be committed to 
essentialism. (Scheman,1997, p. 143). 
 The choice of female markers, and the time of ascription may be socially 
decided, but still female marking is constitutive of how we live our lives.  
The importance of natal assignment is not to divide real women from 
others but rather to ‗note that there would be no categories of the sort that 
genders are if some people were not assigned to them at birth.‘ (Scheman, 
1997, p. 145) 
It would be extraordinary to deny that a woman-born-woman, who 
remains a woman, was a woman, and yet it seems that we women-born-
women have only a fluid idea of what it means to be a woman.  If, as 
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women-born-women we find the category of woman ambiguous and hard-
to-pin-down, we provide an opportunity for solidarity with MTF 
transsexuals that does not appear in a sharp-boundaried concept of being 
woman.  Such a concept places women-born-women at the centre, and 
MTF transsexuals at the margin.  If there is a fluid essence, without clear 
boundaries, to being female, being female can be a more diasporic 
concept, and thus more receptive to MTF transsexuals.   
Ironically, it is the fact that some women are born women 
that provides one of the strongest arguments against 
attempts to police the boundaries of womanhood. 
(Scheman, 1997, p. 146)34 
Thus for Scheman the concept of being a woman is not an essence 
which is unclearly exemplified in its instances.  It is not like, to use 
Hallett‘s example referred to above, a blue bit of glass that can be placed 
here or there across different women in order to see whether they match 
up to the sample.  It is not a fixed rule or schema for handling instances.   
Scheman does not suggest that transsexuals are ruled in or ruled out of the 
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 A report in The Guardian, 7th May 2004 gives evidence of such policing by the police 
themselves.  A male-to-female transsexual is only allowed to join the Yorkshire police 
force after the Law Lords have ruled that she is a woman.  Baroness Hale of Richmond, 
the only woman judge on the panel said: ‗Ms A. has done everything that she could 
possibly do to align her physical identity with her psychological identity.  She has lived 
successfully as a woman for many years.  She has taken the appropriate hormone 
treatment and concluded a programme of surgery.  She believes that she presents as a 
woman in every respect.‘ (p. 2) 
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category ‗woman‘, as a turquoise might be ruled in or out of the category 
‗blue‘.  Rather being a woman is a blurred concept.  The rules of the 
category are capable of shifting.  As such, what being a woman means is 
preferably understood in terms of solidarity with an oppressed group.  
Scheman writes of the dangers of expert policing of identity boundaries by 
doctors, and those in positions of power and privileged, certain selfhood. 
(Scheman, 1997, p. 149)  Acknowledging the ambiguity of the meaning of 
the concept ‗woman‘ is a means of resisting this policing which depends 
on the falsely essentializing tendencies of this language-game.  Scheman‘s 
ideas can be extended to bear out Wittgenstein‘s image of a rope  
in which the strength of the thread does not reside in the 
fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but 
in the overlapping of many fibres. (P.I.67) 
  The strength of women does not reside in one category of women. 
Conclusion 
I draw together the two conversations –which overlap only in part 
– that of the traditional philosophical debate on essentialism; and that of 
the feminist debate on essentialism. Hallett‘s exegesis of Wittgenstein‘s 
anti-essentialism thus becomes useful for approaching problems of 
essentialism besetting feminist thinkers.  My aim in working with a 
Wittgensteinian schema is to bring in sameness-in-difference.  I follow 
Scheman both in finding problems with the idea of a form of life holding 
together language games, and in finding that Wittgenstein‘s schema can be 
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applied to ideas important to feminist philosophy.   Using resemblance 
theory, Scheman brings in language games of homosexuals, transsexuals 
and women.  She strategically uses a diasporic concept of home as a way 
of keeping within Wittgenstein‘s schema, whilst insisting on 
inclusiveness.  
Scheman‘s ideas are extremely helpful to me in her 
Wittgensteinian engagement with issues important in feminist philosophy.  
In Wittgenstein‘s own writing, there is an underlying (and often hidden) 
pre-theoretical given which holds language games of phenomena together, 
namely the form of life of the language-user.35  In writing of woman, or 
any other social concept, basing use of language on such a given can entail 
conservatism.  The ‗given‘ of the concept ‗woman‘ might well be female 
biology, or ‗female nature‘.  The problem for a feminist writer is to avoid 
conservatism while still holding together the language game of the 
concept.  In Scheman‘s chapter, ‗Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough 
Ground‘ (Scheman, 1996), she highlights the problem of the inability to 
express oneself within a form of life, thus engaging with the ‗problem‘ of 
silence which often besets women and mothers.    In ‗Queering the Center 
by Centering the Queer‘ (1997), she employs Wittgenstein‘s model of a 
shifting centre, and shifting margins in a way that brings in the embodied 
individual and allows an open understanding of the concept ‗woman‘.  
Scheman‘s idea of a centre is an idea of an essence as shifting and fluid.  
In Scheman‘s version, essentialism is not necessarily a vice, as it entails 
                                                 
35
 Wittgenstein‘s concept of a form of life is discussed further in Chapter 4.  
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neither exclusions nor fixed boundaries. Scheman‘s idea of a ‗diasporic‘ 
concept of the homes of words loosens Wittgenstein‘s concept, and moves 
against a conservative understanding of Wittgenstein. Scheman thus 
moves Wittgenstein into the arena of feminist debate. Below I draw on 
Scheman‘s ideas as I argue for a parallel concept of the ‗mother‘ as one 





Chapter 3: The Mother as a Holding Point in Language Games 
My aim in this chapter, brief because it is a positioning chapter, is to 
establish that the language games of mothering form a holding point for 
the language games around women.   Following Scheman, I find a way of 
keeping to a family resemblance approach and of keeping to the idea of a 
shifting centre, but I change the model in bringing in the analogy of the 
type specimen method from botany.  This allows me to show the 
significance of the language games of mothering without being trapped by 
essentialist claims with their concomitant exclusions, nor by the ‗ripple 
outward‘ effect of the Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach.  I 
complete this chapter by turning to Adriana Cavarero who insists on the 
embodied sexually differentiated individual.  She changes the emphasis of 
my inquiries on essence by explaining the shifting fluid essence of the 
individual in narrative form, and by focusing on uniqueness rather than 
resemblance.  
John Wisdom points out that: 
features of the picture may be brought out by setting it 
beside other pictures; just as the merits of an argument may 
be brought out, proved, by setting beside it other 
arguments, in which striking but irrelevant features of the 
original are changed and relevant features emphasised; just 
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as the merits and demerits of a line of action may be 
brought out by setting beside it other actions. (1964, p. 
160) 
My strategy is to provide a different picture of the debates around 
essentialism and around family resemblances through building on such 
debates in order to place the mother in female language games. 
 
Before trying out the concept ‗mother‘ as a holding point, I note 
that this is a treacherous area in which to write.  Since we all have 
mothers, and since most of us have related, or relate, more or less closely 
to our mothers, writing on the mother is bound to be emotionally charged.  
Similarly, mothering children requires emotion of some sort, as does 
living as a woman and not mothering children.  My aim is that the emotion 
should be both recognised, and set aside. Expert in this techne is Adriana 
Cavarero, whose ideas I will explore further at the end of this chapter. The 
temptation to use the language of a (restricted) universal mother and 
particular essence-bearing instances of mothers is strong.  Each of us 
comes from a mother, and yet the language of universals and particulars is 
as liable to sharp boundaries, exclusions, and misleading essences, as 
described above, in this case as in any other. 
Being a mother is so very common amongst women that it is 
difficult both to avoid generalisations, and to do justice to the prevalence 
of this female condition.  The problem is to present the mainstream 
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mother, without restricting the range of variation among mothers.36  
Writing about mothering cannot claim to be emancipating the view of a 
marginal group, and yet the mainstream mother makes infrequent 
appearances in feminist theory.  The normative figure of the mother is 
important to society.  I understand the idea of a norm as a pattern or 
template, which is capable of shifting and changing.  Ignoring this 
normative figure means failing to describe the very many women who 
constitute it, and are glad to constitute it.  Keeping too closely to the norm 
means erasing the significance of mothers who diverge from the norm, 
either in corporeal aspects of being a mother, or in the relational aspects. 
Incongruous as it may at first seem, my solution is to offer an 
alternative taxonomy, adapted from botany.  My schema here differs from 
Wittgenstein‘s schema.   I   provide a method of describing sameness-in-
difference without either prototypes and conservatism, or a ripple-outward 
effect which diminishes the significance of the mother.  I use the schemata 
warily.  I agree with John Wisdom that: 
 the comparisons we make are at once valuable and 
dangerous.  Without them we cannot bring order into 
                                                 
36
 Wittgenstein explored this problem in relation to the language games around thinking.  
‗He urged the … strategy of treating as the primitive instance of having a thought the 
case of someone‘s articulating his ideas in a conversation or discussion.  This is not the 
paradigm of thinking, but rather a centre of variation for describing a field of varying 
examples.‘ (Baker, 2004, p. 170)  Baker directs the reader to Wittgenstein, Ludwig 
(1988) Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, 1946-7, notes by P.T. 
Geach, K.T. Shah and A.C. Jackson, p. 142. 
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bewildering flux, but with them we may in the interests of 
unity blind ourselves to the diversity of the individual. 
(Wisdom, 1964, p. 274)   
Having outlined the botanical system, I explore the language games 
around mothers in the society of which I am part.  I draw on my 
experience as a born woman living as a woman and a mother to describe 
these language games, both those involving the body of the mother; and 
those involving maternal work and life practices. 
The type specimen method is designed in order to assist 
classification in the system of botany.  This is helpful in two ways.  The 
method distinguishes clearly between the functions of classification and 
naming, and thus allows a variety in the natural world, while retaining the 
usefulness of a stable nomenclature.  This develops beyond the 
Aristotelian ideas of species.  In the mid-eighteenth century, Linnaeus 
developed a new system for classifying plants37 which required a long 
description of the species.  The basis of the categorisation was, as today, 
the sexual system of plants.  The concept of a species was broader than it 
is in modern times, and allowed more variation between members of a 
species.  From 1900 the concept of a species was narrowed in the interests 
of exactness, and the type specimen method was developed.  Charles 
Jeffrey explains in Biological Nomenclature that the process of 
classification precedes naming.  (Jeffrey, 1989, Chapter 5) Classification 
                                                 
37
 I do not discuss Linnaeus‘ classification of animals, although the principles remain 
broadly similar.  
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is based on the occurrence of living organisms as series of similar 
individuals showing certain common features.  The individuals are not 
identical with each other; they always vary but retain some similarities.  
Such series of individuals are known as species. The system of 
classification is continually changing, and being finessed, as more 
organisms are discovered, and as our knowledge of biological structure 
and function deepens.  DNA analysis has affected classification, as has 
pollen structure revealed by the electro-microscope.  The classification 
leads to a hypothesis of natural units, which include all organisms that 
exhibit the appropriate group-defining features.  Since the classification is 
subject to flux, and the aim is nomenclatural stability a system of 
establishing a type specimen is used.  This resolves the problem of the 
conflict between the need for stability of nomenclature and the inevitable 
changeability of classification. 
Specimens that are types are merely those which happen to 
have had names associated with them, and for the purposes 
of classification are treated like any others.  As a result a 
type falling within the range of variation of a taxon may 
stand at one extreme of that range.  Nevertheless, the name 
to which that type is linked will apply to the taxon and may 
well be the name by which it should properly be known.  In 
other words, the nomenclatural type associated with the 
name by which a taxon is properly known is not necessarily 
typical of the taxon in terms of range of variation.  It is not 
the purpose of a type to be typical in the variational sense; 
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the purpose of a type is to provide a fixed point associated 
with a name in the range of variation of organisms so that 
no matter where discontinuities are found to occur and 
boundaries between taxa drawn, the application of the 
name can be objectively and unequivocally drawn. (Jeffrey 
1989, p. 22) 
A type specimen is not just a written description, which is too capable of 
ambiguity and misinterpretation.  It is a physical manifestation of the 
description.  A type is designated to fix the application of a name. There is 
no expectation of a lack of variety in the examples, but the examples must 
resemble each other, and crucially resemble the type specimen.  The type 
specimen holds together the taxonomy of the species not through words 
but through its physical presence.  The name is published, and thereafter 
invariant. 
I suggest that the type specimen may be seen as a holding place of 
the species to which it belongs. This is not a point that divides the centre 
from the periphery.  It is more like a cartological point that offers a 
perspective on the lie of the land.  It is a point from which the viewer can 
start to make sense of what is seen.  The value, to me, of the type 
specimen approach, is that it avoids a classification which requires a true 
inner essence to mothering, but denotes a significant place of the language 
games of mothering in language games about women.  It allows a 
grouping of the categories ‗women‘ and ‗mothers‘.  The analogy I make is 
between the flux of classification of the varied category, ‗mother‘, and the 
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way in which we refer to the category in language.  Being a mother is not 
the fixed essence of being a woman.  A mother is certainly not more 
essentially a woman than a non-mother.  But in her potential, whether or 
not fulfilled, to conceive, to gestate, to deliver and to breastfeed a child, to 
form a lasting bond with a child, the mother has characteristic practices 
which form a stable point.  Whereas the named plant is still and lifeless 
pressed upon the page, the mother is so named in recognition of her 
maternal practices.  However much the classification of women may 
change, this point of nomenclatural certainty forms a limiting case to the 
flow of variation between women.  It denotes a hypothetical natural unit.  
As Jeffrey is at pains to point out above, the type specimen is not typical 
in terms of range of variation.  It is crucial to register this point as ignoring 
it leads in the direction of the mother seen as prototype with all the 
conservatism and invidious comparisons that this entails.  This is not a 
method seeking purity and exactness with correlative exclusions.  Many 
women do not want to be mothers.  Many want, more or less desperately, 
to be mothers but do not become mothers.  Amongst some groups of 
women, the mother may be at one extreme of the range. Yet the name 
forms an emblematic point in the language of resemblances between 
women.  I now make some suggestions as to who can be identified as a 
mother, in the language games of mothering, showing overlapping series, 
and resemblances of features. 
The first definition of the term ‗mother‘, given by the Oxford 
English Dictionary, is ‗a woman who has given birth‘.  This definition 
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highlights straightaway that being identified as a mother involves uniquely 
female practices of the body. Language describing our experience of our 
bodies is socially mediated.  Femaleness is important to mothering in that 
the bodies of mothers are female.  Although mothering is not always 
embodied, there is a necessary relation to embodiment in the concept. 
‗Giving birth‘ denotes a series of activities, amongst which fall 
giving birth with more or less help from a midwife, and giving birth by 
caesarean section.  It is extremely rare for a woman to give birth alone; 
giving birth is, usually in our society, a co-operative event.  The lore of 
midwives is that each birth is different.  Other practices of the body which 
are characteristic of mothers are conceiving a child, gestation, and 
breastfeeding a child.  Conceiving a child is again normally a co-operative 
event, either between a woman and her partner, or between a woman and 
some combination of medical personnel, who assist conception by In-
Vitro Fertilisation, or other methods.  This is the area in which there is 
currently the greatest flux in reality, and the area which receives most 
media attention.  The language game of gestation is curious in that 
although gestation is a female activity, it often is portrayed in ways that 
shade into female passivity.  A woman is pregnant.  Her hormones are 
fluctuating. She is carrying the child.  The language here downgrades the 
female energy put into the process.  A pregnant woman may be often 
extremely tired because her energy is going into gestation.  She may be 
often unwell, feeling sick, fainting, suffering cramps, irritable, 
uncomfortable, because she is engaged in an extremely demanding 
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activity.  Surrogate motherhood complicates, without negating, gestation 
as a marker of mothers.  The language games around breastfeeding are 
complex.  The historical use of wet-nurses, and the use of bottle-feeding 
mean that keeping a child alive cannot be counted as a marker of the 
mother.  Yet the milk flows in only to the individual woman who has 
given birth, only she experiences the pain and the benefits of 
breastfeeding.  Feeding a child from her own body is a practice which is 
not a marker of a specific mother of a specific child, but is still a marker of 
the mother. A relatively recent scientific marker of the mother is shared 
DNA with the child. 
If language games around the body of the mother reveal the 
complexities of identifying who may be termed a mother, the language 
games about the relationships of mothering reveal even greater internal 
and external differentiation.  The relationship between mothers and their 
children is a multi-coloured weave in which those who engage in the 
virtues of mothering do so in myriad ways. 
The term ‗mother‘ denotes relationality, but this relationality is 
patterned differently.  For many women who have given birth to the child, 
she and the child exist in a relationship of mutual love, which is central to 
the virtue of mothering.  Mother and child bring a great deal of happiness 
and heartache to each other.  As a mother, a woman lives through and with 
some form of dependence. She lives among ‗inequalities in power 
relations‘. (Battersby 1998, p. 8)  Being a mother who lives in such a 
relationship with her child, involves attentiveness to the child, but the 
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form of this attentiveness can vary from a twenty four hour concern to an 
intermittent focusing.  Adequate mothering involves prioritising the child, 
but the manner of prioritising varies.  For many women in my society, it 
involves devoting time to the child‘s health, educational, nutritional needs, 
in intensely practical ways – waiting at the doctors, waiting outside the 
school, endless cooking and clearing up, but also enjoying being with the 
child, and enjoying the child‘s achievements.  Similarly the degree of 
dependence stretches between the woman who withdraws entirely from 
society and from the labour market in favour of mothering, through 
innumerable intermediate stages, to the woman who does not allow 
motherhood to affect her ‗own life‘.  Given economic pressures, and 
women‘s interwoven responsibilities to themselves as women, only at the 
extreme end of the spectrum of concern for her ‗own life‘ could a woman 
be said to lack the virtue of the mother.  There is an overlapping series of 
degrees of dependence of the child on the mother, in that childcare is often 
shared with a male or lesbian partner, family member, friend or paid carer.  
This web of relationships may involve the mother in further dependence 
which she may welcome as a sharing of the workload, or may not 
welcome in that further demands are placed on her.38 In most scenarios in 
                                                 
38
 Collins uses the term ‗motherwork‘ to describe this co-operative activity in caring for 
children in her community. (Collins, 1994, Chapter 3)  In my model the term mother is 
restricted to females, and the co-operative work becomes a form of gender-free 
parenting.   
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our culture, the work of mothering involves resistance to a society that is 
reluctant to recognise dependency as normal. 
Relationality is central to mothering.  Within the language games 
of relationality come the language games of adoption, fostering, mothering 
a partner‘s children.  Such mothers are identified as mothers by virtue of 
their care for their children, and by virtue of the social and legal 
recognition of their status as mothers. Recognising that this is a different 
language game, the same reasoning can be applied here as Scheman 
applies in the case of MTF transsexuals above.  If we have a more 
differentiated and fluid understanding of what identifies a mother who has 
given birth as a mother, solidarity with those who do not have the physical 
markers of being a mother is easier to achieve.  These groups of mothers 
do not, of course, stand in need of a sex-change operation, to become 
mothers.  But like MTF transsexuals sharing in the attitudes and life-
practices of women, this group of mothers shares in the work, social 
attitudes, and life-practices of women who have given birth.  The 
existence of this group of mothers both reinforces our sense of the 
importance of embodiment to mothering, and our sense that mothering 
involves an entire set of practices, beyond the bodily practices of the 
mother of an infant.   
Here my position differs from that of Sara Ruddick, who argues for 
‗conceptually separating birthing labour from mothering.‘  For Ruddick, 
being female is not a necessary condition for engaging in mothering.  The 
female body plays a relatively minor part in Ruddick‘s ideas.  She 
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‗minimises the importance‘ of birthing labour, and regards pregnancy, 
birth and lactation as brief episodes in years of mothering. (1989, p. 48- 
49)    Ruddick‘s project is to advocate a distinctive kind of maternal 
thinking, which grows from maternal practices of protection, nurturance 
and fostering growth. (1989, Chapter 4) According to Ruddick, such 
practices require a specific kind of reflection, knowledge and capacity for 
reason.  Mothers, men and women who are not biological mothers, are all 
able to engage in such (social) practices and such thinking.   
My strategy is to retain the significance of pregnancy, birthing, and 
breastfeeding while arguing for a blurred border around the concept 
‗mother‘.  Thus, for me, mothering is, emblematically, a female activity. 
However, as in the language games of describing plants there can be 
variations from the type specimen of a plant, when describing varied 
members of the species, so there can be variations in the language games 
around the figure of the mother when describing others engaged in the 
activities of mothering.  I do not claim that such activities give rise to a 
specific form of thinking.  
An important group engaging in maternal practices, in our society, 
and thus part of a blurred border around the language games of mothering 
are fathers.  In a welcome shift of labour, men in heterosexual partnerships 
have increased their share of caring for children from around 19% in the 
1960s to 32% today, according to a survey reported in The Guardian. 
(August 17, 2005)  Single parent fathers, together with homosexual male 
adopting and fostering couples also engage in maternal practices, and 
 117 
these activities can be described within the language games of mothering. 
Such males are part of a blurred border in that their male relation to 
embodiment moves them away from the emblem of the mother, as I have 
described it.  
If we think of the mother as a type specimen, the internal diversity 
and differentiation towards which I gesture, giving a far less than 
exhaustive series of examples, can be accepted, as the constitutive 
variation of a plant species is accepted.  Nevertheless, the female relation 
to embodiment is presented as crucial to language games of the ‗mother‘.  
I close this chapter by bringing in Adriana Cavarero who stresses 
embodiment,  and also stresses differences rather than resemblances.  
Cavarero 
In the work of Adriana Cavarero there is recognition of the 
embodied difference which I suggest in my work on the mother.  For me 
embodied difference is vital in forming a holding point in a series of 
resemblances; Cavarero‘s point is that embodied difference leads to 
uniqueness.  I focus here on her work on essence and discuss her ideas on 
narrative fully in Chapter 6.  For Adriana Cavarero there is an essential 
and originary difference between man and woman: 
by essential and originary difference I mean that, for 
women, being engendered in difference (l’essere sessuate 
nella differerenza) is something not negotiable; for each 
one who is born female, it is always already so and not 
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otherwise, rooted in her not as something superfluous or 
something more, but that which she necessarily is: female. 
(Cavarero, quoted in Lauretis, 1989, p. 32) 
motherhood, and the maternal function, which far from 
being reduced to a support of patriarchy, is turned into a 
structuring or foundational site for the empowerment of 
women. (Braidotti, Foreword to Cavarero 1995, p. xvi)  
Cavarero insists being born means being sexed.  The mark of sexual 
difference appears at birth, and its acclamation is the speech of birth.  If 
birth is taken as the focus rather than death, this instantly and irrevocably 
gives sexual difference a signal importance.  It also changes the tenor of 
what is said thereafter.  According to Cavarero, universal man is never 
born, but simply exists: 
But every human born, male or female, is always born of a 
woman, who was born of a woman, who, in turn, was born 
of another woman, and so on, in an endless backward 
movement toward our origins. (Cavarero, 1995, p. 60) 
Every living person can trace back a female line.  For the sexually 
differentiated embodied person, thinking of nothingness disappears into 
reflection on the female line, the line of mothers that the person comes 
from and the line of those who will be born. Cavarero‘s ideas on essence 
not only enable but insist on a difference between men and women.  As 
women are essentially female at birth, so they live female lives and create 
female stories.  Female experience is different from male experience. 
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Whereas a Wittgensteinian anti-essentialism leads to an 
indeterminate individual, and does not draw a sharp boundary round the 
sex of the individual, Cavarero‘s individual, by contrast, is bounded by her 
sex and by her narrative, and finely drawn in the narrative she creates.  
The story is neither abstract nor universal.  A different kind of thinking, 
neither essentialist in the traditional sense, nor anti-essentialist, is needed 
for the feminine art of narration.  Karen Blixen‘s story of the stork is 
important to Cavarero: 
A man, who lived by a pond, was awakened one night by a 
great noise.  He went out into the night and headed for the 
pond, but, in the darkness, running up and down, back and 
forth, guided only by the noise, he stumbled and fell 
repeatedly.  At last, he found a leak in the dyke, from 
which water and fish were escaping.  He set to work 
plugging the leak and only when he had finished went back 
to bed.  The next morning, looking out of the window, he 
saw with surprise that his footprints had traced the figure of 
a stork on the ground. (Cavarero 2000, p.1, drawn from 
Blixen, 1954, pp. 213-5) 
Cavarero‘s story places ideas of a fluid essence in narrative form.  Rather 
than looking for an ‗inner‘ essence to the man who lived by the pond, she 
looks at how the stork emerges from our actions.  Our stories are evolving 
as long as we live, and are only complete on our deaths.  We are able only 
to glimpse our stories as we live them out.  We are making a pattern, 
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which we do not see. The story illustrates that the events and accidents of 
our lives shape our stories but do not determine them.  There is in this 
fable the idea of resistance to the benign and malign contingencies of life; 
the man continues drawing his stork regardless of events.  There is also a 
stress on a hidden unity.  The pattern exists as the individual exists and has 
a potential completeness.  The pattern makes sense.  The stork is 
recognisable. 
Yet perhaps the outline of Cavarero‘s drawing holds the individual 
too tightly.  Although like Scheherazade we escape the text, in a way we 
are trapped by the listener to our story: the watcher, the ‗self‘, who sees 
the outline of the stork.  Blixen hides herself as much as she reveals 
herself in her autobiographical Out of Africa (1954), and in her stories.  
Moreover we see her merged with the force of the African landscape, and 
with the Kikuyu with whom she surrounded herself.  The Kenyan scene 
merged with the uniqueness of Karen Blixen as she fell in love with the 
country and the people.  
Cavarero‘s stress on uniqueness changes the emphasis.  She 
focuses on the differences integral to a Wittgensteinian schema working 
with resemblances, as distinct from identical sameness.  For her, the 
unique emerges relationally.  Whereas I write on mothers as a loosely 
related group, and therefore think through resemblances, Cavarero here 




My strategy is to adopt Scheman‘s methodology while introducing 
a new element: the role of the type specimen.  I add in to the debate the 
type specimen approach from botany.  Adopting this approach enables me 
to avoid a classification which requires a true of inner essence to 
mothering, and provides a way for me to denote the significant place of 
the language games of mothering in language games about women without 
restricting the range of variation among women and mothers.  This blurred 
and flexible concept of the mother underpins my remaining chapters.  
I argue for the practices of the embodied mother as an emblem of 
the female.  Such an emblem provides a Wittgensteinian changing norm 
that can act as a rule for handling instances.  In closing the chapter with 
Cavarero‘s ideas, I reinforce my insistence on the embodiment, and move 
towards a shifting essence expressed in narrative.   Blixen‘s pattern of the 
stork, described by Cavarero, is not decided in advance.  The story tells us 
how the stork comes into being. The narrative form, integral to my thesis, 
has a valuable fluidity and open-ness. 
Having made clear my position on the concepts ‗woman‘ and 
‗mother‘ I turn to the tasks of reading women and mothers into the writing 
of Wittgenstein in Chapter 4, and of Kierkegaard in Chapter 5. Through 
investigating the language games of Wittgenstein and of Kierkegaard, I 
find philosophical spaces for a changing, flexible figure of the mother. 
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Chapter 4: Absence in Wittgenstein: Difference in Wittgenstein  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I resist Wittgenstein‘s omission of the female, and 
continue to show how his ideas can offer resources for a different pattern 
in understanding the figure of the mother.  I interrupt Wittgenstein by 
interposing Cavarero‘s vivid retelling of the Demeter myth to highlight an 
alternative symbol of the mother, and to emphasise  the importance of 
Cavarero‘s method of reading against the grain to find the meaning of the 
symbol ‗mother‘ trapped outside the text.   I find spaces that women might 
inhabit, and I continue to show how a Wittgensteinian approach could be 
useful for finding the new understandings necessary to feminist 
philosophy.   
Chapter 4 is structured into four parts.  I begin in Wittgenstein‘s 
Account of Language: A Critique from Within, by explaining and 
agreeing with Wittgenstein‘s account of language.  However, at the same 
time, by adopting the strategy of ‗reading as a woman‘, I bring to light the 
absence and exclusion of women and mothers from Wittgenstein‘s 
accounts of language learning and examples of language usages.   I 
suggest that Wittgenstein‘s naturalism is conjured by his allusions to 
children‘s learning and playing.  I find that Wittgenstein‘s exclusions 
make his account of language damagingly incomplete.   My second part is 
entitled Wittgenstein‘s Concept of a Form of Life.  For Wittgenstein 
language games arise from shifting practices that make up forms of life. 
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Although Wittgenstein used the phrase ‗form of life‘ sparingly, it is 
important to his thinking as a form of life holds together the language 
games of those who inhabit the form of life.   I examine the origins and 
meaning of ‗form of life‘ in Wittgenstein as a step towards introducing 
female forms of life, and thus female language games.  In my third part, 
Female Forms of Life, I focus particularly on maternal language games 
with immanent changing norms. As I have argued in Chapter 2, the 
Wittgenstein agent is the author of patterns of language use, and I 
introduce Cavarero‘s writing on Demeter as a different pattern of 
language, which re-symbolises the ‗Great Mother‘.  In my fourth part, 
Wittgenstein‘s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, I argue that 
Wittgenstein‘s thinking is able to accommodate and welcome difference.  
I introduce this text to show how Wittgenstein stretches our awareness of 
differences within the human and challenges conventional ways of 
understanding the world in Western societies. I make a strategic use of  
Wittgenstein‘s  re-presentation (Darstellung) of different forms of life to 
focus on female differences, developing his examples.   
Wittgenstein’s Account of Language: A Critique from Within 
Although, as I have demonstrated, a Wittgensteinian methodology 
is useful for feminist purposes, the fact remains that Wittgenstein does not 
write about women.39 Equally he does not write about tortoises. The first 
omission matters while the second does not, and this is primarily because 
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 As I have indicated in earlier chapters, my use of the terms ‗women‘  and ‗mothers‘ 
does not entail a traditional essentialist approach.  
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women are language users.  Inasmuch as Wittgenstein is writing about the 
‗multiplicity of the tools in the language and of the ways they are used, the 
multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence‘ (P.I.23) his account is 
incomplete if it should turn out that women deploy language differently 
from men. Since Wittgenstein is silent on the question of female forms of 
life, including the mother‘s form of life, his account of the different forms 
of language seems incomplete. I indicate the shaded nature of women‘s 
relation to language, and suggest female language games that are missing.   
The problem might be described as Wittgenstein giving with one 
hand what he takes away with the other.  Wittgenstein‘s writing has 
always been explored and discussed by women. He included women 
amongst the select band of his pupils at Cambridge40and from Elizabeth 
Anscombe on there has been a succession of female commentators.  His 
biographies41 demonstrate his total unease within the philosophical 
establishment of his day, and his strenuous efforts to disassociate himself 
from it.  He fled to Skjolden or Wicklow as a feminist philosopher might 
flee from the philosophical hierarchy.42 Viewed as an ordinary language 
philosopher, who was reaching out to the everyday, Wittgenstein may be 
read as suggesting, but not engaging with, the language games of women 
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 Ambrose, Alice Ed. (1979) Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32, from the 
notes of Alice Ambrose, Margaret Macdonald. 
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 Monk, Ray (1990). McGuinness, Brian (1988) 
42
 I do not discuss Wittgenstein‘s personal attitude to women. To assume that 
Wittgenstein was a misogynist seems too swift. Ray Monk provides some discussion of 
this in his biography. (Monk, 1990) 
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whose history has been that of confinement to the ordinary.  He provides 
an opening for an engagement with women‘s language games, but does 
not refer to them.  The description of language use given by Wittgenstein 
applies to women.  Recognition of the concept of a language game is 
possible for women.  This raises a set of questions.  When Wittgenstein 
writes on language is he excluding women, or is the language of women 
subsumed in language as described? Is there anything distinctive about the 
language of women?  Do mothers have a particular relation to language? 
As I have already demonstrated, I recognize the importance of 
differences between women, and the danger of ethnocentric and class-
based generalizations.  I recognise that there is a multiplicity of styles of 
speech and writing.  What matters here is not what women have in 
common but the variety of language games not addressed.  In writing of 
women as a group, I emphasise that neither men nor women can ever be 
situated outside language.  My aim is to cast a light on women‘s different 
relation to the universal, language.  This difference may be occluded when 
a woman reads male texts.  Battersby describes the shift in awareness 
involved between simply reading a text, and reading ‗as a woman‘ without 
interpreting reading ‗as a woman‘ in a straightforwardly biologist or 
essentialist way. (Battersby, 1989, pp. 9-10) She traces how women 
develop through their education a way of ‗blanking out‘ sexual difference.  
Noticing sexual differences requires ‗a new pair of glasses‘.  Reading 
Wittgenstein ‗as a woman‘ means becoming aware of female forms of life 
and female language games.  It means resisting the ignoring of sexual and 
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gender differences. My gestalt shift came in a group discussion of ‗seeing 
the schematic cube as a cube‘ (P.I., p. 213). A female member of the 
group started referring to sugar cubes. Cubes are not only geometric 
diagrams; they play a part in the language game of making tea.  Assisted 
by Wittgenstein‘s surrounding metaphors of blindness and notion of 
‗seeing as‘, I became aware of the limitations of Wittgenstein‘s range of 
examples.  Once one example had unravelled, others followed suit.  Once 
one silence had been broken, others started to fragment. The concept of a 
language game is neutral vis-à-vis the emancipatory concerns of feminist 
philosophy.  Yet, my claim is that both Wittgenstein‘s style of expression, 
and his allusions make his work difficult of access for women who are 
reading ‗as women‘.  
Wittgenstein claims: ‗It disperses the fog to study the phenomena 
of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a 
clear view of the aim and functioning of words.‘ (P.I.5)  By this he means 
that we are in our everyday lives so immersed in language that we are 
unable to see clearly how language works.  His particular target for a 
mistaken view of language is surrogationalism: the view that words ‗stand 
for‘ objects, name objects.   He thinks that this misleads us both as to the 
relation of language to the external world, and as to the relation of 
language and thought. 
The surrogationalist account of language is found in St Augustine‘s 
Confessions where Augustine is describing how he learnt language as a 
child:  
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 ‗When they (my elders) named some object, and 
accordingly moved toward something I saw this and I 
grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered 
when they meant to point it out.‘(Confessions, 1.8 cited in 
footnote to P.I.1)  
Here, Wittgenstein quotes Augustine at some length and suggests that 
Augustine‘s view places learning the names of objects as central to 
language learning.   
The idea of words standing for objects in the external world goes 
back to Plato‘s Cratylus (Plato, 1977), and is also found in Aristotle.   My 
reading of the passage from Augustine reminds the reader of the context of 
this description of language learning. When Augustine goes on to write of 
‗intention shewn by bodily movements‘ he describes this in a way that 
recalls the close attention with which children sometimes watch the 
activity of adults.  Augustine‘s last sentence adds the facility of using 
words in their proper places, and the training of the ‗mouth to form these 
signs.‘  This passage reads as a short narrative, in which Augustine is 
reaching back from his adult self to his childhood simplicity.  He is 
moving outside his current use of language to imagine an earlier state of 
language use.  The adult Augustine is gathering to himself the naturalism 
of childhood. 
In opposing the surrogationalist position, Wittgenstein has to 
ensure that his description does not leave language floating free of thought 
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and the world; and to ensure that language is embedded in the human 
community.  Wittgenstein‘s strategy is at once to defamiliarise us with our 
language, and to retain the conviction of familiarity.  To achieve the 
former, he introduces Builder A and Assistant B, who are like pin-men, 
invented to perform a specific function.  His technique might be compared 
to someone who simplified a complex drawing of a machine by providing 
a diagram of the main elements.  They are delineated as sparingly as 
possible.  To achieve the latter, he keeps up a counterpoint of examples 
from the world of children who bring with them the necessary naturalism.  
This point is developed in my critique of Wittgenstein below. 
In the imaginary language used by Builder A and Assistant B there 
are only four words: ‗block‘, ‗pillar‘, ‗slab‘ and ‗beam‘.  For this language 
Augustine‘s picture (as quoted by Wittgenstein) is correct, in that naming 
the materials is the only use to which the language is put.  Naming allows 
differentiation.  Naming does not, however, establish a direct relation with 
the external world.  Naming the materials is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for allowing them to be used in building.  Wittgenstein replaces 
the surrogationalist theory of language by his description of the working 
of language explained by the analogy of a game.  Words do not (only) 
stand for objects, they play a part in a series of interlocking and 
overlapping games.  In P.I.3 Wittgenstein first mentions the idea of a 
game, showing that the diagram of the builders is like moving pieces on a 
board game.  In P.I.5 he first mentions a child, and goes on to show that 
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learning names and learning the purpose of pointing are part of how 
children are brought up.   
In P.I.7 he demonstrates the learning of naming and of repetition, 
before introducing the term ‗language-game‘, which is to become central.  
Earlier, in the Philosophical Grammar, worked on  in 1931,  Wittgenstein 
had used the term ‗calculus‘ interchangeably with language-game: ‗The 
meaning is the role of the word in the calculus‘ (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 
63). However, by the time of The Brown Book dictated in 1934-5, the 
preliminary studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein had 
decided that: ‗Our language conforms to this standard of exactness only in 
rare cases‘. (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 25)  The metaphor of a game had 
become more flexible.43 (Harris, 1988, Chapter 1) One striking aspect of 
Wittgenstein‘s introduction of the term is his immediate departure from 
the mathematical symbolism introduced by the term ‗calculus‘ to link his 
concept with the game ‗ring-a-ring-a-roses‘.  This suits his purposes 
exactly as it is a use of words in which the naming of the ring is combined 
with, and repeated into, the action of going round in a ring, and the roses 
move the use of language well away from the labelling Wittgenstein is 
opposing.  The idea of a game is appropriate for Wittgenstein because a 
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 As Harris demonstrates, in the 1930s games had a new status. He points out that both 
Saussure and Wittgenstein, who had no knowledge of each other‘s work, assume a 
European understanding of the metaphor of a ‗game‘. He suggests the intellectual climate 
was responsive to the idea of ‗the game‘. (Harris, 1988, Chapter 1) 
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game contains a play of inter-related parts as language does.  Each 
element in a game depends on the other elements.  As Harris expresses it:  
Language is not a set of relations between independently 
given sounds or marks on the one hand and independently 
given features of the external world on the other.  To view 
language thus is both to isolate words from the linguistic 
system to which they belong and, simultaneously to isolate 
the language user from the linguistic community. (Harris, 
1988, p. 17)  
 The linguistic system is explained by Wittgenstein by means of the most 
familiar of all series: the letters of the alphabet.  As each letter differs but 
is part of a series, so each word differs but is part of a series. 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein‘s next important 
point is that language is use. To explain this, Wittgenstein introduces the 
analogy of the box of tools.  As tools have different functions so do words.  
A functionless word is a nonsense word.  A meaningless word is a 
nonsense word.  He elaborates this point by showing how the builders‘ 
language uses the word ‗Slab‘.  The builder is not just attaching names to 
slabs, beams and so on.  He is also using a system in which the word 
‗Slab!‘ gives rise to the action of moving the slab as this is the agreement 
on the use of this word in his linguistic community of Builder A and 
Assistant B.  There is no need to assume that the builder thinks or means 
the words ‗Bring me a slab!‘  The agreement, by convention, in this 
community, is that ‗Slab!‘ is followed by a slab being moved.  This is the 
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agreement about the use of this word. Words have different uses as tools 
have different uses. 
In P.I.23 Wittgenstein brings together the concept of the language-
game and of language as use in his concept of ‗a form of life‘.  
Wittgenstein is opposing the view that language is simply a naming of the 
external world, and needs to prevent language from floating free by 
showing how it is integrated into our daily activities.  Of course it is 
integrated in a multiplicity of ways.  Wittgenstein‘s choice of examples 
demonstrates the form of life with which he was surrounded: 
Giving orders, and obeying them— 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its 
measurements— 
Constructing an object from a description (a 
drawing)—  
Reporting an event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and 
diagrams— 




Making a joke; telling it— 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic— 
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Translating from one language into another—44 
Wittgenstein closes with the more every day examples: 
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 
—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in 
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of 
kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said 
about the structure of language. (Including the author of the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) (P.I.23) 
Wittgenstein reminds us of the different uses of language, and draws us 
away from the labelling approach. ‗Description‘, which might have been 
thought a close cousin of labelling, is now shown to be something much 
more subtle: 
Think of how many different kinds of thing are called 
‗description‘: description of a body‘s position by means 
of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; 
description of a sensation of touch; of a mood. (P.I.24) 
  The co-ordinates are measurements: the facial expression might involve a 
metaphor as in ‗a far-away smile‘; the touch might be expressed by 
gesture as a shrinking away; the mood might be an image such as an 
autumnal sadness.  The concept of the form of life brings back 
Wittgenstein‘s naturalism, ‗Commanding, questioning, recounting, 
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 Ellipses in original, P.I. 23 
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chatting are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking, playing.‘(P.I.25) 
 In P.I.27, children are introduced talking to their dolls.  
Wittgenstein‘s point here is that the very activity of naming is a natural 
part of our form of life, as children naturally name their dolls and talk to 
them.  As many mothers would recognise, naming a doll is not a separate 
activity from playing with a doll. Naming a doll can be a mode of playing 
with a doll.   Finding names is playing the language-game of naming. 
Wittgenstein placed a gulf between his philosophy and linguistics.  
Harris discusses this in the context of the attitude of Wittgenstein to 
scientific status.  Wittgenstein is clear that ‗Philosophy is not one of the 
natural sciences.‘ (T.4111)45  He claimed his interest was in studying the 
working of language, providing a description, not an explanation, of 
language. Hacker (1986, quoted in Harris, 1988, p.161) makes the 
distinction that for Wittgenstein ‗the linguistic investigation receives its 
purpose from conceptual problems in philosophy, not from empirical 
problems in linguistics.‘  Harris is not convinced by this: 
Words are at the same time cultural facts, metalinguistic 
posits and conceptual tools.  Hence to draw the 
empirical/non-empirical distinction for language within the 
framework of that [scientific] paradigm becomes 
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 T.4.111 indicates the number of the remark in Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1990) Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. 
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intrinsically problematic.  It involves the paradoxical 
enterprise of trying to go beyond and yet keep within the 
limits of language. (Harris, 1988, p. 126) 
Patently Wittgenstein‘s work was not empirical in the sense of recording 
and analyzing language.  Neither did he, in his philosophical work, have 
the ambition to change or ‗improve‘ spoken or written language use in a 
way that could be empirically worked out and put into practice, though he 
did engage in precisely this activity in his spelling book for 
schoolchildren.(Wittgenstein, 1977)  Both these sets of activities fall 
within linguistics rather than philosophy.  Where his conceptual problems 
do rub shoulders with empirical work, however, is in his emphasis on 
practice and activity as ‗tools‘ of language.  Here, his choice of examples 
to carry his meaning is a cultural fact.  The examples bring a culture along 
with them.  They are particular practices and activities, which are part of a 
form of life. 
I now consider the silencing of women; and show that 
Wittgenstein‘s contexts are male-specific in a way that denies female 
meanings.  My suggestion is that there is a masculine form of life implicit 
in the languages imagined at the start of the Philosophical Investigations.  
As indicated above, Wittgenstein places language use firmly within our 
natural history.  His strategy here is to introduce children learning 
language, along with his ‗purely imaginary‘ language games.  Each time 
he mentions children he is suppressing the predominantly female context 
in which most children start learning language.   
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He most often writes simply ‗the child learns‘.   The figure who is 
present, but suppressed in this account, is the woman (usually) who, to 
express it formally, introduces the child into this community, or to express 
it informally, who holds the children‘s hands and sings, or picks up the 
doll and starts the conversation.  These are both private exchanges, both 
are female contexts.  The female meanings are suppressed as the figure of 
the woman is suppressed.  The language-games Wittgenstein evokes serve 
his purposes.  Ring-a-ring-a-roses provides doing/saying; naming dolls 
shows creative language-use.  The language-games which are lost are the 
joyful exchanges and encouraging words with which women thread 
through these times of play. 
At the start of his ‗Lectures on Aesthetics‘ Wittgenstein writes: 
One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask 
how we were taught it.  Doing this on the one hand 
destroys a variety of misconceptions, on the other hand 
gives you a primitive language in which the word is used.  
Although this language is not what you talk when you are 
twenty, you get a rough approximation to what kind of 
language game is going to be played. (Wittgenstein, 1966, 
p. 2) 
Here, he elides the ideas of a primitive language and a child‘s language.  
He makes clear the importance of being taught.  We are not born into 
language; we are born into the necessity of being taught language.  When 
he instructs us to discuss how we were taught words, presumably he is not 
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asking us to call on a vast repertoire of childhood memories.  He is 
instructing us to approach the word use as if we were children.  This is not 
a memory testable by tape recordings.  It is a rough approximation of a 
memory.  The world of childhood is shoring up Wittgenstein‘s naturalism.  
His interesting example is the language game of dreams.  Obviously the 
child cannot learn this through ostensive definition, but only through 
talking, on awakening, with the person present (usually the mother), who 
dresses, and gets breakfast for, the child.  Wittgenstein goes on to 
emphasise the significance of learning facial expression and gestures – 
again placing himself as a child intently concentrating.  Maybe these 
interlocutors of children are not to Wittgenstein‘s purpose, but maybe his 
purpose is incomplete without them.  He is resting his naturalism on 
shadows of women, who, for him, shadow-like, do not speak.  
I interpose a female version of Wittgenstein‘s ‗primitive‘ language 
game used by the builders, to highlight the male nature of Wittgenstein‘s 
example:  
Let us imagine a language for which the description given 
by Augustine is right.  The language is meant to serve for 
communication between cleaner A and assistant B.  A is 
cleaning with cleaners: there are soaps, pumices, scourers 
and brushes. B has to pass the things, and that in the order 
in which A needs them.  For this purpose they use a 
language consisting of the words ‗soap‘, ‗pumice‘, 
‗scourer‘, ‗brush‘. A calls them out;—B brings the thing 
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which she has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.——
Conceive this as a complete primitive language. 
Perhaps the potential for comedy (explored in the Wittgenstein version in 
Tom Stoppard‘s play, Dogg’s Hamlet (1980)) remains, but my version 
would generate a different comedy scarred by the stereotype of the 
garrulous cleaner in her knotted headscarf. 46  The comedy would be partly 
created by the clash between the august figure of St Augustine and the 
cleaners.  Yet the cleaners‘ materials, like the builders materials, are 
differentiated by shape, and theirs too are to be used in sequence for a 
specific purpose, and need fetching and carrying in the same way.  This 
might be called a primitive language.  If it will not serve to defamiliarise 
us from our ordinary language, it is because cleaning is too familiar, too 
domestic.  (As I write in this August library I am surrounded by female 
cleaners in their striped overalls.)  If the image of cleaning does not carry 
the creative force of the image of building, it is because cleaning is, as de 
Beauvoir notes, like the torture of Sisyphus, always to be done again. 
(Beauvoir, 1999, p. 470)  Not all cleaners are women.  Not all builders are 
men. Still, it is difficult to deny that in this word game the gendered 
prototype is in play. 
It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders 
and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of 
questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And 
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remains a stereotypically female activity. 
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innumerable others.—And to imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life. (P.I.19) 
So a language limited by expressions such as ‗Ready!‘ ‗Fire!‘ ‗Six 
stretchers immediately!‘ brings to mind the necessity for obedience and 
clarity on the battlefield, and the urgency of communication.  The second 
language Wittgenstein suggests reminds one of a catechism, where 
authority is a given within the system of thought; or of a tough 
authoritarian structure, such as a strict school or a prison regime.  Others 
that one might imagine are the language of the birth delivery room, which 
might be limited by expressions such as ‗Push‘, ‗Fully dilated‘, ‗Heartbeat 
normal‘ where again obedience, clarity and urgency are paramount; or the 
language between many GPs and their female patients in which the 
language serves to place symptoms in a scientific category.  Wittgenstein 
shows how we find our place in the ancient city of language.  The words 
do not necessarily denote objects; they enable us to orientate ourselves in a 
particular context.  Wittgenstein advises the reader not to be troubled by 
the fact that his imaginary languages consist only of orders and are 
therefore incomplete, since language is incomplete.  He does not consider 
that the whole process of giving orders may itself be alienating for the 
female reader who has traditionally been in the position of obeying orders 
rather than giving them.   
In agreeing with Wittgenstein‘s account of how language works, I 
also point out that Wittgenstein does not engage with either the learning of 
language games from the mother, nor with a child‘s language games in a 
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social context.  I have argued that such absences become visible when 
‗reading as a woman.‘  My claim is not that Wittgenstein‘s philosophy 
cannot provide space for specifically female language usages, simply that 
it does not.  
  
I make suggestions for additions to Wittgenstein‘s account from 
Simone de Beauvoir and from John Wisdom.  I begin by examining de 
Beauvoir‘s early reservations about language.  She shows that women may 
not emerge into language as Wittgenstein says we do. Her account in 
Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter provides a marked contrast both with 
Augustine‘s confident engagement, in which his private experiences are 
matched on to the world, and with Wittgenstein‘s projection of the child as 
game-player learning how to see, and to name, the world.  Secondly, I 
draw from John Wisdom who, again in contrast to Wittgenstein, explicitly 
brings the mother into his exploration of how a child enters into language 
games.  John Wisdom introduces an intelligent mother into his 
demonstration of the usefulness of reasoning by reference to analogous or 
parallel cases. (1991, pp. 46-47) His Proof and Explanation is a 
transcription of lectures recorded at the University of Virginia, in 1956-7, 
only eleven years after Wittgenstein completed the Philosophical 
Investigations.  I demonstrate how both these authors provide accounts of 
understanding how language works emphasising aspects which are 
ignored by Wittgenstein, but which make for a fuller account. 
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De Beauvoir suggests that in learning to describe the world, women 
are setting aside part of what they would name, as the general language of 
men has no need for these names.  ‗The use of language as it is passed 
down to her can seem to falsify a woman‘s experience, and present an 
obstacle to discussing it authentically.‘ (Hornsby, 2000, p. 88)  In face of 
the recognition that Simone de Beauvoir‘s autobiography, fiction and 
philosophy have spoken when so many other women were silent, and have 
spoken throughout my life, her early unease with language becomes the 
more striking. De Beauvoir learns to see the world differently, in a female 
way.  She puts forward a more personal view which exposes a felt gap 
between her experience and the social world she enters: 
I saw greys and half-tones everywhere.  Only as soon as I 
tried to define their muted shades, I had to use words, and I 
found myself in a world of bony-structured concepts.  
Whatever I beheld with my own eyes and every real 
experience had to be fitted somehow or other into a rigid 
category: the myths and the stereotyped ideas prevailed 
over the truth.  (Beauvoir, 1987, p. 19) 
In engaging with language she experiences a sense of loss, of the 
rigidification of experience.  She suggests that there are aspects of a 
woman‘s experience that are non-nameable.  Her sister saves ‗her daily 
life from silence‘ in that she provides a way of talking in which ‗words 
had a meaning yet did not weigh too heavily upon us.‘ (p. 44) The 
intimacy of her relation with her sister provides her with modes of 
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interaction which are not linguistic. This provides a way of speaking 
otherwise excluded, from which she moves to a position in language.  As a 
female child, de Beauvoir has a vexed, emotional relationship to the 
customary words of public life.  There is an attraction to the idea that there 
is a female arena, which does not touch and cannot be touched by ‗public‘ 
language.  The Wittgensteinian insistence that such private meanings are 
mythological: that we have only the meanings which can be transmitted, 
thought a second time, maintained as the meanings they are, by use, does 
not address the issue.  The issue is a desire for a less alienating alternative 
which welcomes the ‗greys and half-tones‘.  Having passed all her exams, 
de Beauvoir relegated her desire to childhood sentiment, and became a 
prolific writer.  In de Beauvoir‘s fiction, her own early unease is set aside.  
Her women engage confidently with universal philosophical problems.  
Yet such engagement is not widespread.  The shift from private unease to 
a public voice reflects de Beauvoir‘s hard-fought move from oppression 
within her family to a position of public authority. 
John Wisdom‘s introduction of the mother begins with some 
instances of reasoning by analogy.  He argues that a centaur is analogous 
to a horse in that it had hooves, and that therefore we may call this 
fabulous beast a horse. Turning to a different field, he argues that we 
might support a claim that an action is dishonest by stressing the similarity 
of cases which we have granted are dishonest, so that, in all consistency 
the action under discussion must be called dishonest.  He makes clear that 
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the kind of cases with which he is concerned, like those cited, are those 
which cannot be settled by acquiring further information.  
 
In response to the challenge from an imaginary interlocutor that 
reasoning by analogy does not offer ‗real proof‘, Wisdom introduces a 
‗young boy‘ who, faced with an arithmetic problem, ‗cannot see that a 
certain suggested answer is the right answer‘. (1991, p. 47) To show how 
the boy may be led to see the right answer, John Wisdom brings in the 
boy‘s mother.  The arithmetic problem involves computing the number of 
ways there are of flying from England to France in one airplane and 
returning in a different airplane. The answer is six times six.  The mother‘s 
strategy of encouraging her child to see the right answer has two parts.  
Firstly she sets him simple multiplication problems. ‗And they go on in 
this way for a long time.‘ (p. 47) Then she moves on to a problem exactly 
analogous to the airline problem but involving just two ferries.  After this 
the child is able to see the right answer to the airline problem.  The mother 
has thus shown understanding of the difficulties the child was 
encountering, but unable to describe, and has shown understanding of the 
pedagogic power of reasoning by analogy. 
The role in which John Wisdom places the mother here is 
remarkable in a philosophic text – the mother is numerate and has a grasp 
of the structure of the argument needed.   What is even more remarkable is 
that he goes on to compare the mother favourably with the father.  The 
father attempts to teach the boy by beginning: ‗Look here, if there are N 
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things of sort X, and for each of these N things of sort Y, there are N times 
N things of sort Y‘. (Wisdom 1991, p. 47)  It is not hard to imagine the 
young boy‘s perplexity. As John Wisdom points out, in this case argument 
from a general principle is not enlightening, and the father, when pressed, 
is forced to resort to reasoning by analogy as a support to his general 
principle.   
John Wisdom‘s example stands out clearly from Wittgenstein‘s 
lack of examples which acknowledge the role of the mother.  Moreover, 
this particular example reminds me of a remark Wittgenstein made in 
Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics:  
Similarly one can show a child how to multiply 24 by 
37, and 52 by 96, and then say to it, ‗Now multiply 113 
by 44 analogously.‘ The child may then do one of 
many things.  If he can‘t justify his action, we should 
go through it again and again, until we converted him 
to doing the same as us.  The only criterion for his 
multiplying 113 by 44 in a way analogous to the 
examples is his doing it in the way which all of us, who 
have been trained in a certain way, would do it.  If we 
find that he cannot be trained to do it the same as us, 
then we give him up as hopeless and say he is a 
lunatic.‘ (1976, p. 58) 
I recognise, of course, that some children do not have the mental capacity 
to operate with series of numbers.  Still, perhaps the child would not be 
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given up as hopeless if, in Wittgenstein‘s world, his mother were allowed 
an opportunity to teach him. The example that Wittgenstein provides is of 
a fairly complex calculation.  In John Wisdom‘s example, the mother 
moves the child successfully from easier to more complex calculations.  
John Wisdom‘s second reference to the mother comes later in the 
same lecture. (Wisdom, 1991, pp. 53-56)  He gives a series of lively and 
imaginative responses to the audience who are questioning the relative 
strengths of ostensive and verbal definitions.  He demonstrates that those 
who regard ostensive definition as stronger may fail to see the complexity 
involved in grasping an ostensive definition.  John Wisdom refers to 
Wittgenstein‘s point that in understanding ostensive definition you must 
first understand pointing. (P.I. 34-35) This illustrates what ‗a tremendous 
amount of past proceeding is latent in the successful pointing out of a 
single instance‘. (1991, p. 54)  
 
The figure of the mother then appears teaching the child the 
meaning of the terms ‗poodle‘ and ‗greyhound‘.   She shows the child a 
variety of poodles, and a sample greyhound.  The child makes the mistake 
of calling a whippet a greyhound.   The mother replies that the whippet is 
too small.  John Wisdom takes the child‘s part in showing that the child 
may have learnt mere size is irrelevant in this classification.  He suggests 
that the child‘s questioning and mistakes make clear to the mother the 
complexities of the classification. In a perceptive insight, he identifies the 
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reciprocal intellectual stimulation that mothers and children may gain as 
the child learns language as he notes that: 
What the child does, surely, is take mother back over 
her own procedure with the classificatory word in 
question, and other words that may be involved 
besides. (Wisdom, 1991, p. 56) 
Many mothers find their children‘s constant questioning about the world 
tiring – but alongside this many find the whole process of acquainting 
their children with the patterns and vagaries of language delightful.  The 
child with no preconceptions of groupings of words, significant features 
of phenomena, or sense of context, is apt to ask funny and provocative 
questions about language games, so that, as in the case John Wisdom 
cites, the mother learns as she teaches. Although he does not draw specific 
attention to the work of mothering, John Wisdom‘s examples show that he 
is aware of the major role that mothers play in teaching children how 
language works.   
To conclude my critique from within Wittgenstein‘s account of 
language in this part, I emphasise that I am not making suggestions as to 
how we might use Wittgenstein for a distinctively feminist philosophy of 
language.  My more restricted claim is rather, that for historical, 
contingent, and maybe personal reasons, Wittgenstein places the limit of 
his language outside the familiar language of women.  In neglecting our 
practices Wittgenstein is integrating his description of the working of 
language only partially in the culture to which he belongs.  If what 
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‗belongs to a language game is a whole culture‘ (Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 
8), a whole culture is missing in Wittgenstein‘s selection of language 
games.  Female voices and maternal voices are missing from 
Wittgenstein, even when this philosophy describes ordinary language, and 
learning to use language.    
This matters because women are language users.  Wittgenstein is 
perpetuating the harmful metaphor of the silent, or silenced, woman.  If 
women suffer a disadvantage with respect to language it is not that we do 
not speak or write.  The practice of feminist philosophy continually 
affirms female language games.  In drawing in the interlocutor,  ‗Imagine‘ 
‗if we look‘ ‗Let us now look‘, Wittgenstein invites a form of active 
listening which is stressed within feminist philosophy, but his excluding 
examples do not draw in the female reader reading as a woman.  He 
consults the reader, but he consults her on his terrain.   
 Not accepting this exclusion, feminist philosophers are 
increasingly in dialogue with Wittgenstein.  However, as is demonstrated 
in my review of Feminist Interpretations of Wittgenstein (2004), although 
feminists draw Wittgenstein into a range of issues with which he did not 
engage – ‗questions about the environment, or racism and colour, of 
―coming out‖ as gay, and child abuse‘, the figure of the mother does not 
appear in these dialogues.  There is only one mention of mothers in this 
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volume, and here the point is not central to the contribution.47  Seemingly, 
feminist philosophers who write about the mother do not write about 
Wittgenstein, and those who write about Wittgenstein do not write about 
the mother.  My strategy is to remain in a Wittgensteinian framework 
looking at language, as a way of working towards a new presentation of 
the figure of the mother.   To use the openings provided by Wittgenstein I 
have to take him at his word and ‗keep the multiplicity of language games 
in view‘. (P.I.24)  My view, of course, differs from Wittgenstein‘s view.  
Wittgenstein’s Concept of a Form of Life 
 
It is inadequate to restrict the meaning of female difference to 
engagement in alternative language games, so through exploring 
Wittgenstein‘s concept of Lebensform, I approach the problem of how to 
write of female practices in such a way that the meaning of female 
difference becomes apparent.  I investigate Wittgenstein‘s concept of a 
form of life as a means of introducing female forms of life, and female 
language games.  I begin by investigating the definition.  There are two 
major strands of definition in the meaning of Lebensform: the first strand 
claims that ‗Lebensform‘ means pattern of living set over time.  There is 
also a transcendental reading which regards forms of life as all that lies 
within the limits of what can be spoken of.  Although Wittgenstein used 
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 The chapter is Sandra Churchill, ‗Big Dogs, Little Dogs, Universal  Dogs: Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Patricia Williams Talk about the Logic of Conceptual Rearing.‘ 
(Scheman N. and O‘Connor P. eds, 2002, pp. 305-321) 
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the phrase ‗form of life‘ sparingly it is important to the body of his 
thinking.  Hence, 
It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders 
and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of 
questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And 
innumerable others.—And to imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life. (P.I.19) 
Wittgenstein makes clear that language and living are inextricably 
intertwined. The language that we use and what we do in our life are 
interdependent.  A fighting life has a language.  A catechism has a 
language.  The way we live constitutes our language. As there are 
innumerable forms of life, so there are innumerable languages.  In 
understanding the one, we understand the other. Hence his grammatical 
investigations. Wittgenstein has a broad use of the term ‗language‘ to 
include activities and bodily expressions. 
As Wittgenstein favoured the ‗ordinary‘ use of words I begin by 
drawing on E.F.Thompkins who traces the history of the term 
‗Lebensform.‘ (Thompkins, 1990, pp. 67-68) He demonstrates that in the 
Deutsches Wörterbuch (1885) the examples given by the brothers Grimm, 
from 1838, interpret Lebensform in a biological sense and stress the 
multiplicity of forms of life.  The biological sense is that all creatures of 
each biological species necessarily have the same Lebensform. Different 
biological species have different Lebensformen.  By 1967, Wharig‘s Das 
Große Deutsche Wörterbuch gives the following definition: Lebensform: 
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die Form, Art, sich sein Leben einzurichten, sein Leben zu Gestalten, 
which Thompkins translates as ‗the pattern, manner, of organizing one‘s 
life, shaping one‘s life‘. A later edition of the same dictionary re-
introduces, as an addition, the biological sense of form of life.  These dates 
show that the meaning of the term was changing during Wittgenstein‘s 
lifetime.  Thompkins goes on to assert that Wittgenstein would have used 
the term in the ‗pattern of living‘ sense, since he was averse to the 
scientific approach and would not be interested in empirical differences 
between creatures. 
Pattern of living was certainly important to Wittgenstein, but the 
double meaning of the term survives in his usage.  He keeps a number of 
meanings in play in his use of the term. He explicitly favours ambiguity: 
 A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense of 
the term unambiguously.  The actual use, compared with 
that suggested by the picture, seems like something 
muddied… 
In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by 
side-roads. (P.I.426) 
 In my view, Wittgenstein did intend to indicate different ways of shaping 
one‘s life, but he also meant to gesture towards, though not insist on, the 
limits of our human life.  He asks if, and how, different biological species 
lie outside the limit of our human life: 
 150 
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, 
happy, startled. But hopeful?  And why not?   
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also 
believe his master will come the day after tomorrow?— 
And what can he not do here?—How do I do it?—How am 
I supposed to answer this? 
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have 
mastered the use of language. That is to say, the 
phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of 
life. (If a concept refers to a character of human 
handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not 
write.) (P.I., p. 174) 
Here Wittgenstein suggests there is perhaps a boundary around animal 
states – those of being angry etc. – which might show the boundary of 
human states. His interrogative tone makes clear that he is raising this 
possibility rather than firmly endorsing it.  A dog‘s ‗beliefs‘ are limited, 
but we cannot be entirely sure how limited; a human‘s beliefs are more 
extended, but we are not sure how to make the contrast with animals.  
Hoping, talking and handwriting are human activities and seem to indicate 
to us what it is to be human.  Important to being human is using our 
language.  Thus, the biological meaning may find an indirect successor in 
the transcendental meaning.  The enlargement in the meaning of the term 
‗Lebensform’ which took place during Wittgenstein‘s lifetime is evident in 
his use.  The ambiguity of Wittgenstein‘s use of the term brings into 
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question Lebensform as a transcendental limit to human activity, and 
Lebensform as a description of a loose grouping of activities which 
maintains itself over time in a society. 
Michael Luntley (2000)48 works with Wittgenstein‘s stress on the 
limit, and suggests that the self at the limit of the world is a self with an 
attitude to the world.  He suggests that in his later work Wittgenstein 
changed to a more dynamic, fluid conception in which language has a 
shaping role.  Thus a Lebensform (among a variety of Lebensformen) is a 
practice of engaging with reality in which the language is both shaped by 
the reality and shapes it.  The practices which compose the Lebensform are 
more than the habits of the community as described.  The condition for the 
possibility of meaning is that the practice has unity over time, and is 
normative.  This takes the emphasis of the argument away from the 
subject and places it on the practice.  Subjectivity is revealed in what the 
subject does.  This is not denying inner states and replacing them with 
externals.  Wittgenstein is endorsing subjective states but his conception 
of the inner is as fully integrated with the outer.  Norms of use are not 
transcendent to practice but immanent to practice.  The norms of use are 
not necessarily apparent in use.  They make themselves manifest as we see 
resemblances between one practice and another, one set of practices and 
another.  There is no core feature which indicates the heart of a practice.  
There is a series of likenesses which lead us to accept a set of practices as 
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 Material from lectures given by Michael Luntley  in Autumn 2001, University of 
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a way of life.  Seeing the likenesses comes to grasping the immanent 
norms.  Agents are not just points in a shifting pattern.  In acting we 
create, sustain over time, and shape the norms of our usages. 
In the following passage from Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology, Wittgenstein suggests that forms of life are patterns of 
activities: 
Instead of the unanalysable, specific, indefinable: the fact 
that we act in such-and-such ways, e.g. punish certain 
actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give 
orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest 
in others‘ feelings. What has to be accepted, the given―it 
might be said―are facts of living. (1980, 630) 
Von Wright, as editor, notes that ‗forms of life‘ is given as a variant here 
for ‗facts (Tatsache) of living.‘ Wittgenstein shows us what we agree on, 
alongside our conflicting or harmonious opinions. The community is 
significant as a source of agreement in judgements (norms) which make 
up our form of life. 
Female Forms of Life 
Let me now tell another story, introduce another form of life.  I 
counterpoint Wittgenstein‘s examples of practices which make up a form 
of life with examples of female practices.  An example of an aspect of a 
female form of life which meets the descriptions given above is the 
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practice of engaging in female friendships.  In my society, older female 
friends often shape reality for each other.  In relating encounters with the 
worlds of work or public life, and side-stepping masculine authority of 
various types, we create a norm of a more free engagement with society.  
We agree in our judgements for coping with a society which is not 
arranged for us.  The very talking through of situations and engaging with 
them within the ambit of the friendship makes a form of life which lies 
alongside that of the dominant members of society.  The immanent norm 
is a mutual supportiveness, which is revealed in a continuing 
conversational review of events, and interactions.  The attitude to the 
activities of the friendship is an important feature of the selves engaged in 
the friendship.  The pattern of activities may include expressing concern 
over the reversals of life and celebrating minor successes.  As the majority 
of older women are mothers of grown-up, or teenage, children, the pattern 
frequently includes exploring together the current life of the young 
generation.  In this way older mothers help each other to understand a 
form of life that is probably different from their own experience of youth.  
The inevitable rows between mothers and children may be less painful to 
the mother when seen through the lens of a friendship with a woman for 
whom one‘s role as a mother is only part of the story of the friendship.  
The pattern of interaction is sustained over time, and becomes immanent 
to practice, while informing and mediating practice. There is no special 
feature which is crucial to the practice of friendship, but the overlapping 
pattern of conversational activities make up a supple and flexible form of 
life. 
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Wittgenstein stresses the importance of everyday practices which 
make up a form of life.  Yet he ignores a central human practice: the 
practice of mothering.  In the mothering I see around me, caring for a 
small child is a practice with many overlapping variations.  An example of 
this practice is making a judgement that the child is OK. In the variation 
with which I am familiar, she talks with the child or gets her ready for bed 
with both child and mother immersed in the activity.  The mother may be 
stressed, impatient, and hurrying the child, or may be calm and patient.  
The outcome of this practice is that she will be able to say whether the 
child is healthy enough and happy enough.  She need not display an 
intellectual attitude to the activity, and might not give her reasons in terms 
of cause and effect.  A Wittgensteinian view might be that attending to the 
customs of feeding, bathing and talking to the child is a form of life with 
immanent norms.  The judgements which the mother makes are integral to 
her form of life, and to the society of which she is part:  
what one acquires here is not a technique; one learns 
correct judgments.  There are also rules, but they do not 
form a system, and only experienced people can apply 
them right. (P.I. p. 227) 
She monitors the child‘s body, appetite and frame of mind.  An external 
view of the practices of the mother provides an understanding of her 
attitude to the child.  Her vigilance is acted out, symbolised in these 
domestic rituals.  The vigilance shown is an example of a virtue of 
mothering.  Whilst any mother can have a lapse of attention, or interest in 
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her child, lasting for a certain time, such customary vigilance is part of the 
expression of this virtue.  So a mother expresses her responsibility for the 
child, and to the child, and to herself as a mother.  The good and 
experienced mother engages in practices which ensure the well-being of 
the child. 
However we need to remember the ever-changing nature of 
Wittgensteinian immanent norms, (discussed in Chapter 2) demonstrated 
in the practices49 I detail below.  Women who achieve motherhood 
through medical intervention of various types act to change the norm of 
‗natural‘ conception.  The many women who conceive through In-Vitro 
Fertilisation techniques move against the conventional picture of the 
mother‘s body as the passive receiver of the male sperm.  Different  IVF 
mothers may find this process untroubling, or extremely emotionally and 
physically demanding. The mother who engages with a medical Assisted 
Conception Unit makes a definitive turn towards motherhood through 
engaging in a course of treatment prior to conception and in the luteal 
phase.  ‗Natural‘ conception is not a fixed point but a blurred area 
stretching from conception after heterosexual intercourse, through 
intercourse timed to meet a woman‘s fertile period, to medically assisted 
conception.  Women in lesbian, gay or bi-sexual relationships who 
become mothers are part of this blurred area.  In opposing discrimination 
against their desire to become mothers, and engage in the practices of 
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 Of course, the norms of fatherhood are also changing.  I do not discuss these for 
reasons of relevance to my main project, and for reasons of space. 
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mothering, all such women promote changes in mothering.  In these 
language games, as in so many others, the conventional concept of what is 
natural is damaging to women‘s interests, and matches ill with women‘s 
diverse life experience.   
 In contemporary Britain, women are hedged in by the public 
norms, which demand of women both economic work and motherhood. 
Challenging this, many mothers move away from the traditional role to 
display originality in the work of mothering.  The increasing norm of 
working at home encompasses both the poorly paid home-worker, often 
working in the clothing industry, (as described for example in Monica 
Ali‘s Brick Lane (Ali, 2004)); and the better-paid  workers of various 
levels who sit at computers while children sleep,  play around their feet, or 
watch DVDs.   
Single mothers challenge the norms of women‘s role in everyday 
maintenance of family life combining traditional female tasks such as 
getting the washing done, with traditionally male tasks such as ensuring 
financial viability (if not stability.)  Teenage mothers often manage 
motherhood successfully combining motherhood with work or study and 
managing older family members as well as their children. (Phoenix, 1991)   
Among the changing practices of single mothers is the sharing of childcare 
with the father and other male or female partners in childcare.  As 
divorced and separated parents have become so common, and fathers have 
become more involved in the everyday life of their children, strict 
allocation of access time to mothers or fathers has given way, in some 
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cases, to shared parenting in separate homes.  A mother‘s or father‘s 
subsequent partner, or partners, may also play a large part in childcare. 
Recognition of the changing practices of mothering prepares the way for 
an alternative symbolisation of motherhood.  
Demeter  
Adriana Cavarero offers such an alternative. (Cavarero, 1995, 
Chapter 3)  Cavarero brings to the surface the power of Demeter, evident 
in her creativity and in casting the curse of infertility on the winter 
months.  She shows the huge force of the love between mother and 
daughter.  These female strengths are understood by being seen together 
with the accepted version of the myth, which focuses on Demeter as 
nurturer, and on the drama of her daughter‘s abduction.  Cavarero relates 
the female meaning, occluded in male post-Platonic re-tellings, to the 
familiar meaning and so deepens understanding.  My aim is to re-consider 
the mother as a female symbol.  Lucy Goodison is interested in the 
relationship between symbols and power: 
I will take issue with those who would derive symbols 
from a universal, absolute or primordial language or from 
innate patterns in the human mind.  I am more interested in 
exploring the relationship between symbols and the power 
structures in society.  I will suggest that it is no coincidence 
that relatively powerless groups in our society are 
associated with less powerful, or negative symbols.  I will 
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suggest it is a mistake to confuse patriarchal symbols with 
universal symbols. (Goodison, 1992, p.11) 
Cavarero‘s retelling of the Demeter myth replaces the symbol of the 
mother who is diminished in power by the power of Apollo, with the 
symbol of the mother as a creative force.  
Cavarero presents the figure of Demeter, the goddess of 
generation, whose daughter, Kore, was abducted by Hades and taken to 
the Underworld.  Demeter grieves by turning the earth arid, so Apollo 
agrees to reunite the mother and daughter for six months of the year.  
Cavarero claims that the myth of the great mother who has the secret of 
life and fertility is lost in Western thinking.  Demeter and Kore symbolise 
light and life; female regeneration and birth.  The mother and daughter 
need the reciprocal visibility of the horizontal gaze (theorein) on birth. 
The oppositional categories are darkness and death; masculinity and 
dying.  The world is opposed to the Underworld.  A different view shows 
the conflict, the violence of the abduction, the encroachment upon female 
power.  Irreducible, but in need of re-presentation, within the myth is her 
power to bring the sterility of the winter months, to prevent regeneration, 
as her vengeance on the superior power of the male gods.  Cavarero‘s 
presentation focuses on this power.  The rituals described in the myth are 
part of an overlapping series which go to make up a maternal form of life.   
Cavarero demonstrates the Italian feminists‘ particular desire to 
resymbolise motherhood and birth.  She re-examines the male view of a 
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history of female practices of caring, nurturing, tending, and shows how 
the focus on these practices has occluded a clear understanding of the 
myth of Demeter.  Cavarero places new aspects of the myth alongside 
familiar aspects.  She shows Demeter is not a tame creature of the seasons, 
the spirit of the growth of summer, she is the creator of the seasons, winter 
and summer, death and life. The simplicity and familiarity (P.I.130) of 
motherhood has hidden the truth from us. 
Cavarero shows a way of understanding Demeter which is 
continuous with a ‗primitive‘ understanding of the power of motherhood.  
She removes the layers of comfort from the history of the concept of the 
mother, and reminds us of the mother as creator.  In creating an alternative 
symbol of Demeter, Cavarero shows how the practices of motherhood 
have been cast in the shadows, neglected and misunderstood.  Goodison 
writes: 
 It is a question of moving away from symbols which trap 
and restrict us towards those which enable us to ask new 
questions and articulate, in turn, new symbols which reflect 
more closely the phenomena of our experience. (Goodison, 
1992, p. 145) 
Demeter and Kore do not instantiate universal forms of mothers and 
daughters.  It is more that in understanding their story we may find a route 
to understand our own.  If we look for a single feature in common 
between all mothers and daughters and Demeter and Kore it is as though 
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as Wittgenstein said, to ‗find the real artichoke we divested it of its 
leaves.‘ (P.I.164)  
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough 
In my final part, I move on to show how Wittgenstein offers a way 
of understanding differences within the human. I turn to the Remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough, reading a female version onto Wittgenstein when 
relevant.  Here Wittgenstein makes a response to J.G. Frazer‘s, The 
Golden Bough, (1987), first published in 1890.   Frazer was a Victorian 
anthropologist who produced an extremely influential, many-volumed 
study of the mythological lives, and the magic of primitive peoples.  
Frazer also produced an abridged edition, which Wittgenstein used in 
1936 as the basis for his later Remarks on Frazer.50  Frazer is interested in 
the many varieties of primitive myths.  He presents a broadly Romantic 
picture of primitive myth and magic, pointing out the differences between 
the primitive mentality and the mentality of his time. The book is named 
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after the golden bough in the sacred grove at Nemi, near where Rome now 
stands.   Frazer‘s universalist view is that humans are essentially the same, 
but the Western races are more developed than the members of primitive 
tribes.  Elaborating on Frazer, Wittgenstein presents the practices of 
primitive societies in order to make their form of life manifest, and to 
make our human form of life in our society manifest by showing 
resemblances and differences.  Wittgenstein‘s Remarks move through 
examples of different tribes described by Frazer.  Wittgenstein aims to 
correct Frazer‘s ‗error‘ in writing of primitive practices.  He criticises 
Frazer‘s version of ‗primitive‘ lives as demonstrated in their symbolic 
practices.  He suggests that Frazer presents such practices as ‗pieces of 
stupidity‘. (R.F., p. 119)  In this he is unfair to Frazer whose classic study 
shows the power and variety of primitive myths in a way that is 
understandable to those who have no experience beyond their own society. 
Wittgenstein re-presents Frazer, and what Frazer took to be the task of 
anthropology.  Wittgenstein writes against the Romantic tradition of 
seeing the primitive as enticingly strange, and shows overlapping features 
of human life.  He is showing us a form of life different from our own in a 
way that makes us reflect on our form of life.  I suggest that in writing on 
‗primitive tribes‘ and primitive practices, Wittgenstein was going up to the 
limit of our form of life to enable us to reflect on both familiar and 
unfamiliar practices from a different, human and humane viewpoint. He 
shows the inner lives of the tribe through their outward rituals, and 
provides an alternative to Frazer‘s account of their inner lives. 
 162 
Wittgenstein‘s description is rooted in his concept of forms of life 
as composed of groups of interwoven rituals.  He writes of actions and 
ceremonies as well as of speech.  The secrets of a culture can only be 
understood by close attention to all the practices which make up that 
culture.  The symbols of which Wittgenstein writes are both seen and 
heard.  His writing does not involve hidden generalisations, but series of 
aperçus.   There is no hidden essence of being, for example, a Nemi, 
which is instantiated by particular rituals.  Instead there are overlapping 
particular rituals which indicate a particular way of life within the 
universal human form of life.  Thus the universal has no essence, but there 
are a series of overlapping resemblances between humans which give us 
the idea of ‗the human‘. 
Much of Wittgenstein‘s revision of Frazer‘s meaning lies in the 
placing of his remarks.  Wittgenstein writes in brief suggestive notes and 
aphorisms.  In Philosophical Finesse, Warner writes: 
the most obvious characteristic of the aphorism is its 
brevity, its ability to enable the reader to grasp the matter 
in question ‗at a glance‘.  The juxtaposition of many such 
fragments, encouraging a sequence of such ‗glances‘ 
within a coherent but non-deductive framework, is ideally 
suited to those operations of l’esprit de finesse which 
bring it about that, ‗Light dawns gradually over the 
whole.‘(On Certainty, Wittgenstein, 1969b, quoted 
Warner 1989, p. 187) 
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Warner here aptly describes Wittgenstein‘s task in Remarks on Frazer.  
The ‗whole‘ which is in question is the relation between two different 
patterns of activity that of the primitive, and that of the technologically 
advanced, within one human form of life.  In P.I.23 Wittgenstein writes: 
‗Here the term ―language-game‖ is meant to bring into prominence that 
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.‘  I 
begin by showing how Wittgenstein provides arguments against Frazer, 
and then suggest how to find the ‗path from error to truth‘. (R.F., p.119) 
Wittgenstein wishes to avoid a traditional metaphysics which 
divides the spiritual from the material.  At the start of the Remarks on 
Frazer, one of Wittgenstein‘s earlier rejected ideas is printed: ‗I think now 
that the right thing would be to begin my book with remarks about 
metaphysics as a kind of magic.‘ (p.vi).  Perhaps he thought of suggesting 
here that metaphysics is a form of magic; or that forming an understanding 
of magic may be an alternative to adopting a metaphysical viewpoint, 
providing instead an attitude which still allows a grounding in the 
material, or as he puts it, a ‗personification‘ of the material.  In his 
presentation of primitive practices, Wittgenstein shows the reader a 
different attitude to the world, a different form of life from that prevalent 
in technologically advanced societies.  In this different primitive form of 
life the spiritual and the material are openly united.  In our form of life the 
material and the spiritual are divided by our habits of thought.  The 
material world is perceived in terms of the laws of causation.  The spiritual 
world is not touched by these laws.  As well as showing us the differences 
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between ideas of cause and effect, and ideas from magical thinking, 
Wittgenstein is reminding us of the continuity of human thinking about the 
world.  The sharp turning towards rationality of the modern age has not 
expunged our understanding of the pre-rational.51 
Wittgenstein is teaching us to ‗take‘ our experience differently.  He 
is teaching us to draw on our memories and a more ‗enchanted‘ 
understanding of ourselves. For Wittgenstein, Frazer‘s error is to 
misunderstand the form of life of primitive people so that although he 
records their activities, he does not understand the way that they speak, the 
form of life that they lead.  His attitude to the form of life of ‗the savages‘ 
is a mistaken attitude.  For Wittgenstein, Frazer has a false theory of 
magic.  Frazer supposes that primitive tribes are engaged in instrumental 
or effective action to achieve certain ends.  He assimilates their practices 
to the practices of his own scientific society, which explains actions in 
terms of cause and effect.  Wittgenstein quotes Frazer endorsing theoretic-
explanatory reason, but seemingly ignores the final phrase which links the 
errors of the ‗primitive‘ tribe with the errors any of us might make: 
―their errors were … simply hypotheses, justifiable at the 
time when they were propounded, but which a fuller 
experience has proved to be inadequate.  It is only by the 
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 Aspects of Wittgenstein‘s inheritance of the Jewish and Hebrew tradition, which may 
be linked to his interest in the pre-rational, is being explored by Naomi Scheman.  She 
stated in Women’s Philosophy Review 23 (2000, p. 23), that she is working on a volume 
of essays: Shifting Ground: Margins, Diasporas and the Reading of Wittgenstein.  
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successive testing of hypothesis and the rejection of the 
false that truth is at last elicited. After all, what we call 
truth is only the hypothesis which has been found to work 
best. Therefore in reviewing the opinions and practices of 
ruder ages and races we shall do well to look with leniency 
upon their errors as inevitable slips made in the search for 
truth, and to give them the benefit of that indulgence which 
we ourselves may one day stand in need of.‖(Frazer, 
quoted  R.F., p. 120 n.1) 
Against Frazer, Wittgenstein argues that those who pray to a Rain-King in 
Africa do not expect their ceremony of the Rain-King to produce the 
effect that rain comes ‗otherwise they would do it in the dry periods of the 
year when the land is ―a parched and arid desert.‖ ‘ (R.F., p. 137)  They 
clearly do not have the hypothesis that the ceremony of the Rain-King 
will cause rain to fall.  That they perform the ceremony in March when 
the rain begins, regardless of the supposed divine intervention, defeats this 
instrumentalist interpretation.  Wittgenstein points out that ‗it never does 
become plausible that people do all this out of sheer stupidity 
(Dummheit)‘.  When the ‗savage‘ needs to use instrumental action he does 
so:  
The same savage, who stabs the picture of his enemy 
apparently in order to kill him really builds his hut out of 
wood and carves his arrow skilfully and not in effigy. 
(R.F., p. 125) 
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 If the ‗savage‘ needs to use the law of cause and effect, he does so.  He 
brings about the effect that the hut is built and that the arrow is sharp by 
interacting with the material world.  This means it is incredible that 
‗primitive man‘ understands the world so little that he thinks that rain can 
be produced by the ceremony of rain-making in the same way that sharp 
arrows can be produced by the action of the law of cause and effect. Skill 
in managing practical life is not likely to be successful in some cases, and 
entirely mistaken in others.  When the member of the tribe needs to be 
practical, he can be practical.  
The ceremony of the Rain-King is instead part of a religious attitude 
to life-threatening events such as the absence of the rain.  The religious 
attitude is to accept God‘s power and to pray within the grain of things.  
The timing of the ceremony indicates that the member of the supposedly 
‗primitive‘ tribe is aware of Wittgenstein‘s insight that: 
How52 things are in the world is a matter of complete 
indifference for what is higher.  God does not reveal 
himself in the world. (T.6.432) 
The coming of rain is an expression of God‘s power which the primitive 
tribe rightly expect in the rainy season.  Frazer‘s view could be compared 
to the supposition that the fruits collected for the Harvest Festival in 
Christianity are placed in church to ensure that food should last through 
the winter.  It is absurd to us to think that a religious gesture could be 
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interpreted in this way, but this is how Wittgenstein suggests Frazer 
interprets the religious gesture he describes.  Wittgenstein shows how 
such practices overlap with our own and so fall within the human.  To 
understand the intention of those who pray to the rain-god we need to 
understand that: 
An intention is embedded in its situation, in human 
customs and institutions. The activity of intending 
demonstrates a human form of life.  In seeing the customs 
in which intending is embedded, we see the varying norms 
for the activity which expresses the intention. (P.I.337) 
To show us the road from error to truth, Wittgenstein uses 
‗übersichtlichen Darstellung‘. He writes: 
Der begriff der ‘übersichtlichen Darstellung’ ist für uns 
grundlegender Bedeutung.  Er bezeichnet unsere 
Darstellunsform, die Art wie wir die Dinge sehen. (Eine 
Art der ‘Weltanschauung’ wie sie scheinbar für unsere Zeit 
typisch ist. Spengler.) 
Diese übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das 
Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir  die 
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‚Zusammenhänge sehen.’ Daher die Wichtigkeit des 
Findens von Zwischengliedern.53 
For us the conception of a clear view is basic.54  It denotes 
the form of our representation, the way we see things.  (A 
kind of ‗World-view‘ as it is apparently typical of our time. 
Spengler) 
This clear view makes possible that understanding which 
consists just in the fact that we ‗see the connections‘.  
Hence the importance of finding connecting links. (R.F., p. 
133) 
I follow Wittgenstein in taking ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ as basic to 
writing and seeing things – and in this case, to the reading of his text. I 
note that he uses the simple word ‗Dinge‘ to show that this approach can 
deal with what is not understood in ‗ordinary life‘.  His emphasis on 
‗Zusammenhänge‘, the way things hang together, and ‗Zwischengliedern’ 
intermediate links, shows the necessary skill in putting things together in 
such a way that our understanding is changed.  This requires an accurate 
selection and presentation. 
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 Wittgenstein goes on to discuss briefly ‗Zwischengliedern’ , ‗intermediate links‘ as 
used in evolutionary theory  (R.F.,  p. 133) 
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 Corrected, usually translated ‗perspicuous presentation is fundamental‘.   
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I have provided an explanation of ‘übersichtlichen  Darstellung’ in 
my introductory chapter.  I now expand this by differing examples which 
suggest the layers of meaning of this term, which is very important to 
Wittgenstein. An academic paper may be preceded by an ‗übersichtlichen 
Darstellung’.  This would be a preliminary paragraph which gives a clear 
synopsis of the area to be covered in the text. The ‗übersichtlichen 
Darstellung’ would be well-structured, visually clear, and well-presented.  
A cognate use is the ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ in mathematics, in 
which the relationships of symbols and definitions may be presented as 
equations, algebraically or as diagrams.  The phrase may also be used for 
items on display, but not normally for items in general museums.  It is 
more likely to be used in a science museum, where the exhibit 
demonstrates the working of the object displayed.  In an anatomical 
display the strata or layers of a human might be displayed showing the 
inter-connections between skin, muscle, blood vessels, and bones.  In a 
display of mechanical objects, there might be an ‗übersichtlichen 
Darstellung’ of an internal combustion engine.  In such a model, the 
cylinders are replaced by a see-through layer to make visible the sequence 
of the combustion cycle.  On show are the pistons working up and down 
as the exhaust and the inlet valves open in succession and the petrol is 
ignited by the spark plug.  My examples show how the phrase is useful to 
Wittgenstein in that it draws attention to connecting links –
Zwischengliedern – which are crucial to Wittgenstein‘s idea of how 
language works. Wittgenstein‘s ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ shows the 
relationality between language games, gestures, rituals and practices 
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which forms our overlapping lives.  His disaggregation of language is 
analogous to, and yet differs from, Kierkegaard‘s breaking up of the self 
into an interior view which shows series of forming and reforming 
relationships. 
Wittgenstein also uses the word ‘Weltanschauung’ – world-view 
or philosophy of life.  In mentioning Spengler he links his work to the 
contemporary ideas of the decline of the West, and the sense of a specific 
historical period for his writing.55 
I select two examples of Wittgenstein helping us to see our way 
about: his remarks on photographs, and burning in effigy; and his remarks 
on the female practice of adoption. The effigy and the picture Wittgenstein 
writes of are shadows of the reality of the subjects; the practice of 
adoption is a shadow of the practice of giving birth. The shadowy double 
is the symbolic idea which is manipulated.  Here the effigy and the 
photograph, the doubles of the subjects, are manipulated. (R.F., p. 123) 
The symbolisation works to ‗model‘ the projected action. The symbol 
carries the performance, as I show below.  Equally the history of a practice 
works as a ‗double‘ of the practice, creating the atmosphere which gives 
meaning.   
Wittgenstein does not give an ‗interior‘ view of the practices of 
‗primitive‘ tribes but presents their practices and the symbols they use in a 
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way aimed at changing our understanding through demonstrating 
relationality.  He gives what might be termed an external view in order to 
show us how life might be for them understood through how life is for us.  
Ways in which we can persuade someone to see something differently 
include bringing new aspects of things to a person‘s notice, ‗placing the 
problematic thing alongside an object of comparison, by setting it in 
different surroundings.‘ (Clack, 1999, p. 61)  If a practice with which we 
have become unfamiliar is brought into a familiar ambit, we will see it 
differently.  It will lose some of its exotic quality and become more 
everyday, not assimilable to our everyday practices, but not entirely 
different from them.  The skill is to choose the object of comparison which 
indicates to the reader which quality of the exotic thing is being clarified.  
Wittgenstein places the practice of burning in effigy in relation to the 
practice of kissing the picture of a loved one. (R.F., p. 123)  He states that 
neither of these gestures can be understood as instrumental actions aimed 
at achieving an effect on an object.  Rather the aim is inward towards the 
person investing the object with the attributes of the person loved or hated: 
‗we act in this way and then feel satisfied.‘  Kissing the picture of a loved 
one is the more familiar gesture.  The action of kissing the picture is not 
based on the belief that this will have an effect on the loved one, nor on 
the picture.  It is a performance of affection, an expression of affection.  
Looking at a picture of a loved one denotes affection.  Many people have 
photographs of their loved ones around them at home or on their desks at 
work.  Kissing the picture is a more intense action of affection, which 
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aims at satisfying a need to act the love.  The history of this practice can 
be traced to the kissing of religious icons as an act of faith. 
Burning in effigy is a more powerful and dramatic practice that we 
prefer to associate with a primitive form of life. Yet this is selective 
memory.  It indicates how we class as ‗primitive‘ practices that are 
uncongenial to our modern sensibility.  These primitive practices survive.  
On President Bush‘s visit to London in 2004, an effigy of him was toppled 
in Trafalgar Square, as a response to the toppling of a statue of Saddam 
Hussein in Baghdad.  In October 2003 effigies of gypsies in a caravan 
were burnt in Firle in Sussex.  In Lewes, four miles away, in 2001, a straw 
Osama Bin Laden was burnt.  An effigy of the footballer David Beckham 
was lynched after his sending-off in the World Cup 1998. Effigies of Guy 
Fawkes are burnt on Bonfire night.  The ‗primitive‘ custom is not 
unknown to us.  We understand the gesture.  Here the performance is of 
hatred.  There is no belief that actual harm is done to the person burnt in 
effigy.  The gesture of hatred is the hatred displayed.  The burning of Guy 
Fawkes seems a mere joke since he died four hundred years ago, and yet 
the survival reminds us of the time when the burning of a man (or, more 
commonly, of a ‗witch‘) was an accepted punishment, and even a cause 
for noisy celebration. The night processions in Sussex, the ‗lynching‘ of 
the sportsman, the effigy in London, show how fresh to the memory are 
such enactments of hatred.  
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  The history of this practice creates the atmosphere of fear around 
it, as the history of the practice of kissing the icons creates an atmosphere 
of faith around kissing the picture.  Wittgenstein writes: 
The representation (Darstellung) of a wish is, eo ipso, the 
representation (Darstellung) of its realization. 
But magic brings a wish to representation (Darstellung); it 
expresses a wish. (R.F., p. 125) 
The display of love is in itself the love which is felt.  The gesture of love 
is the love performed.  The display of hatred is the hatred felt.  The 
gesture of hatred is the hatred performed.  The ‗magic‘ lies in personifying 
the lifeless objects, or attributing to them the desired attributes.  The 
magic is the acting out of the wish.  It is expressed in gesture.  The way 
that the person with the picture or the effigy ‗takes‘ her experience of the 
kiss or the destruction is what gives the action meaning.  Relating the 
gestures of love and the gestures of hatred brings us to a clearer view of 
both passions; and a clearer view of our interaction with the material 
world.  Such practices may strike us as irrational in that they are not 
purposive acts aiming at particular ends.  But Wittgenstein is persuading 
us not to let us be confined by rationality – to make an imaginative leap in 
understanding, and thus to move towards understanding some of our own 
actions.   
Wittgenstein‘s focus on gesture is amplified in his remarks on 
adoption.  Here Frazer and Wittgenstein are focusing on a female practice.  
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‗In the ancient rites we have the use of an extremely developed gesture-
language.‘ (R.F., p.135) In seeing the actions of primitive peoples as 
gestures, Wittgenstein re-presents Frazer‘s account of unfamiliar practices.  
He challenges the differentiation between primitive societies and 
technologically advanced societies by showing the force of the symbolic 
in both. 
Frazer writes: 
‗a woman will take a boy whom she intends to adopt and 
push or pull him through her clothes; ever afterwards he is 
regarded as her very son, and inherits the whole property of 
his adoptive parents.‘ 56 (Frazer, quoted in R.F., p. 125) 
Wittgenstein writes: 
Baptism as washing.—There is a mistake (ein Irrtum) only 
if magic is interpreted scientifically. 
If the adoption of a child proceeds in such a way that the 
mother draws it from under her clothes, it is surely insane 
to believe that an error is present and that she believes she 
has given birth to the child. (R.F., p. 125) 
According to Wittgenstein, Frazer supposes that the adoptive mother 
thinks that pulling the child through her clothes causes the child to become 
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her natural son.  Wittgenstein demonstrates the symbolic nature of the act 
by linking it to Baptism.  In Christianity, the gesture of Baptism 
symbolises the washing away of original sin.  It is a religious performance 
which enables the child to belong to the family of God.  Christ was 
baptised in the river Jordan at the start of his ministry.  There should be no 
question of anyone believing the child is actually being washed by the 
baptismal water, as there should be no question of the adoptive mother 
believing that she has given birth to the child.  As those present at a 
Baptism should accept the symbolic meaning of the gesture, so should the 
adoptive mother.57  The ceremony in which the child is pulled through the 
clothes makes explicit that the child is not part of the adoptive mother‘s 
body, but is part of her apparel in life, she can now present herself as the 
mother of the child.  The ceremony allows the child to become part of her 
family.  Wittgenstein exhibits the relation between the practices. As the 
reader sees the relation, she sees the ceremonial nature of our gestures of 
acceptance into the Christian community, and the ceremonial nature of the 
‗primitive‘ gesture of acceptance.  Learning to understand a form of life 
other than our own, is learning to understand our form of life.  
Wittgenstein is showing us how we relate to exotic practices, what it is 
about these practices that impresses us what we share with ‗primitive 
peoples.‘ (Clack 1999, p. 95-6)   
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Wittgenstein writes: 
So you are saying that human agreement 
(Übereinstimmung) decides what is true and what is false?‖ 
—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and 
they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement 
in opinions (Meinungen) but in form of life (Lebensform.). 
(P.I.241) 
The word ‗Übereinstimmung‘ contains the word ‗stimm‘. An initial 
meaning here is ‗right‘, as in ‗stimmt so’ – ‗that‘s right‘.  Beyond this, it 
also refers to the key, or tone of speech, indicating harmony with 
prevailing opinion.  Humans are not just agreeing.  They are agreeing to 
tune in to each other, to speak in a certain way. This is not just agreeing in 
what they think, (meinen – to think), but agreeing in mood, or frame of 
mind, agreeing in a voiced pattern of living. (Stimme also means voice.) 
Within the history of philosophy, ‗Übereinstimmung’ is a word used for 
the Renaissance idea of harmony with the spheres. If we find something 
beautiful, we concur in a sense of beauty.  There is harmony of judgement.  
For Wittgenstein the harmony indicated is not with an imaginary 
community, but with an actual community. 
Here, human beings may say true or false things about the practices 
of baptism and adoption.  Pace Wittgenstein, Frazer may falsely say that 
the mother believes she has given birth to the child.  A non-Christian may 
falsely say that the point of Baptism is to wash the child.  The agreement 
in language is agreement in the use of gesture and ceremonial to indicate 
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acceptance.  Engaging in rituals is part of our attitude to life, to each other 
– ‗the characteristic feature of ritualistic action is not at all a view, an 
opinion … ‘.(R.F. p. 129) Opinions are inept here, as Wittgenstein shows 
in his ‗Lectures on Religious Belief‘ : 
Why shouldn‘t one form of life culminate in an utterance 58 
of belief in a Last Judgment? But I couldn‘t say either 
‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘ to the statement that there will be such a 
thing. Nor ‗Perhaps‘, nor ‗I‘m not so sure.‘ (Wittgenstein, 
1966, p. 58)   
Wittgenstein‘s responses given here, and rejected, are examples of the 
expression of opinions.  The speaking of a belief in the Last Judgement is 
a part of a form of life, as is the performance of the ceremonies of 
adoption and of Baptism.  The adoptive mother need not have the 
erroneous beliefs ascribed to her by Frazer, but she does have the belief 
which is part of her form of life, namely the belief that meaning may be 
symbolically expressed.  Those attending the Baptism ceremony have the 
same belief.  Both ceremonies are ‗utterances‘ in the way that 
Wittgenstein uses this term of the Last Judgement.  They are culminations 
of patterns in related forms of life. 
Today in England, the naming ceremony may well take place in 
the Registry Office rather than at the Baptismal font.  The change in the 
outward trappings of ceremony leaves its central core untouched.  The 
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telling of so many anecdotes of parents arguing until the last instant 
evidences the importance of the occasion.  The naming of the child is a 
powerful ritual performance.  In engaging in naming, in providing an 
official record of the child‘s existence, the mother or the parents start her 
engagement in the form of life of our bureaucratic society.  Uttering the 
name is inescapable, and once named, the child becomes enmeshed in 
practices surrounding her as a named individual. 
Conclusion 
In some orchestral performances one set of stringed instruments is 
arranged at the front of the stage directly facing another, so that in the 
course of the piece they sometimes play against each other, sometimes 
with each other.  Both sets contribute to the tensions and the harmony of 
the music.  The relation of my thinking to Wittgenstein‘s might be so 
pictured.   Female ideas both fit with, and disturb, Wittgensteinian ideas.  
Although Cavarero‘s writing appears in this chapter solely in her re-
presentation of the Demeter myth,   her influence on my methodology is 
evident throughout.   Her method of reading against the grain to rediscover 
the creative force of the mother is a powerful antidote to the forgetting of 
the mother I find in Wittgenstein.  Equally, like Cavarero, I seek traces of 
female resistance which resist inadequate representation.   
Although the beginning of this chapter is negative in that I 
demonstrate that Wittgenstein did silence and exclude women, I claim that 
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such an exclusion is a contingent feature of, rather than necessary to, his 
philosophy.  My positive strategy is to read his work ‗as a woman‘ and to 
use some openings provided by Wittgenstein‘s ideas to affirm the different 
voices of women and mothers.  I investigate Wittgenstein‘s form of life as 
a route to this. Since a form of life ‗underlies‘ language games, this 
concept is important for my project of introducing the language games of  
the mother. I exemplify female and maternal practices.  I interpose a 
different note to the chapter in Cavarero‘s re-presentation of Demeter.   
 Wittgenstein‘s ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ has the power to 
offer an understanding of female differences and typically female forms of 
life, within the human.  Wittgenstein examines the symbolic order to bring 
to light hidden likenesses, and to disturb accepted analogies, within an 
overlapping series of features in Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. The 
idea of a defamiliarising strangeness plays a part in this.  Wittgenstein 
reminds us, that the: ‗aspects of things that are most important to us are 
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.‘59 (Einfachheit und 
Alltäglichkeit). (P.I.129) Wittgenstein teaches us to see relationships 
between the familiar and the strange.  I supplement Wittgenstein‘s writing 
on tribal differences by introducing female differences.  Females are not a 
separate tribe in the way that, for example, the Nemi are a separate tribe.  
But there are specific female practices, customs and ways of speaking as 
there are Nemi practices, customs and ways of speaking, so considering 
Wittgenstein writing on the ‗primitive‘ practices provides an opening to 
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using Wittgenstein to access typically female forms of life.  I show how 
Wittgenstein‘s approach to differences in practices here, when seen in 
conjunction with Cavarero‘s approach, may open up the philosophical 
terrain to female difference. 
In the Remarks on Frazer, the ‗primitives‘ are engaged in ritual 
activities.  They are not engaged with each other, but engaged in what they 
do and say. Wittgenstein contrasts his viewpoint with Frazer‘s in order to 
offer a different understanding of what they do and say.  I have adopted a 
parallel method in that I have taken a female viewpoint to emphasise 
female relationality, and female practices.   
In my next chapter, I introduce the philosophy of Kierkegaard. 
Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are concerned with points of view in 
the texts that I have selected for this thesis. Both Wittgenstein‘s forms of 
life and Kierkegaard‘s existence-spheres show selves shaped by their 
surroundings and shaping their surroundings. I write in the figure of the 
mother to their ideas.  
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Chapter 5: Difference in Kierkegaard: Spaces for the Mother. 
Introduction 
Although Wittgenstein rarely acknowledges philosophical 
influences, he held a deep respect for the thought of Kierkegaard.  Janik 
and Toulmin relate that in his early preoccupations in Vienna he reminded 
his contemporaries of the Danish philosopher.  He learnt Danish himself60, 
and paid Haecker to translate Kierkegaard‘s works, presumably so that 
they would become better known, as he regarded Kierkegaard as the ‗most 
important thinker of the nineteenth century.‘ (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 
26)  In this chapter, I explore this influence; and bring in the mother via  a 
re-reading of Kierkegaard.  
Wittgenstein writes in short aphorisms, at each point forcing the 
reader back on her own thoughts.  Kierkegaard writes seductively, and at 
length, drawing the reader in to his vivid evocations, but simultaneously 
making the reader suspect a distancing irony in what is written.  Like 
Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard writes outside the philosophical tradition of his 
time, paradoxically because his focus is so much on the interior of his 
characters.  The view from the outside is helpful for thinking against the 
philosophical tradition, as I think against the philosophical tradition, in a 
different way, in much of my writing on the figure of the mother.  
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Kierkegaard self-consciously introduces female viewpoints and 
forms of life into his philosophy, and sketches an alternative idea of the 
self for both men and women.  Having introduced the female to 
Wittgenstein, I now introduce the female in Kierkegaard.  In this I 
continue to follow Cavarero‘s method of seeking out and building on the 
residual traces of the female in philosophy. My argument here continues 
my depiction of differences: human differences and sexual differences. 
The aim of this chapter is to bring points of view, that is, subjectivity, into 
my discussion, and thus to argue for a different female points of view.   
 
I continue to build towards a different thinking of the figure of the 
mother through searching out the female in Kierkegaard‘s works.  This 
chapter works by juxtaposition, comparison and analogy.  I use the 
analogy of shadows throughout, as I seek out shadowy females and a 
shadowy subjectivity.  The starting point for this analogy is the description 
of the shadows on the wall in Plato‘s cave.  Since a shadow will disappear 
if a light is directly shone upon it, I do not approach shadowy women and 
mothers directly.  Developing John Wisdom‘s idea of a hidden pattern of 
meaning, I show a different pattern which emerges as I introduce and add 
to female meanings in Kierkegaard.  Throughout I discuss the 
interpretation of symbols, bringing in, and highlighting female meanings.  
Kierkegaard writes on women, and so brings women, albeit in a 
shadowy form, on to the philosophical stage.  Mainly Kierkegaard writes 
on women in relation to men.  Whilst the only mother that Kierkegaard 
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presents is Sarah in the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac, he raises a 
different symbol of the self in which experiencing relationality is 
significant.  Since I see the mother as a relational figure, Kierkegaard‘s 
symbol is important to me.  I move towards the symbol of the mother 
through considering the female subjectivity obliquely suggested by 
Kierkegaard.  
This chapter is structured into three parts.  In my first part, I make 
a transition.  In Moving from Wittgenstein to Kierkegaard, I start by 
drawing Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard together by making some points of 
comparison between them. I return to, a Gjentagelse or retake, of the 
inner/outer distinction.   I move on to focus on some specific resemblances 
and points of difference. My second part, Kierkegaard‘s Existence-
Spheres, provides my reading of the idea of an existence-sphere, and 
focuses on the female in Volume 1 of Kierkegaard‘s Either/Or. My third 
part, The Female Relational Self as Mother, employs Battersby‘s feminist 
ontology as a stimulus for my ideas of a relational maternal self.  I seek 
out the submerged figure of the mother in Kierkegaard. I focus here on his 
reworking of Aristophanes‘ myth of the ‗rounded creatures‘ in In Vino 
Veritas.  I close with my re-reading of the ‗Attunement‘ to Fear and 
Trembling, where Kierkegaard reworks the biblical story of Isaac, son of 
Sarah. 
Moving from Wittgenstein to Kierkegaard 
Placing Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard in consecutive chapters 
makes apparent to the reader a multiplicity of perspectives.  It shows 
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Kierkegaard‘s focus on relationality between individuals and between 
aspects of fractured selves; and Wittgenstein‘s focus on relationality 
between practices and language games.  Through the pseudonyms‘ points 
of view, Kierkegaard‘s characters reveal themselves relating to each other, 
persuading each other, admonishing each other, and commenting on each 
other.  His characters are not engaged in everyday life, but are shaped by 
each other.  The people whom Wittgenstein describes are engaged in 
activities.   
Kierkegaard shows viewpoints from the ‗inside‘.  He writes of, and 
within, the subjective attitude of his ‗characters‘ to their subjective lives.  
From the outside, their placing in their existence-sphere is not apparent.  
Kierkegaard‘s Knight of Faith (see below) is not distinguishable from his 
fellows as he walks home from work.  By contrast, Wittgenstein shows 
viewpoints from the ‗outside‘.  He states clearly: ―Ein ‘ innerer Vorgang’ 
bedarf aüßerer Kriterien.‖  ‗An ―inner process‖ must have outward 
criteria.‘(P.I.580) Wittgenstein shows the symbols and practices which 
indicate a viewpoint, or form of life.  Given that men and women often use 
the same symbols and engage in the same practices, it is helpful for me to 
supplement Wittgenstein‘s writing with Kierkegaardian insights to 
introduce a distinctive subject position for women and for mothers.  I 
suggest that Kierkegaard‘s focus on the individual brings to light an 
interiority signified by a female presence which may be disruptive of  
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Wittgenstein‘s language games.  I suggest that Kierkegaard influenced 
Wittgenstein in his concept of the significance of the viewpoint, or of 
‗seeing as‘, as discussed in Chapter 4, but that the earlier philosopher paid 
more attention to female viewpoints. 
The female ‗haunts‘ Kierkegaard as he writes of the torments of 
mental life. Wittgenstein places such torments at a distance.  In 
Kierkegaard a female presence has a disruptive force.  Neither the 
subjectivity of the female characters nor that of the men who are haunted 
by them, can be described as ‗the given‘ in a Wittgensteinian way.  Rather 
inhabiting an existence sphere offers a shading of the given.  The 
experience of Kierkegaard‘s characters is mediated by their situations.  
Kierkegaard is not suggesting a series of language games but an interiority 
that he gestures towards in language.  For him, language is not always the 
main determinant.  He suggests secrets that cannot be communicated in 
language, to which language can only point.  His men and women do not 
rationally adopt their frame of mind, it is cast upon them by their passion.  
Céline Léon points out that Kierkegaard‘s women are frightening not 
because they are rejected, but because they disturb the subjectivity of their 
errant lovers: ‗far from being outside the masculine, the feminine inhabits 
it as otherness, as difference, as disruption or anomie‘. (Léon, 1997, 
p.171) 
The forms of life exemplified by Wittgenstein do not pay heed to 
‗feminine otherness, difference, disruption nor anomie‘.  For him, we can 
only develop an inner life through deploying the public criteria of an inner 
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life, deploying this way of talking and acting.  Conflicting emotions, 
passions, desires, torments do not so much lie outside language games, as 
lie alongside them unnoticed.  For him the individual struggles to emerge 
from the bewitchment of language, he does not struggle to overcome 
desires.  In Wittgenstein there is agreement in language, learning and 
dialogue but no consideration of relational dependency, no struggle with a 
captivating passion, no recognition of damaging power differentials. 
Specific Resemblances and Points of Difference 
I begin by the symbols used in the approach to the interiority of 
Cartesian philosophy,61 which Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard oppose.  The 
Cartesian thinker turns inward to discover truth by the ‗clear and distinct 
ideas‘ provided by his own reason.  He withdraws himself from his body, 
and from ‗the other‘.  I discuss three symbols useful to Wittgenstein and to 
Kierkegaard.  These are the labyrinth; the physical pressure of intellectual 
difficulties; and the fisherman. 
Kierkegaard describes the isolation of the Cartesian thinker in the 
early part of Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. 
(Kierkegaard, 2000b) This short piece finds echoes in images of 
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 Mooney suggests that although Kierkegaard exalts the passions, he does not oppose 
reason per se.  Beneath the surface there is always some specific view of reason that is 
discounted or deflated. Mooney, Edward (1998) Repetition: Getting the World Back. 
Wittgenstein provides the famed Private Language argument to defeat the idea of the 
truth of the ‗inner‘ realm. I do not here explore the epistemological arguments. 
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intellectual difficulties and solutions used by Wittgenstein.  Kierkegaard 
narrates the story of an unusual child who grew up deprived of society, 
and living entirely within his imagination ‗Whenever he suspected a 
labyrinth he had to find a way.‘ (p. 130).  The image of a labyrinth appears 
also in Wittgenstein: 
Language is a labyrinth of paths.  You approach from one 
side and you know your way about; you approach the same 
place from another side and no longer know your way 
about.‘ (P.I.203) 
The image of a labyrinth provides an indication that neither Kierkegaard 
nor Wittgenstein is a system-builder.  Neither philosopher aims at finding 
foundations and building a conceptual edifice.  Coming to understand both 
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein is more similar to learning to know the way 
around a complicated and uncertain route. 
The formative influence on Kierkegaard‘s Johannes Climacus was 
his (Johannes Climacus‘) father who knew how to render as his (the 
father‘s) knowledge as ‗unimportant and valueless as possible.‘ 
(Kierkegaard, 2000b, p.131)  The philosophical father‘s modesty is 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein‘s Preface to Philosophical Investigations: 
It is not impossible in that it should fall to the lot of this 
work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to 
bring light to one brain or another—but of course it is not 
likely.  (Wittgenstein, 2000, Preface) 
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By contrast, one of Kierkegaard‘s striking images is helpful in 
clarifying a picture of the self that is the antithesis of Wittgenstein‘s 
picture.  Speaking through the pseudonym of the aesthete, a ‗character‘ 
from Either/Or, Kierkegaard writes: 
 The exterior, then, is indeed the object of our scrutiny but 
not of our interest. In the same way, the fisherman sits and 
looks fixedly at the float; the float, however, does not 
interest him at all, but rather the movements down at the 
bottom. (E/O, p. 174) 
 Wittgenstein‘s focus on the body rather than on hidden ‗mental 
processes‘, the float rather than the hidden depths, suggests to the 
interlocutor that Wittgenstein is a ‗behaviourist in disguise‘. (P.I.307)  
However, Wittgenstein is not interested in behaviour as such, as the 
fisherman is not interested in the float, he is interested in meaning, but not 
A.‘s (the aesthete‘s) hidden meaning, in the depths.  The behaviourist, in 
splitting off behaviour from mental processes, that is the float from the 
line, has already made ‗the decisive movement in the conjuring trick.‘  
Wittgenstein does not accept the picture of the external self and the hidden 
depths.  He does believe that ‗the human body is the best picture of the 
human soul‘. (P.I., p. 178)  He advises us ‗…denk nicht, sondern schau!‘ 
‗…don‘t think, but look!‘ (P.I.66) The verb ‗schauen‘- to look, is close to 
the noun ‗schau‘ ‗show‘ as in the expression ‗etwas zur schau stellen’, to 
make a show of something.  The body is able to express (show) all the 
meaning there is to those who look. 
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Another aspect of the comparison of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein 
arises from attitudes to the ‗outer‘.  The surface is more favourably seen 
by Wittgenstein than by Kierkegaard.  In his review Two Ages: The Age of 
Revolution and the Present Age (2000d) Kierkegaard contrasts the public, 
outer life with the life of the individual in modernity.  The outer life is the 
life of ‗chatter‘. (p. 265)  It is a life in which the individual reflects his 
time, and is subject to a levelling which is ‗abstraction‘s victory over 
individuals‘. (p. 258)  In the modern age, the abstraction is the public, 
which is composed of many individuals, but which relates to none.  There 
is no collective life as in more heroic ages, and thus no community support 
for the individual.  The individual is imprisoned by the reflections of him 
by his associates and by his own reflection of himself. (p. 257)  
Kierkegaard contrasts this life with the ‗separateness of individual 
inwardness in the religious life.‘ (p. 259)  The individual who has turned 
inward ‗in quiet contentment‘ has changed his situation so that although 
he still belongs to the ‗decadent‘ modern age, he is not preoccupied by the 
externalities of the age, he has freed himself from its snare. (pp. 265-6) He 
is preoccupied by himself and his relationship to God. 
This review, Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age 
(2000d) published under Kierkegaard‘s own name, suggests a way of 
engaging with, and complicating, Wittgenstein‘s idea of a form of life.  
Wittgenstein does not commend turning inward.  He does not admit the 
private in the sense of the unspeakable.  He writes in the Tractatus: 
‗Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.  Everything 
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that can be put into words can be put clearly.‘ (T.4.116) He does not 
intend to restrict us to reflecting the public sphere in an empty chattering 
way.  The private he denies is a private sphere out of reach of language.  
In engaging in a form of life we are not, or not necessarily, thoughtlessly 
reflecting our age.  The ‗outer‘ for Wittgenstein is not the ‗public‘ as it is 
for Kierkegaard in his review.  His sense of ‗the public‘ is not a 
derogatory sense.  For him all is open to view (P.I.126) in a helpful way, a 
way that allows understanding of the human, and of different societies, for 
those who see ‗aright.‘  The ‗outer‘ for Wittgenstein is what can be seen 
but this is not a simple seeing, a ‗public‘ seeing.  It is an active seeing of 
what ‗lies open‘.  Seeing a symbol is a distinct form of seeing which leads 
to a truth shown by the symbol.  Seeing a ritual similarly demonstrates a 
truth about a way of life.  The symbolic and the ritual have about them a 
performativity.  It is not that the performance carries the truth.  It is more 
that the performance is a truth which cannot be shown in any other way.  
In looking at the rituals, symbols, practices, and a multiplicity of language 
games from the outside, we see what a form of life might be like from the 
inside. 
This is not at all to ascribe Kierkegaardian ideas of subjectivity to 
Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein‗s view that ‗nothing is hidden‘ (P.I.435) in 
grammar is part of his view of the importance of symbols and rituals for 
expressing meaning.  In a form of life humans use symbols and rituals to 
engage with the world as it is created through their practices.  The 
different viewpoints that Wittgenstein presents are not so inward as 
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Kierkegaard‘s. A simple way of expressing this is to suggest that a 
Wittgensteinian viewpoint is more of an outlook on a practice or an 
activity.  It is directed outward, but does not remain ‗outer‘ in a superficial 
sense. 
Returning to the inner, for both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein the 
language of gesture and expression is highly significant.  They have a 
similar regard for the power of the secret, hidden in wordless 
communication.  The gesture expresses the secret which lies outside 
spoken language.  In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard emphasises through 
four retellings that the manner in which Abraham carried out God‘s 
command is all-important.  He is described as having a fatherly gaze 
changing to a mien of horror; a silent determination; a thoughtfulness 
changing to torment; and finally a calm changing to anguish.  These 
retellings are interspersed with the mother weaning the child with a tender 
look; weaning the child quickly; weaning the child sorrowfully; and 
finally weaning the child looking towards the future.  In each case, the 
author places the meaning of the retelling in the expression of the face, the 
way the action is performed. (F.T., pp. 44-48) He shows how religious 
action depends on the ceremony of the action.  In Wittgenstein‘s Remarks 
on Frazer’s Golden Bough the killing of the priest-king is only religious if 
performed ceremonially. (R.F., p. 119) Equally, the sacrifice guided by the 
choice of lots is a valid sacrifice only if the actions of choosing lots are 
ceremonially carried out. (R.F., pp. 145-51) The performances here 
display a ceremonial power which carries the meaning. 
 192 
Kierkegaard’s  Existence-Spheres 
Kierkegaard‘s existence-spheres are, in the main, presented 
through ‗narrative portraits‘ of individuals inhabiting these spheres. 
(Mooney, 1996, p. 43)  Mooney also writes of Kierkegaard‘s ‗concrete 
poetic-literary portraits (1996, p. xi); and the self in Kierkegaard as a 
‗narrative centre of gravity‘ (1996, p. 99).  Kierkegaard presents an inner 
view of the subjects of these portraits by writing ‗through‘ them by the use 
of pseudonyms.  In writing as, for example, the seducer, Johannes‘ 
aesthetic existence-sphere, he gives the reader an ‗inside‘ view of his 
‗take‘ on life.  Kierkegaard‘s exaggerated perspectivalism alerts the reader 
to the point of view of the author. Commenting on his writing strategy 
elsewhere, Kierkegaard  ironically diminishes his role: ‗I am just as little, 
precisely just as little, the editor Victor Eremita, as I am the Seducer or the 
Judge.‘ (Kierkegaard, 2000a, p. 243) The characters speak for him, 
illustrating the joys and sorrows of each existence-sphere.  The 
‗characters‘ interact with each other, and reappear in later Kierkegaard 
texts. From the Preface where the ‗editor‘, Victor Eremita, draws attention 
to the curious story of how these papers came into his possession, and 
throughout the work Kierkegaard continually makes the reader aware of 
the pseudonymous writer, and thus of the writer‘s perspective. 
The existence-sphere is, as we say, a world to itself.  As 
Kierkegaard‘s existence-spheres are all spheres of subjective reflection, 
there is no space for the empirical.  Kierkegaard distinguishes between 
‗Gestalt‘ and form.  He does not suggest that we look at the world and see 
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it in a certain way, as it were, but rather he suggests emergent patterning.  
The ‗characters‘ create their worlds as they inhabit them, and reality 
emerges as the characters engage with their experiences of the world.  
Events in these stories – the engagement in Either/Or, the appearance of 
the ram as a substitute sacrifice in Fear and Trembling – are part of the 
history of the characters.  Kierkegaard shows an inward subjective truth 
not reducible to the objective truth of what has happened.  Each narrative 
portrait is concerned with how an ‗existing subject in concreto relates 
himself to the truth.‘ (C.U.P.62 p. 201).  The truth is not an objective 
certainty in the world but is a ‗redoubling‘ in which the individual reflects 
back his own existence to himself.  The self changes in reflection and in so 
doing changes what it reflects. 
Kierkegaard‘s existence-spheres are distinct: the aesthetic, the 
ethical and the religious.  Each indicates a different point of view, thus 
suggesting he influenced Wittgenstein in his stress on point of view.  
Beyond this, each indicates a different way of taking experience, or 
experiencing life, a different subjectivity.  Kierkegaard understands the 
self as changing through choices, this is a self in process.  The stages are 
not in sequence but are rather placed  
not against some easily accessible standard, but in 
openness to one another, in openness to the other‘s 
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 C.U.P. p. 201 indicates the page number in Kierkegaard, Søren (2000a) ‗Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments.‘  
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situation and placement, and in critical openness to 
opposing points of view. (Mooney, 1996, p. 7) 
Within Kierkegaardian subjectivity there is an element of repetition.  
The Danish word for ‗repetition‘, Gjentagelse, also means ‗retake‘ as in a 
cinematic second or third ‗take‘. From the existence-spheres, I focus 
mainly on the aesthetic and the religious, which have most relevance for 
alternative thinking of the self.  Repetition comes from actually repeating 
the experience and confining oneself to the actual as does the aesthete, 
Johannes with his repeated seductions; or from repeating the experience in 
reflection before God as does Abraham. The aesthetic or religious 
meaning comes with the repetition which contributes to the subjectivity of 
the protagonists.  Yet, Kierkegaard makes the idea of repetition more 
complex by also suggesting that repetition is impossible or paradoxical, 
since it is out of ‗repetition‘ that the new emerges, and the self emerges or 
is born. (Mooney, 1996, pp. 28-34)  
Kierkegaardian women are in the shadows of their male lovers.  A 
helpful motif for this chapter is the shadows on the wall seen by the bound 
prisoners in Plato‘s myth of the cave.  Julia Annas provides a useful 
summary: 
Imagine, says Socrates, prisoners in an underground cave 
with a fire behind them, bound so they can only see the 
shadows (eikones) on the wall in front of them, cast by 
puppets manipulated on a wall behind them.  They think 
 195 
that this is all there is to see; if released from their bonds 
and forced to turn round to the fire and the puppets they 
become bewildered and are happier left in their original 
state.  They are even angry with anyone who tries to tell 
them how pitiful their position is.  Only a few can bear to 
realise that the shadows are only shadows cast by the 
puppets; and they begin the journey of liberation that leads 
past  the fire and right out of the cave to the real world.  At 
first they are dazzled here, and can bear to see real objects 
only in reflection and indirectly, but then they can look at 
them directly in the light of the sun, and can even look at 
the sun itself. (Annas, 1981, p. 252) 
This works at several levels.  In offering an alternative to the main body of 
Western philosophy, Kierkegaard (like Wittgenstein) was attending to 
shadows.  Kierkegaard‘s depictions of subjectivity can be read as shadowy 
interiors of forms of life, but forms of life themselves depend on the 
shadowy history of the practices which compose them, as I have shown. In 
projecting existence-spheres Kierkegaard was lighting little discussed 
arenas of life.  At another level, women can be seen as the shadows on the 
wall, projected as an illusion, and unbearable to the hero of philosophy 
returning from the sunshine. 
The following reading of the existence-spheres highlights the 
importance of females, and of the viewpoints of the author and the reader. 
The young women in the aesthetic existence-sphere are in love with men, 
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and their existence is shaped by this love.  Life in the aesthetic existence 
sphere is thus symbolic of female relational dependency.  In ‗The 
Seducer‘s Diary‘, which forms a large part of Either/Or Volume 1, the 
seducer, Johannes, is an exemplar of an individual inhabiting an aesthetic 
existence-sphere.  Mackey notes: 
Traditionally ‗aesthetic‘ has come to mean pertaining to 
beauty and the fine arts but in Kierkegaard it retains its 
original sense of ‗aesthesis’, ‗sense perception.‘  He 
defines what he calls the ‗aesthetic‘ as a dimension of 
existence and as an overall design for living – by means of 
the immediate. (Mackey, 1971, p. 3)  
Living in the immediate signifies living without reflection, absorbed in the 
flow of events, always seeking gratification of the latest desire.  It is a 
‗mode of relating (or misrelating) to the world that…is incomplete, its 
melancholy sheen covering the deep indifference of despair.‘ (Mooney, 
1996, p. 5)  Like the Unhappiest Man, also depicted elsewhere in this 
volume, the aesthetic individual has his being outside himself.  He is ruled 
by his desires.  Johannes, Kierkegaard‘s ‗author‘ of the ‗Diary‘, strives to 
live in the immediate without reflection.  He provides himself with the 
immediate by attempting to immerse himself in calculated and complex 
seductions of young girls, particularly Cordelia.  Johannes is undialectical 
in that he does not think about his activities in any other light than that of 
moving towards the success of his selfish schemes. 
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For me, the story of Johannes and Cordelia suggests the evanescent 
nature of female subjectivity when seen from the point of view of male 
language and male language games, as created by Kierkegaard.   Whereas 
Kierkegaard‘s ‗character‘ Johannes‘ thoughts and feelings are vividly 
conveyed by his diary entries which constitute the whole of Either/Or 
Volume 1, (apart from one letter from Cordelia to her seducer), we only 
know of Cordelia‘s thoughts and feelings at one remove, through 
Johannes‘ account of them, and through her actions.  As Kierkegaard 
makes us aware of the presence of the writer through his use of 
pseudonyms, so he makes us aware of ourselves as readers by the same 
device.  Many would be repelled by Johannes‘ cold calculation of his best 
advantage, and in being so repelled we realise in ourselves the attraction 
of what we have read, of the aesthetic existence-sphere.  As an author, 
Kierkegaard leaves the reader free to respond in accordance with her or his 
own point of view, and indeed, the reader is freed by the many-layered 
nature of the text. 
The evanescent nature of female subjectivity, when seen from a male 
viewpoint, is again illustrated in Kierkegaard‘s chapter ‗Silhouettes‘, 
written by the aesthete, ‗A.‘ in Either/Or Volume 1. A‘s intention is to 
depict reflective sorrow in written portraits since it cannot be depicted 
artistically: 
 it is never really present but is continually in the process of 
becoming; the exterior, the visible is a matter of 
unimportance and indifference. (E/O,1, p. 172)  
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 The Danish word used for silhouettes is ‗Skyggerids’, literally ‗shadow 
outlines.‘  The author emphasises that he is showing the dark side of life, 
which can only be seen when held up to the light, as a watermark on paper 
is only visible in the light.  He aims to present an obscure sorrow for the 
benefit of the members of the mysterious society he addresses.  A. begins 
by drawing this distinction in that he contrasts sorrow in repose, which is 
capable of artistic expression, with the reflective sorrow of the 
‗Silhouettes‘, a restless unstable sorrow, which is always in the process of 
becoming.  The lack of solidity is an important feature of the 
Kierkegaardian self to which images of light and dark, of uncanny dawn 
and mysterious twilight are appropriate. A., the writer, explains his image 
of the silhouette: 
If I pick up a silhouette, I have no impression of it, cannot 
arrive at an actual conception of it; only when I hold it 
toward the wall and do not look at it directly but at what 
appears on the wall do I see it.  So it is also with the 
pictures I want to show here, an interior picture that does 
not become perceptible until I see through the exterior.  
Perhaps there is nothing striking about the exterior, but 
when I look through it, only then do I discover the interior 
picture which is what I want to show, an interior picture 
that is too delicate to be externally perceptible, since it is 
woven from the soul‘s faintest moods. (E/O,1, p. 173) 
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The image is again reminiscent of Plato‘s cave. The bound prisoners do 
not see reality.  The objects in the cave firelight are puppets manipulated 
by unseen hands so that they appear to the prisoners.  The prisoners see 
firelight reflections against a wall.  For Plato there is one correct 
viewpoint, that of the freed prisoner who recognises that the firelight 
reflections are illusions.  
 
By contrast, Kierkegaard suggests that there is no one correct 
viewpoint.  The pictures of women which A. presents lack substantiality 
as do the firelight reflections.  They are not seen with a direct gaze, but 
appear differently depending on the point of view of the reader.  In one 
reading the silhouettes of women presented in Kierkegaard‘s work offer a 
narrative of women manipulated by their lovers, and their very 
insubstantiality makes their sorrow more moving.  In other readings, in 
these portraits, the ironic Kierkegaard is the puppeteer; the bound prisoner 
is A., caught in the aesthetic existence-sphere; and the Silhouettes are the 
reflections that he deludes A. into seeing. Or Kierkegaard is himself a 
silhouette, a shadowy author continually writing and rewriting his 
disappointed love. 
In A.‘s portrait, these are selves without underlying solidity.  As 
these selves relate to their lovers they take shape: their outlines emerging 
only via relationships to others.  As Kierkegaard places them in A.‘s 
writing, the Silhouettes echo each other, echo their literary selves.  Their 
similarity suggests a multi-faceted idea of the subjectivity of the 
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‗deceived‘ woman.  Each story begins with betrayal and ends with restless 
sorrow, but as the women appear and disappear a shifting composite 
picture is created.   
From the Silhouettes, I select Donna Elvira.  As the reader is familiar 
with her name from the opera, Don Giovanni, she already has a past.  In 
that she is surrounded by the music of the opera, she is already part of the 
staged illusion so much favoured by the pseudonymous author, the 
aesthete, A.  The story is presented in the grand Romantic manner.  Don 
Giovanni is fleeing from a dishevelled Elvira on a forested mountain.  Her 
passions of love and then of revenge overwhelm her, the pursuit becomes 
her life.  In A.‘s vivid picture, the strength and force of this female 
character jump off the page.  She torments herself with questions about 
her lover, she cannot rest in her anger, but is in a passion of perpetual 
anxiety.  For Elvira autonomy and free will are irrelevant.  She is swept 
along by her passions as she is swept by the wind down the mountain. 
This is not the Enlightenment division between body and mind. Her body 
and mind are restless in distress and longing.  The light of the 
Enlightenment is lost in the storms surrounding Donna Elvira. 
The Silhouettes flicker across each other, suggesting but not 
embodying depth.  For each it is the relationship to her seducer which 
shapes her, and which each silhouette shapes.  She does not stand alone 
and thoughtful, but moves endlessly towards and away from ‗the other‘.  
She cannot choose but feel the loss of her lover, as we cannot choose but 
hear sounds. 
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The Female Relational Self as Mother 
I have used Battersby‘s dialogue with Kierkegaard in The 
Phenomenal Woman (1998) as a starting point for my reading of the 
‗Silhouettes‘.  Battersby finds in Kierkegaard‘s writing resources for her 
project of a feminist ontology.  Her technique is to read with and against 
masculine philosophers to construct her new metaphysics in which a 
female becoming is privileged over being, the female subject position is 
taken as normal, selves are treated as embodied. For Battersby, ‗there is a 
normative connection … between female identity and the capacity for 
pregnancy.‘ (1998, p. 17)  Kierkegaard is important to her in presenting 
women as disruptive of the autonomous, rational self-determining model 
of personhood, which is a legacy of Kant.  For Battersby, women are 
singular, outside the universal.  Drawing on Kierkegaard‘s Antigone, 
Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way, she shows how his account of the 
self: 
privileges vertical relationships – relationships between 
unequals – between the seducer and seduced; the father and 
his daughter; the father and his son. Although he doesn‘t 
write about motherhood, he frequently uses images of 
childhood, of wombs and weaning in order to stress what is 
inherited from the past. But that past is not simply a 
‗given‘, and neither is it negated: it is a part of finding 
oneself as a self by living through – and with – 
dependence. (Battersby, 1998, p. 149) 
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  Relationality is crucial as ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ take shape together.  
There is no Kantian cut between self and other but a fluid patterning of 
individuals with intersecting lives.  Battersby uses musical imagery to 
avoid the sense of mastery of the seeing ‗eye/I‘. She writes: 
  … the female self is shaped as it negotiates and 
renegotiates obstacles, and as it registers the resonances 
and echoes that its repeated movements produce. 
(Battersby, 1998, p. 197)   
 This different subject-position is that, 
in which the self is fractured into personae which function 
as a unity always and only in relation to an embedded (but 
ambiguous) past and to other (non-equal) selves. An 
(uncertain) past gives the Kierkegaardian self a kind of 
permanence; but that permanence is no more than a 
temporary stability in the flow of intersecting systems and 
lives … ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ take shape together – . 
(Battersby, 1998, p. 150) 
Battersby does not write specifically about the ‗Silhouettes‘.  Her 
position differs from mine in that she is more concerned with the material, 
the real, whereas I am more concerned with the symbolic.  For me, the 
‗Silhouettes‘ provide a powerful imaginative alternative to the substantial 
autonomous self which dominates masculine ideas of personhood.  The 
very dependency which they demonstrate is useful for the alternative 
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subjectivity which I wish to suggest.  I find here an alternative to the 
clearly thinking consciousness of the Cartesian tradition.  I hold Elvira up 
to the light of my female gaze, to decipher a different sense of self in 
which autonomy becomes less significant and relationship with the other 
matters more.  Here, the relationship is to a careless male, the love is 
romantic love.  I do not write on these girls to approach the reality of 
being female, but to raise a different symbol of the self.  For me, the 
different symbol is helpful in approaching the shadowy figure of the 
mother, whose relationship is to a child; whose love is a maternal love, 
little discussed in philosophy.  Like the shadows flickering across the wall 
in Plato‘s cave, the Silhouettes are difficult to forget.  While the hero is 
struggling towards the light, the Silhouettes are peopling the darkness.  
Plato‘s philosophical hero returns unable to endure belief in the shadows 
on the wall.  In different ways, Kierkegaard, Battersby and I are 
remembering the shadows. 
I suggest that although in Kierkegaard women do not inhabit the 
ethical existence-sphere, leaping straight from the aesthetic to the 
religious, the way in which he describes the choosing/receiving of the self 
seems apt for the transition of some women to motherhood.  The use of 
the pseudonymous author of course leaves open Kierkegaard‘s own 
direction on this.  In Either/Or, Part 2, the Judge spells out the 
transcendent demand on Johannes to live an ethical life, to enter into the 
universal categories of right and wrong.  For the Judge, the transcendent is 
an external power which can demand a deep-seated change in individual 
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subjectivity.  If we respond to the demand, our experience becomes 
differently mediated.  In Philosophical Fragments (2000c), Kierkegaard 
describes the change as a ‗rebirth‘.  For the woman who welcomes her 
pregnancy, it is both a state she chooses and a state she gives way to – the 
movement of heart of the mother who gladly first sees her baby.  As the 
woman chooses to become a mother, she takes on the possibility of 
expressing the virtues of the mother.  For the woman who does not 
welcome her pregnancy, or is ambivalent about it, the shift is likewise an 
ethical shift.  She enters into the unchosen values surrounding her, and has 
to take responsibility for setting aside her reluctance to become a mother, 
or having an abortion with all that this entails.  ‗The idiom of receptivity 
captures our sense that values, convictions, selves, are largely given in 
experience.‘ (Mooney 1996, p. 24)  The experience of motherhood, 
wanted or unwanted, exemplifies this. 
The heroes of the transcendent religious existence-sphere are males: 
amongst them, Abraham and the Knight of Faith from Fear and 
Trembling. (1985)  Yet this existence-sphere is important to the female in 
two ways: Kierkegaard writes of the women from the Bible who inhabit 
this sphere. On the whole Kierkegaard privileges the girl or the beloved, 
not the wife, but he also suggests that the capacity of a wife for devotion 
to her husband can be a model for man‘s proper relationship to God, 
(though what this might mean is thrown into doubt).  I add that a striking 
example of a female love which goes beyond the self without negating the 
self is the love of the virtuous mother for the child.  
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Johannes de silentio, the narrator of Fear and Trembling, inserts into 
the story of Abraham and Isaac from the Bible, his reflection that he 
himself ‗can make the movements of faith but [he] cannot perform them.‘ 
(F.T., p. 67)  He insists on the inwardness of the Knight of Faith, showing 
how such a man is, from the outside, like a tax-gatherer (like St Matthew), 
or a capitalist. The Knight of Faith is completely ordinary and 
indistinguishable from others: ‗and yet this man has made and is at every 
moment making the movement of infinity.‘ (p. 69) He is not oppressed by 
worldly cares – ‗he is reconciled with existence.‘  Beyond this he has 
made the movement of faith.  He lives his life on the strength of the 
absurd.  In these pages Kierkegaard emphasises the interior nature of the 
religious existence-sphere, and its lack of outward marks on the 
individual. 
Given  Kierkegaard‘s  double task of ‗becoming a Christian‘, and of 
bringing to the attention of others what is involved in becoming a 
Christian, the analogy between woman‘s relation to man and man‘s 
relationship to God achieves significance. (Taylor 1997, p. 178)  His 
commendation of women is such that becoming like a woman is 
analogous to becoming a Christian, and that showing female relationality 
is showing Christian devotion.  Kierkegaard, in the person of Climacus, 
commends a womanly inwardness directed outward to another person.  A 
creative dependency enables women to give themselves in relationships:  
A woman is defined primarily through her relationships; 
her inwardness or subjectivity requires another to whom 
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she gives herself hence … He views this relationality both 
as the weakness and the peculiar strength of women. 
(Taylor, 1997, p. 178)  
The feminine religious existence-sphere draws on the defining mark of 
woman: to direct her inwardness outward, that is, to be capable of 
devotion to another.  Yet the female religious must differ from the 
religious sphere of Abraham.  The mother as life-giver and nurturer could 
not become the mother of The Faithful through a story of violence like 
Abraham‘s.  The test for her is to free her child, and herself.  The story of 
the mother weaning her child is, as it were, hidden in the story of Abraham 
and Isaac.  I explore this story at the end of this chapter.  Like the Knight 
of Faith the mother does not stand out from the crowd.  She is hidden both 
by domesticity, and by the norms of society which focus on the well-being 
of the child. 
In her chapter entitled ‗Kierkegaard, Woman and the Workshop of 
Possibilities‘, Battersby (1998) discusses Kierkegaard‘s reworking of The 
Symposium, In Vino Veritas (Part 1 of Stages on Life’s Way, 1988).  I use 
Battersby‘s work as a route to my position, but as I shall indicate, her 
position and her purpose differ from mine. Battersby draws on 
Kierkegaard‘s imagined dialogue, now on the topic of women, not 
homosexual love, as part of her strategy of outlining a female subject-
position which takes natality seriously.  Kierkegaard‘s move to a 
heterosexual perspective means that he writes of woman in relation to 
man, and Battersby‘s feminist re-reading here necessarily follows him in 
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this.  Her aim in her re-reading is to support her argument for a 
(normalized) female ‗in which there is no sharp division between ―self‖ 
and ―other.‖‘  (1998, p. 8)  I now turn Battersby‘s re-reading by applying 
selected points to pregnant women and mothers of infants.  I find the 
mother trapped outside the text.  Battersby‘s interpretation of 
Kierkegaard‘s ideas on reality has provided a stimulus for my 
understanding of the maternal body, which Battersby does not discuss in 
this context. 
Battersby summarises Aristophanes‘ myth told at Plato‘s 
Symposium, and re-presented by Kierkegaard: 
… the gods first created self-sufficient and rounded beings: 
each had two faces, facing in opposite directions upon a 
circular neck.  Each being also had four legs and arms and 
two sets of genital organs.  Jealous of their completeness, 
the gods decided to cut these beings in two; but the result 
of that ‗cut‘ was love, since erotic desire simply is the 
search for one‘s lost other half. (Battersby, 1998, p. 156) 
Kierkegaard‘s Young Man sees the humour in Aristophanes‘ myth as 
illustrative of the ridiculous nature of the idea of the autonomous man.  
Battersby points out that this is Kierkegaardian mockery of the 
autonomous male self.  She quotes the Young Man: 
The more one thinks about it, the more ludicrous it 
becomes, for if the man actually is a whole, then he 
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certainly does not become a whole in erotic love, but he 
and the woman become one and a half.  No wonder the 
gods laugh, and especially at the man. (Kierkegaard, 
1988, p. 43, quoted Battersby, 1998, p.157) 
For me, the pregnant woman is, in the Young Man‘s terminology, ‗one 
and a half‘.  That it seems absurd to describe a pregnant woman in this 
way is, for me, an argument for a relational, flexible self.  In my re-
reading, the pregnant woman offers an example of such an identity.  She 
becomes more aware of the fetus if it moves, or if her shape obstructs her 
movement.  She relates to it with protectiveness or interest, but then 
becomes less aware of it as the rest of her life commands her attention.  
The new-born child becomes more aware of the mother, has a greater need 
for her when she is hungry, or is in discomfort.  These are selves taking 
shape together.  In a movement of becoming, the mother emerges as 
mother of this child, the child emerges as child of this mother.  They 
inherit each other as part of the condition of their lives.  Past generations 
affect them in obscure ways, and their own early interaction cannot be 
definitively worded.  A mother will often wake from the deepest sleep if 
her infant cries, even if she is out of earshot.  The baby is dependent, yet 
she is also dependent on the infant.  If she is breastfeeding, her breast milk 
will come down at feeding time and she needs the infant to give her relief.  
In my illustration, the repeated movements of nurturing in response to 
needs never simply reproduce a given.  The mother changes: the child 
changes.  Their realities emerge. 
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Battersby quotes Johannes‘ words from Kierkegaard‘s Stages on 
Life’s Way, to show how Kierkegaard‘s character ‗Johannes‘, 
 reverses the values of the Platonic texts, allowing infinity 
(being) to emerge from change and from continual motion, 
and from that which simply seems to exist: 
Woman cannot be exhausted in any formula but is an 
infinitude of finitudes.  Trying to conceive the idea of 
woman is like gazing into a sea of misty shapes continually 
forming and reforming, or like becoming unhinged by 
looking at the waves and the foam maidens who 
continually play tricks, because the idea of woman is only 
a workshop of possibilities …  (Kierkegaard, 1988, p. 76, 
quoted Battersby, 1998, p. 162) 
Battersby‘s position is not identical with that of Johannes.  She wants to 
build on Johannes‘ statement the idea of a model of identities ‗fluidly‘ 
emerging out of patternings of relationship to ‗otherness‘, in movement. 
(1998, p. 200)   Battersby‘s relational ontology births the real, a 
multiplicity of reals that co-exist. Her model of fluid emerging identity, 
unlike my model of flexible changing identity, is not specific to the 
human. 
In distinction from Battersby‘s position, my ontology retains a 
notion of a more adequate representation of a (true) reality.  For me, 
Kierkegaard stimulates a sketch of the figure of the pregnant and nurturing 
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mother: a flexible maternal self with mobile edges. I adapt ideas of change 
and continual motion presented by Johannes to the ‗morphing‘ quality 
represented for me by the figure of the pregnant woman.  Whereas 
Battersby moves away from Johannes‘ position, I remain close to it but 
adapt it to my ideas on the mother.  I move away from Battersby‘s ideas of 
‗fluidity‘, to employ the idea of a notion of an individualised self which 
then flexibly transforms.  The pregnant woman has an identity, but is then 
subject to change, metamorphosis.  
From the frequent pallor of the first trimester, a pregnant woman 
may bloom in the second, and become heavy and awkward-looking in the 
third.  Often a heavily pregnant woman is utterly changed from her non-
pregnant self.  A sylph-like girl will have transformed herself into a solid 
mound.  A well-built woman will have become mountainous.  In my 
reading, Johannes‘ ‗misty shapes‘ might be the memory that those close to 
the pregnant woman retain of her former self, which may momentarily 
appear in a gesture, a smile, or a way of moving.  Such memories are not 
definite but hazy, dimmed by her changed presence.  His phrase 
‗becoming unhinged‘ is extreme, but it captures for me something of the 
unnerving quality, for the onlooker, and even for the woman herself, of the 
transformation of a woman as her pregnancy progresses.  The notion of 
the ‗waves and foam-maidens‘ alludes to a different world enclosed by 
water.  I adapt this to suggest the strange distance and inwardness of the 
expectant mother.  After delivery, she re-forms herself into a new series of 
possibilities.   
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Battersby writes that for woman ‗action emerges not out of 
autonomy, but out of an acceptance of dependence and being bound to the 
other.‘ (Battersby 1998, p. 163)  In the context within which I write, which 
differs from Battersby‘s context, this indicates the supreme effort many 
women make in recognising the infant‘s dependence, and their own 
dependence, by succouring the child immediately after birth, setting aside 
the sense of themselves as autonomous, and setting aside waves of pain 
and exhaustion.  Battersby links the female subject-position to ideas of a 
relational self.  I provide a different and additional illustration of how the 
pregnant and child-nurturing body can be seen as a symbol of such 
relationality. In so doing, I present a ‗morphing‘ maternal self with 
Wittgensteinian blurred outlines.  Such a figure of the mother is not 
defined through her properties, but described in her relationality.  
A movement between past and future is part of pregnancy, and part 
of the maternal condition.  As we all come from our mothers, there is a 
movement back to origins.  As the mother is usually focused on the future 
of the child, there is a movement towards a more generalised future.  
Recollection plays a part in Plato‘s Symposium in that this text is a report 
of a conversation held twenty five years earlier.  Kierkegaard begins his 
heterosexual reworking of Plato‘s text by distinguishing recollection from 
remembering.  Kierkegaard‘s Gjentagelse indicates a ‗retake‘ or a 
dropping of an initial approximation in favour of a new version, ‗done 
better, or being richer in meaning.‘ (Mooney, 1996, p. 28) The new 
emerges from repetition of ‗the same‘.   
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 Musical terms assist in understanding the idea of ‗recollection 
forwards‘. Music frequently moves onward by developing a theme, thus 
referring back to the origin and forward to the new sequence of sounds.  
For example in Prokofiev‘s 1988 ballet, Romeo and Juliet, the famous 
theme which mixes joy and foreboding appears in the ball-scene. During 
the ballet each character is introduced by an elaborated variation on the 
theme.  The theme is repeated, not aridly, but creatively.  Each character 
appears as if caught in the skeins of the theme, and yet each changes the 
theme by her actions.  The theme sets the scene but does not control it.  
The characters move forward, but their past echoes around them.  Romeo 
and Juliet perform the formal dance steps as prescribed, but they also 
make variations and thus change the music.  The past and the context 
make themselves heard, but the movement is forwards towards new 
possibilities.  
As I have demonstrated, I find Kierkegaard‘s Gjentagelse valuable 
for understanding ideas of mothering. In her phenomenological reflection 
on pregnant experience, entitled ‗Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and 
Alienation‘,  Iris Marion Young writes of her own ‗normal‘ female 
experience, restricting the range of her account to the specific experience 
of women in technologically sophisticated Western societies,63 ‗who have 
been able to take up their situation as their own.‘  (Young, 2005b, p. 47) 
Young writes: 
                                                 
63
  The admirable maternal tradition of many African-American peoples lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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This split subject appears in the eroticism of pregnancy, 
in which the woman can experience an innocent 
narcissism fed by recollection of her repressed 
experience of her own mother‘s body.  Pregnant 
existence entails, finally, a unique temporality of process 
and growth in which the woman can experience herself 
as split between past and future. (Young, 2005, p. 47) 
Whereas Young describes her experience as a split between past and 
future,64 I suggest a Kierkegaardian ‗recollection forward‘.  The 
recollection is of her own mother.  The forward movement is not towards 
an abstract spiritual immortality but to a particular child‘s future, or 
particular children‘s futures, and to future lives.  The sense of the future is 
linked to future generations, especially the new generation to which the 
mother has contributed, thus gaining a sense of generations past, present 
and to come. 
Aristophanes‘ myth is of course a myth about sexuality.  Yet 
maybe there is a Wittgensteinian ‗fuzzy border‘ between sexual love and 
maternal love.  In her essay Breasted Experience Young challenges the 
patriarchal border between motherhood and sexuality, which derives from 
the logic of identity and its dependence on opposites. (2005) Mother love, 
understood as defleshed, spiritual, is opposed to carnal desire:  
                                                 
64
 Also discussed in my Introduction. 
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 The separation of motherhood and sexuality thus 
instantiates the culture‘s denial of the body and the 
consignment of fleshly desires to fearful temptation. 
(Young, 2005, p. 86)  
She explains this separation by reference to the incest taboo, and to 
the desire of men to monopolise women‘s desires.  If mother-love instead 
of being totally selfless and giving, contains bodily pleasure for the 
woman, this gives her a source of satisfaction independent of men.  She 
opposes the desiring woman to the self-sacrificing woman who just listens 
and cares.  She suggests that the pleasure some women take from breast-
feeding is an example of a ‗shattering of the border‘: ‗One of the most 
subversive things feminism can do is affirm this undecidability of 
motherhood and sexuality.‘ (p. 199) Of course, I agree with Young that 
there are dangers, especially to children, in the eroticization of mothering.  
But to recognise that a mother has desires which are met by her child is 
not to eroticise the mother in a harmful way. There is no necessary 
opposition between desire and protectiveness, or desire and nurturance. 
I re-instate the mother‘s body.  I understand nurturing not as a 
denial of the self, but as a development of the self.  Where Plato focuses 
on the agency of erotic desire, I focus on the agency of maternal desire.  
To be afraid to claim an undecidability because of an opposition that is 
part of male logic, is damaging to women. 
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Sarah 
In the ‗Attunement‘ preamble to Fear and Trembling, the author 
intersperses four retrospective versions of Abraham‘s fateful journey with 
Isaac with four poetic evocations of a mother‘s love for the child. 
(Kierkegaard, 1985)  My final section elaborates Kierkegaard‘s short 
evocations of Sarah, the mother of Isaac. I weave together the themes of 
love, temporality and contingency which emerge through thinking through 
the meaning of Sarah in this text.  In the preamble, Kierkegaard‘s 
pseudonymous author uses the repeated symbol of the mother weaning her 
child to indicate both Sarah‘s presence in the story of Abraham and Isaac, 
and an orientation to a future shaped by the past.  He writes of the mother 
weaning her child. 
I precede my discussion of Sarah by noting an additional element 
of contingency.  The weaning may not necessarily be from the mother‘s 
breast.  The powerful symbol of the mother breastfeeding her child is part 
of religious iconography.  Raphael‘s Madonnas present an image of 
perfect motherhood with the infant Jesus suckling at the breast.  The 
beatific symbol has crowded out the reality of the history of breastfeeding.  
In Wet Nursing: A History from Antiquity to the Present, Valerie Fields 
states: 
The breastfeeding of another woman‘s child in charity or 
for payment occurred in all civilisations in which the death 
of mothers in childbed or during lactation was relatively 
common, but this was not the only reason why it was 
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employed.  Social, political and religious factors played an 
important role.  (Fields, 1988, p. 1) 
She shows how this practice included: the exploitation of slaves by free 
women and poor women by rich women; a wide variety of relationships 
between mothers and babies, and wet nurses and babies; and a number of 
different financial and social practical arrangements.  It remained 
customary among certain groups in European society until the second half 
of the eighteenth century when the influence of Rousseau‘s Émile (1993) 
encouraged parents towards ‗natural‘ child care, maternal breast feeding, 
but even then this included upper class women employing a healthy 
country woman to breast feed. (Fields, 1988, Chapter 8)  Today, in my 
society, ‗natural‘ breastfeeding is encouraged, and wet-nursing is regarded 
as obsolescent.  SMA milk, or as it is commonly called, ‗formula‘ has 
replaced the wet nurse when the mother is absent, unable, or unwilling to 
breastfeed.  Yet problems for breastfeeding mothers remain.  Mothers who 
are obliged to return to employment usually have to stop breastfeeding.  
Goodison writes: 
symbols become restrictive only when we relinquish our 
ability to question our choice and move on.  There may 
come a time when they will need to be adapted, even 
abandoned.  As symbols they must, I feel, remain 
secondary and subordinate to lived experience, and they 
need to be open to change in accordance with that 
experience. (Goodison, 1992, p. 251) 
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The symbol of the breastfeeding mother needs to be adapted to take in a 
realisation of the cultural background and history of what appears a 
‗purely natural‘ activity.  Lived experience reveals the complexity 
underlying the image, the background to the Renaissance Madonnas.  Yet 
perhaps it is not time to abandon this symbol. Very many mothers do 
breastfeed their children.  This is a uniquely female activity, which may 
perhaps still symbolise the nourishment so many women provide for 
others. 
I now return to Fear and Trembling, to Kierkegaard‘s portrayal of 
Abraham‘s wife, Sarah, whom I see as symbolic of a virtuous maternal 
love.  Sarah‘s story echoes through, and counterpoints Abraham‘s story.  I 
find a multiplicity of voices in the ‗Attunement‘.  I take each version of 
the journey in turn, quoting the parts devoted to Sarah. 
At first Kierkegaard‘s narrator, Johannes de silentio, makes a 
contrast.  Abraham encourages Isaac to believe that he has changed to 
look ferocious while God has remained deserving of faith.  Sarah watched 
her husband and son from the window ‗until she could see them no more‘. 
(p. 45)  The mother‘s gaze is important here: 
When the child is to be weaned the mother blackens her 
breast, for it would be a shame were the breast to look 
pleasing when the child is not to have it.  So the child 
believes that the breast has changed but the mother is the 
same, her look loving and tender as ever.  Lucky the one 
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that needed no more terrible means to wean the child. 
(Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 46) 
Here the breast doubles the part of Abraham, made deceptively black, as 
he was deceptively ferocious, while the mother, unlike Abraham and like 
God, remains deserving of love.  The mother‘s body is a temporary source 
of nutrition, but it is not the body itself, but the love of the mother which 
is necessary to the child.  The mother is prepared to negate her body in the 
interest of orientating the child to the future.  The breast symbolises the 
mother, but like all symbols this one can be manipulated.  The symbol is 
not the mother.  The breast may not be the mother‘s, as discussed above.  
Some women agree with de Beauvoir that breastfeeding is painful and 
enslaving. (1999, p. 524) Feeding itself cannot be equated with a 
beneficial mother love.  The loving look of the mother transcends the 
history of breast feeding, in the same way that Sarah‘s gaze went beyond 
the manipulation of Abraham and Isaac to hold them in her love.  Each of 
the passages referring to the mother ends by an acclamation of luck.  This 
draws attention to the vulnerability of the mother/child dyad.  The child 
must pass from the mother‘s nurturing to the wider world, but there is no 
guarantee that this access of independence will come easily.  It reminds us 
of the contingencies that surround a child‘s earliest years.  A child may be 
weaned to a share in the resources of a Western wealthy family, or to the 
hardship of poor Chinese girl-babies.  Cavarero reminds us ‗Each one 
[birth] forms a link in a sequence of births that might not have existed or 
might have existed otherwise.‘ (Cavarero, 1995, p. 118) 
 219 
In the second version of Abraham‘s story, Kierkegaard‘s narrator 
emphasises the physical closeness of the family by noting their farewell 
embraces. (pp. 46-7)  He alludes to the primary importance of child 
bearing for women.  Sarah is ‗the bride of his old age‘; Isaac ‗had taken 
her disgrace from her, was her pride and hope for all generations.‘ Today, 
as in biblical times, women may be criticised for selfishness if they are 
childless.  For many women their self-esteem and sense of the future is 
beneficially influenced by having a child: 
When the child has grown and is to be weaned the mother 
virginally covers her breast, so the child no more has a 
mother.  Lucky the child that lost its mother in no other 
way! (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 46) 
This passage draws an implicit contrast between the virgin and the mother, 
thereby alluding to the integration of heterosexual sex and motherhood.  It 
plays against the earlier passage in insisting on the importance of the 
nutritional link between mother and child.  The final sentence gestures 
towards the devastation of loss of the mother. This emphasises the unique 
nature of the bond between mother and child.  As discussed above, in 
biblical times, on losing its mother to death, a child would, if it was to 
survive, have been breastfed by another woman. 
In Kierkegaard‘s third version, Sarah is a young mother whose 
natural happiness with her son is evoked in contrast to Abraham‘s 
‗thoughtfulness‘. 
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When the child is to be weaned the mother too is not 
without sorrow, that she and the child grow more and more 
apart: that the child which first lay beneath her heart, yet 
later rested at her breast should no longer be so close.  
Thus together they suffer this brief sorrow.  Lucky the one 
who kept the child so close and had no need to suffer more. 
(Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 47) 
Here the author follows a trajectory of the mother‘s love recognisable in 
Western society.  At first she shares her body with the child.  The phrase 
‗lay beneath her heart‘ evokes the intense care that, normally, the pregnant 
woman has for her unborn baby.  In a situation of threat, a pregnant 
woman immediately places her hand on her stomach to ward off danger.  
She changes her way of moving, what she eats and drinks, her work and 
her leisure to suit the fetus.  Today, in my society, pregnant women are 
advised not to take any drugs to alleviate any pain or discomfort, and it is 
normal that they take this upon themselves rather than risking damage to 
the child.  In ‗Pregnant Embodiment‘ Young comments that the fetus 
‗makes me conscious of the physicality of my body, not as an object, but 
as the material weight I am in movement.‘ (2005, p. 52)  As a pregnant 
woman‘s ‗automatic body habits become dislodged,‘ (2005, p. 50) she has 
an increased, aesthetic, awareness of her body.  A woman will frequently 
struggle with the changes to her body in pregnancy, but the loving bond 
between the mother and the fetus is curiously untouched by her 
difficulties. 
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The phrase ‗rested at her breast‘ indicates the possibility of peace, 
and of a sense of completion of breast-feeding, particularly after a feed 
when the mother and child are fully content with each other.  Young 
describes this:  ‗I lay there as she made love to me, snuggling her legs up 
to my stomach, her hand stroking my breast, my chest.‘ (Young, 2005a, p. 
88) Young understands the joy that mothers take in successful 
breastfeeding as an irreducible female pleasure.  Thus, as the child grows, 
the necessary movement more and more apart leaves a melancholy.  An 
alternate reading would refer to post-natal depression suffered by many 
women.  The loss of the child from ‗beneath her heart‘ can incapacitate the 
woman who has put so much energy into pregnancy.  In writing that they 
suffer this together, the author looks ahead to the sharing of sorrows which 
is part of maternal and filial love.  As the closeness comes from the heart, 
it can be affected but not cancelled by external events.  The real sorrow is 
loss of closeness due to separation or death. 
In the final version of the story the normalcy of Sarah is contrasted 
with the fell intention of Abraham. (p. 47) He ‗takes leave‘ of her. He 
makes ready for the sacrifice.  ‗Then they turned home again and Sarah 
ran to meet them.‘  She is impelled by love.  He has been impelled by his 
plan for sacrifice: 
When the child is to be weaned the mother has more solid 
food at hand, so that the child will not perish.  Lucky the 
one who has more solid food at hand! (Kierkegaard, 1985, 
p. 48) 
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Kierkegaard‘s narrator makes clear here that the mother must nourish the 
child and safeguard his life.  Whereas the father may need to accede to 
God‘s command, the mother‘s primary duty is to keep the child alive.  
Thus her love is both protective, and practical.  She foresees the future, 
and prepares for it.  She recognises that her love will not suffice for the 
child, and prepares the more solid food of an independent existence.  The 
threat is that the mother is unable to offer the child a way forward into the 
world.  She has to send him out unprovided for, hungry and vulnerable. 
Maternal love includes enabling the child to make the transition well. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I ground my argument for a relational figure of the mother 
by bringing in Kierkegaard‘s philosophy.  I demonstrate links between 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard before moving on to seek in Kierkegaard a 
relationality that is missing in Wittgenstein. The Wittgensteinian concept 
of forms of life is focused not on relationality between individuals, but on 
relationships between practices. I introduce female subjectivity through 
the narrative portraits in Kierkegaard‘s existence spheres, which stress 
relationality between beings who emerge together.  I find resources in 
Kierkegaard for a way of writing of the self, which moves towards the 
‗morphing‘, relational figure of the mother.  My aim is a more adequate 
representation of a (true) reality. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
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 The aspects of things that are most important for us are 
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is 
unable to notice something—because it is always before 
one‘s eyes.) (P.I.129)  
The ordinary mainstream mother is an example par excellence of this.  
Each of us is aware that we come from a mother, and, in the vast majority 
of cases, that a mother has nurtured us and guided our growth to 
adulthood.  Yet the mother is scarcely present to the philosophical mind. I 
suggest the figure of the mother as a paradoxical forgotten emblem as I 
show both her importance, and her obscurity.  I vary male symbols by 
introducing the changing lived experience of the mother. I seek spaces for 
her by adapting myths from Kierkegaard.  I insert language games of the 
mother into Kierkegaard‘s writing on women.   
Yet the mother evades the page.  She is at once an intensely practical 
and obvious figure, and an elusive figure.  Think of the face and the figure 






Chapter 6: Narrative Identity? 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I reflect further on, and critique, the narrative form 
which, in the preceding chapters, has advanced my search to re-present the 
language around the figure of the mother.  I bring together an investigation 
of the narrative form and the insight, stimulated by Wittgenstein‘s remark 
on games, that rather than a narrative, a multiplicity of narratives ‗with 
multifarious relationships‘ is needed.  I problematise the narrative of the 
figure of the mother, both as a subject of theory and in examples.  Whilst 
recognising Cavarero‘s point that the narrative form is helpful in moving 
depictions of the self away from masculine abstraction, I express my 
suspicions that the meanings around the figure of the mother are not 
entirely captured in a given narrative, and may be even distorted in the 
transformational effect of narrative. I try out the strategy of adopting the 
perspective of the mother to examine the ambiguous nature of such 
transformation: both therapeutic and distorting.  I question the function of 
narrative, and ask whose story is being told, and whose story is being 
forgotten.  
 Integral to this discussion is my presentation of the Kierkegaardian 
relational self – the self formed through and in relationship with others.  I 
write of family resemblances, both deriving from ‗blood‘ relationships, 
and, in the metaphorical sense, derived from Wittgenstein (discussed in 
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detail in Chapter 2).  I make a different pattern of meanings from 
examples which put the theory of the narratable self in question.  I explore 
the paradox of the forgotten emblem.  I emphasise that the mother is 
forgotten in that her part in language games is marginalised or disguised, 
but that she has the force of an emblem in that her presence, once noticed, 
has an impact on all that surrounds it. 
In ‗From Analogy to Narrative‘, Warner explores how narratives can 
work to re-invent persuasive cases, and to impel us to grasp new concepts. 
(Warner, 2005)  As part of this exploration, he discusses Wittgenstein‘s 
analogy between language and an ancient city. (P.I.18)65  Warner adverts 
to Lueken‘s idea that to understand the force of the analogy we should 
 ask how a language game works in relation to the practice 
and form of life in which it is embedded …. 
[Wittgenstein‘s argument] frames the field in a way which 
changes the sense of old questions and generates new ones. 
(Lueken, 1997, pp. 219-20)  
In my examples of analogous narratives below, I challenge the frame 
of reference from which the mother is excluded.  I frame the field in a way 
that shows the male nature of old questions, and generates new female 
                                                 
65
  …. Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of 
old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this 
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform 
houses. (P.I.18) 
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questions.  I show language games in relation to female practices and 
forms of life.  Such examples are essential to my argument for a changed 
understanding of the term ‗mother‘, and a philosophically significant 
relational self.  As the figure of the mother is ‗outside‘ philosophy, her 
importance cannot be argued deductively, since first premises are absent.  
By creating new analogies between language games previously thought 
remote from each other, I create the opportunity for a new understanding 
of the symbol of the mother, and of the interplay of symbols in particular 
cases.   
Warner writes: 
One remembers Wittgenstein‘s ‗A picture held us captive‘ [P.I. 
115]; analogical argument, it would appear, can shake the 
power of such a picture by providing an alternative. (Warner, 
2005, p. 27)  
 Warner also goes on to say:  
It is not difficult to see how the more dynamic concept of 
‗narrative‘ may sometimes be more appropriate than ‗picture.‘  
Since human experience is inescapably temporal, if our ‗pre-
understanding‘66 of that experience is narrative shaped, and if 
our perceptions of ourselves and others is such that we live in 
story-shaped worlds, the most appropriate way of de-
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 Pre-understanding is a term used by Paul Ricoeur to support his narrative theory, 
discussed below.  I ask whether we do all always live in story-shaped worlds.  
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stabilising our standard frameworks may well be to relate to 
our time-bound existence through telling a disruptive story. 
(Warner, 2005, p. 42) 
Thus Warner argues from Wittgensteinian analogies which urge us to try 
to see the familiar differently, across to the ‗more dynamic‘ narrative 
form.  In appealing to the imagination of my reader,67 I both use and resist 
Wittgenstein in engaging with the narrative form as a way of   bringing 
together differing viewpoints, expressing relationality, and finding space 
for embodied experience.  I discuss the mother as a symbol, and a material 
presence.   
The chapter is divided into three parts.  In the first part, Narrative 
Theories, I explore and critique the claims for narratives in the theories of 
MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and of Cavarero, whose ideas I consider in depth.  I 
draw on my key text, Sophocles‘ Antigone.68  I adopt a female perspective, 
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 Wisdom insists that in the form of analogical argument from case to case  which he 
advocates, the  ‗imaginary case is as good by way of evidence as any actual case‘. (1991, 
p.112)  
68
 I recognise that there are significant differences between myth, narrative and drama.  In 
this chapter, I read the relevant myths as narratives, and I refer to a narrative thread that 
runs through Sophocles‘ plays.  The Sophoclean narrative synthesises elements from 
well-known myths.  Although there is overlap between the forms, myth is distinguished 
by its flexibility, and ability to absorb and meld multiple narratives.  The relationship 
between myth, narrative and drama is complicated by questions of literacy.  The audience 
for a narrative, or spectators of a drama need not be literate, and may, as I demonstrate, 
be influenced by myths received within oral culture.  Oral narratives of pre-literate 
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and raise problems for the theories which emerge when they are applied to 
the figure of the mother.  In the second part, Reading Antigone, I follow 
Cavarero in looking back at the pre-Platonic myths of the house of 
Labdacus, as narrated by Sophocles.69  Although Oedipus the King 
appears in my work on Jocasta, the primary focus of my work is 
Sophocles‘ Antigone.70  My aim is to read the mother‘s body and the 
mother‘s voice into these open-textured myths. I present fictitious figures, 
whose stories are both acted out in Sophocles‘ tragedies, and reported in 
narrative form, in line with the Classical convention that all action takes 
place off-stage, and is recounted retrospectively.  I aim to make a bridge 
between the dramatically conceived lives of the women and the 
significance of the figure of the mother.  In the third part, Differences in 
Mothering, I exemplify differences.  I draw on poetry, a novel, and then 
on interview material for a factual account.  I choose diverse stories which 
complicate the figure of the mother, and, in so doing, complicate the idea 
of narrative identity. 
                                                                                                                         
societies function differently from written narratives.  Interaction from the audience or 
spectators is expected.   
69
 All quotation from Sophocles is taken from Sophocles (1994) Antigone;Oedipus the 
King; Electra.  
70
 Cavarero states (2002, p. 206, n. 24,) that part of her analysis aims at a dialogue with 
Judith Butler‘s (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’.  In her later 
book, (2000), Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death Butler continues her 
focus on the obstruction of vision consequent on a culture of normative heterosexuality.  
She begins this volume by providing a clear discussion of earlier interpretations of 
Antigone, by Hegel and Lacan.   
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Narrative Theories: MacIntyre, Ricoeur, Cavarero 
I begin by exploring Alisdair MacIntyre‘s historicist view in which 
there is an internal connection between belief in virtues being of a certain 
kind, and belief in human life exhibiting a certain narrative order.  As I 
explained in my Introduction, I am using MacIntyre‘s concept of virtue to 
exemplify the virtue of the mother.  Here, I outline his link between virtue 
and a strong view of narrative identity.  However, I argue against 
MacIntyre in introducing Lois McNay‘s critique to suggest a different, 
female narratable self.  (McNay, 2002) One of MacIntyre‘s central claims 
is that: 
If a human life is understood as a progress through harms 
and dangers, moral and physical, which someone may 
encounter and overcome in better and worse ways and with 
a greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find 
their place as those qualities the possession and exercise of 
which generally tend to success in this enterprise and the 
vices likewise as qualities which likewise tend to failure.  
Each human life will then embody a story whose shape and 
form will depend upon what is counted as a harm and 
danger and upon how success and failure, progress and its 
opposite are understood and evaluated.  To answer these 
questions will also explicitly and implicitly be to answer 
the question what the virtues and vices are. (MacIntyre, 
1981, p. 144) 
 230 
MacIntyre‘s perspective on pre-modern traditional societies is 
enlightening with regard to the world in which the women of Antigone 
live.  This is a world in which ‗the chief means of moral education is the 
telling of stories‘. (p. 121) Human life is understood as embodying a 
certain type of narrative structure.  Every individual has a given role and 
status: 
Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking 
set of social relationships; lacking that space, they are 
nobody, or at best a stranger or an outcast.  To know 
oneself as such a social person is however not to occupy a 
static and fixed position.  It is to find oneself placed at a 
certain point on a journey with set goals; to move through 
life is to make progress – or to fail to make progress –
towards a given end. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 34) 
In Sophocles‘ play, neither Antigone nor her sister, Ismene has an 
individuality apart from her family relationships.  The threat of being a 
stranger or an outcast is exactly the threat over the very body of 
Antigone‘s brother, Polyneices, and subsequently over the actions of his 
sister.  Antigone demonstrates her sense of her ‗interlocking set of social 
relationships‘ through her preparedness to die for her brother.  Her social 
relationships outside the family count for less, as indeed they do for 
Ismene when she voices her horror at the thought of life without her sister.  
In Sophocles‘ play, Ismene appeals to Creon: ‗But what is life to me, 
without my sister?‘(l. 66)  MacIntyre emphasises the importance of the 
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forms and claims of kinship in this society.  Friendship and fidelity are 
important male virtues.  MacIntyre informs us that in women, who 
constitute the crucial relationships within the household, fidelity is the key 
virtue (MacIntyre 1981, p.136).  Antigone and Ismene suffer through 
conflicts of fidelity.  MacIntyre informs us that sôphrosunê, ability to 
control one‘s passions, is the womanly virtue.71 (p. 136) Antigone sought 
out death rather than control her passions.  Ismene is at first controlled, but 
then desires to die with her sister.  For MacIntyre, a Sophoclean insight is 
that ‗through conflict and only through conflict do we learn what our ends 
and purposes are.‘ (p. 163)  Creon evidently learns the distinction between 
the purposes of tyranny and the purposes of just rule in the unfolding of 
Antigone. The sisters learn what they have always known, that they were 
born of Jocasta, and that they continue her story. 
For MacIntyre, the narrated self produces unity: 
 And the unity of a virtue in someone‘s life is intelligible 
only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can be 
conceived and evaluated as a whole. (MacIntyre,1981, p. 
205)   
 He offers ‗a concept of self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative 
which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.‘ 
(p. 205) In her feminist critique of MacIntyre, Lois McNay challenges this 
                                                 
71
 MacIntyre‘s italics.  MacIntyre here follows the Greeks in noting a virtue which is 
convenient to men.  He does not observe the virtue of the mother.   
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function of narrative, and the idea that there is a true narrative of the quest 
in which we are engaged.  She suggests that an analysis of power relations 
is a missing element in MacIntyre‘s advocacy of a coherent, narrated self. 
(McNay, 2002)  MacIntyre demonstrates an uncritical acceptance of social 
structures.  McNay suggests that our memories may contain ‗crevasses, 
ruptures, emptiness, deep wells of non-being‘; that there may be a 
mismatch between different narratives of identity all of which we wish to 
retain; and that we may find a fundamental lack of congruity between our 
various social roles. (McNay, 2002, p. 87) She shows how women may be 
prevented from telling their story, indeed from hearing their story narrated, 
by issues of power, ideology and exclusion.  Her example here is drawn 
from Spivak‘s ‗Can the Subaltern Speak?‘ (Spivak, 1988) which explores 
the impossibility of Indian widows expressing themselves in the male 
debate on the practice of sati. (Spivak, 1988, p. 308)  McNay examines the 
resignation to their situations and disorganisation of behaviour and 
thought in those who lack social power. Such difficulties may prevent 
women (and others) from creating or even desiring a narrative. The stress 
of child-rearing may lead to an uneven memory of its struggles.  Older 
mothers frequently comment on how much they have forgotten of their 
children‘s younger years.  The roles of mother and employee are often 
incongruous.  The social structure in which they interact may place 
mothers in an inferior position. 
McNay‘s acceptance of a fragmentation of social roles and 
narratives could also be illustrated by reference to Kierkegaard‘s 
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narratives in Either/Or.  Kierkegaard offers an alternative to the unified 
narrative of MacIntyre.  As author, Kierkegaard used a number of masks 
which reflect the fragmented self he explored.  Each mask offers a self, 
but in the mosaic of masks the author is disguised, and the narrator 
shatters into a self as splintered as the selves he narrates.  If we accept 
fragmentation, the continuity of memory which may be painful, or simply 
unreliable is no longer necessary.  The different narratives of identity are 
not necessarily harmful.  Rather they offer alternatives none of which has 
to be seen as definitive.  In setting aside the authority of the narrator, 
Kierkegaard liberates him from the listener‘s possible demand for a 
coherence to events that is absent from the narrator‘s experience of them.  
The incongruity between social roles is no longer an impediment to the 
story.  In the Kierkegaardian approach, the silencing of women, to which 
McNay and Spivak refer, is perhaps circumvented.  Discontinuous parts of 
life, spoken in different ‗voices‘, in different contexts, could be recognised 
as valuable narratives.  Such a loosening of the demands of the narrator, of 
the narration itself, and of the narratee, is helpful to those who are 
marginalised in the traditional narrative form – amongst whom are 
mothers. 
Ricoeur 
In his impressive essay, ‗Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator‘, Paul 
Ricoeur‘s aim is to rethink the ‗relation between a story and a life, rethink 
it such that fiction helps to make life –  in the biological sense of the word 
– human.‘ (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 425) Ricoeur points out that plotting a 
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narrative involves synthesising heterogeneous elements which are 
organised into an intelligible whole by narration.  The plot mediates 
between multiple incidents to achieve a unity of components such as 
accidental or expected confrontations, and interactions of various kinds.  
The narrative that runs through the Sophoclean plays synthesises elements 
from well-known myths.  The confrontations of the characters with each 
other, and with their ineluctable fates, are the source of the tragedies.  The 
reader or spectator adjusts her expectations in line with the unfolding of 
the story.  Nevertheless, the plot can cover over erasures and omissions.  
As is well-known, many of Shakespeare‘s magnificently plotted dramas 
omit the figure of the mother.72  The attentive female reader or audience 
does indeed adjust expectations.  The expectation becomes that the mother 
will be absent, probably dead.  For Ricoeur, the plot synthesises two kinds 
of time: ‗a discrete, open and theoretically undefined succession of 
incidents‘; and ‗the temporal aspect characterized by the integration, the 
culmination, and the ending in virtue of which a story gains an outline.‘ 
(1991, p. 427) A story ‗endures and remains right across that which passes 
away‘.  The linear sequencing of experience may be ill-suited to the 
narrative of the mother. Her multiplicity of experiences, acknowledged 
and unacknowledged, may be so diverse that to synthesise them is to 
falsify them beyond recognition.  Her narrative looks forward with the 
growth of the child, but as a mother she is defined by retrospect in the act 
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 Notable exceptions are the figure of Gertrude in Hamlet, and Juliet‘s mother Lady 
Capulet in Romeo and Juliet.   
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of birth.  The maternal body which is so vital a part of her experience is 
not fully comprehended in a narrative outline. 
I find Ricoeur‘s idea of a ‗receiver‘ of a narrative helpful.  He 
suggests that the tragedy, the epic, the comedy develop in the receiver a 
‗narrative intelligence‘, which is a form of practical wisdom and moral 
judgment issuing from creative imagination. His thesis here 
 is that the process of composition, of configuration, does 
not realise itself in the text but in the reader … the meaning 
or the significance of a story wells up from the intersection 
of the world of text and the world of the reader.73  Thus the 
act of reading becomes the crucial moment of the entire 
analysis. (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 430)  
The act of reading enables the transition from print to life.  I place myself 
as a ‗receiver‘ searching for the significance of the mother.  In my reading 
below, I understand the succession of incidents, the threat from Laius, the 
defiance of Antigone, the caution of Ismene, as incidents in the lives of 
women born of a particular mother.  I impress on the story an outline in 
which natality and maternal feeling matter.  I seek a new judgment, not 
according to masculine codes of honour, but according to a female 
viewpoint. 
                                                 
73
 Italics used in original. 
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For Ricoeur, the narrative schema has the characteristics of a 
tradition, which contains both innovation and sedimentation.  The 
sedimentation of the tradition allows the ascription of typology to 
compositions.  We know the type of story we hear or read because we can 
place it amongst similar stories.  Yet the rules for what constitutes which 
type of creative composition slowly change under pressure of innovation.  
Innovation is not free-floating but remains a strategy governed by existing 
rules.  Every work can be placed between the poles of repetition of an 
earlier creative act and deviance from such. ‗The variations between these 
two poles confer on the productive imagination a historicity of its own and 
keep the narrative tradition alive.‘ (1991, p. 430)  There is, of course, no 
problem in assigning the profound works of Sophocles to the canon of 
classical drama.  Yet, as Cavarero points out, Antigone is ‗wildly 
eccentric‘ and has ‗significant and unorthodox irregularities.‘ (Cavarero 
2002, p. 17)  For this reason, amongst others, it has become an important 
text in feminist hermeneutics.  The sedimented myth, in which, rarely, 
women are the principal characters, offers opportunities for innovation. 
Ricoeur suggests that narrative leads back to life through realising 
itself in the reader, and makes possible ‗reconfiguration of a life by the 
way of narrative.‘  The reader is able to appropriate the horizon of the 
world of the text:  
 The result is that the reader belongs to both the 
experiential horizon of the work imaginatively, and the 
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horizon of his action concretely.  The horizons meet and 
fuse without ceasing. (Ricoeur,1991, p. 431) 
 My reading below makes a female imaginative appropriation which 
remains within the world of the text.  I aim to engage in an act of reading 
which completes the work, 
 transforms it into a reading guide with its zones of 
indetermination, its latent richness of interpretation, its 
ability to be reinterpreted in novel ways within historical 
contexts that are always new‘. (Ricoeur,1991, p. 432) 
 I allow the narrative to realise itself differently through reading it as a 
woman reading as a mother.  I seek to fuse the horizon of the mother with 
the horizon of these ancient daughters, sisters, and their mother, all of 
whom ‗act under a cloud of steady misogyny‘.  (Cavarero, 2002, p. 31) 
Ricoeur is impressed by the desire for narrative.  He terms life ‗an 
activity and a desire in search of a narrative’.74(1991, p. 434) Action is 
always embedded in a descriptive context. We understand a gesture or an 
action because of what surrounds it.  He sees the demand for a story as 
part of the ‗pre-narrative structure of experience‘, so that episodes in our 
lives may have the quality of potential stories, or stories not yet told.  He 
illustrates by the examples of the patient who goes to the psychoanalyst in 
search of a story and the judge who creates a story from disparate facts to 
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 Italics used in original. 
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understand a crime.75  The function of a story is to bring out the 
‗narratable self.‘  Ricoeur stresses that the narrative must be acceptable to 
the patient for a cure to occur. The story the patient finds plausible 
enlightens him as to aspects of his life which had previously been obscure 
to him.  The judge‘s version of events is more acceptable than a disparate 
account, since this version is that which leads to action, to the sentence.  
Other narratives have other functions.  For example, narratives may be 
expressive of relationality.  They may be configured for purposes of 
reassurance.  They may have entertainment value.  Adapting an insight 
from P.I.66 (where Wittgenstein is talking about families of games) we 
might say that ‗we can go through the many, many other groups of 
[narratives] in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and 
disappear.‘  
For Ricoeur, we find ourselves ‗entangled‘ in stories each with a 
pre-history, a background, and an overlap with other stories.  To 
understand our experience we need to understand our story, so that 
narrative fiction is an ‗irreducible dimension of the understanding of the 
self.‘76 (Ricoeur 1991, p. 435)  My questions here are: Understanding for 
                                                 
75
 Another example can be found in the field of medicine. Helen King suggests that the 
search for meaning in suffering … should be seen in terms of narrative.  Explaining 
illness leads to reflection on one‘s life … Reflection leads on to narrative, as previously 
unconnected events are perceived to have been linked in ways unseen at the time.  
Suffering ‗unmakes‘ the world while, by creating a narrative representation of illness, 
medicine can reconstruct it. (King, 1998, p. 111) 
76
 Italics used in original. 
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whom?  Whose story is of significance, and for whom is it significant?  I 
demonstrate below that a traditional understanding of Antigone as a story 
of a clash between duty to the state, and duty to the family, largely ignores 
the figures of Jocasta, Antigone‘s mother.   An alternative understanding 
requires a perspective on the play in terms of female relationality.  One 
purpose of this many-layered narrative may be to illustrate such 
relationality. 
Cavarero 
In Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, Cavarero 
emphasises equally the desire to tell one‘s story, and the shaping power of 
the listener to the story of one‘s life. (Cavarero, 2000)  The Italian title, 
‘Tu che mi gardi, tu che mi raconti’ – ‗You who look at me, you who 
narrate me‘ – makes her stress on the person of the narrator evident.  
Cavarero does not discuss the idea that different listener/narrators may 
produce different truths, or that there may be no unifying truth to be heard.  
I select from her ideas those that return to the myth of Oedipus; those 
which develop ideas of the unique existent born from a unique mother; 
and those which are concerned with the relationality inherent in both 
identity and story-telling.  I use Cavarero‘s ideas as a stimulus to shading 
in the mother to philosophical tradition; and add to Cavarero by shading in 
the figure of the mother. 
In her first chapter, Cavarero attacks the masculinist tradition in 
philosophy with its enthusiasm for definitions of universals such as ‗truth‘, 
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‗beauty‘, ‗man‘.  She achieves this by illustrating, through the myth of 
Oedipus, that:  
‗Man‘ is a universal that applies to everyone precisely 
because it is no one.  It disincarnates itself from the living 
singularity of each one, while claiming to substantiate it.  It 
is at once masculine and neuter, a hybrid creature generated 
by thought, a fantastic universal produced by the mind. 
(Cavarero, 2000, p. 9)  
In Sophocles‘ play, in his increasingly intense questioning of Jocasta and 
of the Messenger, Oedipus displays the desire, common to all, to know his 
story, in order to learn who he is.  So long as Oedipus knows himself only 
in the universal, he is ignorant of his embodied uniqueness.  This can only 
be revealed through learning of his birth from his mother.  Oedipus cannot 
learn his story, learn who he is, while he is trapped in the universal.  
Demonstrating the importance of the mother for her ideas of narrative 
identity, Cavarero shows that Oedipus is trapped by being ignorant of the 
start of his story, in being ignorant of who was his mother.  Cavarero turns 
away from the heroic preoccupation with death to characterise birth as a 
most significant event for knowledge of identity:   
 The story of one‘s life always begins where that person‘s 
life begins … the uniqueness of his identity, his daimon, 
has its origin in the event of his birth.  (Cavarero, 2000, p. 
11) 
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  From the outset, the desire for one‘s story is linked to another, a 
‗you‘, which Cavarero identifies with the Greek notion of the daimon.  
Here, Cavarero follows Hannah Arendt, (1958), in referring to: 
 the daimon in Greek religion, which accompanies each 
man throughout his life, looking over his shoulder from 
behind and thus visible only to those he encounters. 
(Cavarero, 2000, p. 21) 
In Greek Religion, Walter Burkert provides an account of the 
‗astonishing career‘ of the term ‗daimon‘, now living on as ‗demon‘.  
(Burkert 1985, p. 180) The term moves between the idea of a force of fate, 
and a spirit with particular intentions concerning an individual man (not 
woman).  The daimon begins as an ‗occult power, a force that drives man 
forward where no agent can be named.‘ (1985, p. 180) When the tide of 
fortune is with the agent he acts syn daimoni, when all turns against him 
he acts pros daimona.  The idea which derives from a pre-Classical 
tradition,77 was that each of us is allocated at birth a daimon, who watches 
over us.  The term became associated with spirits after death, particularly 
for those who died fighting for their country. Socrates uses the term 
daimonion to express the sense of something inner which causes him to 
stop and think, rather than ‗speak of something divine.‘ (Burkett, 1985, p. 
181) 
                                                 
77
 ‗A general belief in spirits is not expressed by the term daimon until the fifth century  
A.D. when a doctor asserts that neurotic women and girls can be driven to suicide by 
imaginary apparitions.‘ (Burkert,1985, p. 181) 
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   This internalised usage survives in our sense of being beset by, for 
example, the demon of drink.  Cavarero transforms the daimon into an 
unseen double.  She gives the daimon the unnerving gloss of a spectral 
individual.  She introduces to the meaning the idea of the daimon as 
listener, as one who can see what the narrator cannot see.  This changed 
meaning is important to the claim to truth in Cavarero‘s theory.  We infer 
that there may be false versions of identity with which we fool ourselves, 
but the listener has access to a truth which encircles us. 
Referring to the myth of Ulysses, Cavarero makes distinct the roles 
of the actor and the narrator.  The actor is able to recognise himself only 
when he recognises his story.  The narratee must appear to another in 
order to act in his story.  Cavarero meditates on the significance of a new-
born child, a child without a story.  The philosopher asks from where the 
child came and receives the answer from ‗nothingness‘. The alternative 
question is ‗Who gave birth to this creature?‘  The answer to this question 
brings in the ‗other‘, ‗the ex- of the existent‘, and leads to the particular 
identity.  
 The mother is the other to whom the existent first 
appears…the primacy of appearance constitutes through 
the others‘ gaze, the fundamental corporal aspect of 
identity. (Cavarero, 2000, p. 21) 
 In whatever scenes we may appear through our lives, our first bodily and 
unique appearance is to our mothers. To our mothers, at birth, we never 
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appear as the ‗what?‘ a baby, but always as a ‗who?‘ a unique existent 
born from our mothers.  
 The exhibitive quality of acting … makes birth into a 
phenomenal scene capable of conferring upon identity its 
expressive, contextual and relational status.  In this way 
birth, action and narration become the scenes of an identity 
that always postulates the presence of an other. (Cavarero, 
2000, p. 28)  
 From the moment of birth we appear, we express our being. 
Cavarero is over-privileging sight.  In most cases, the new-born is 
first seen by the midwife, and, today in Britain, by the father. Delivery is 
now accompanied by the steady and insistent sound of the baby‘s 
heartbeat, and the mother will often hear the baby‘s cry before she sees 
her.  Provided that the birth is normal, and the mother is healthy and 
willing, the new-born enters its first reciprocal relationship with her as she 
responds to her cries by putting her to the breast.  The baby begins, often 
after some initial difficulty, to suckle.  In writing of the gaze, the ‗primacy 
of appearance‘, ‗the phenomenal scene‘, Cavarero is straying into an 
abstract picture of birth in which our senses of hearing and of touch slip 
away.  She is preoccupied by the scene under the hospital arc lights.  
Relationality is born as we are born, through our bodies.  The interwoven 
identities of the mother and daughter gradually start to emerge. Cavarero 
writes of the infant appearing to the mother or the lovers appearing to each 
other as unique individuals. In agreeing with this, I add that the speech of 
 244 
birth is not only ‗it‘s a girl‘, but often also immediately a searching for 
similarity. Many new-borns resemble family members.  Family 
resemblance is a literal truth as well as a Wittgensteinian metaphor.  
Cavarero writes: ‗Between identity and narration – and this is our 
thesis….there is a tenacious relation of desire.‘ (2000, p. 32)  Despite my 
disagreement with Cavarero over the privileged role of sight, I do want to 
support her claim that it is this desire that makes each of us into a 
narratable self.  We have a familiar self-sensing recognition. ‗[The 
narratable self is] the familiar self [sapore familiare] of every self …‘ 
(Cavarero, 2000, p.34) The spontaneous experience of memory within 
narrative is not the same as the reflexive nature which constitutes the 
autonomous subject, favoured in the male tradition.  Not all memory takes 
the form of an active process of remembering, it can also take the form of 
involuntary recall or an unreflecting knowledge of the self. (Cavarero, 
2000, p. 34) Cavarero‘s sense of our desire for our story is linked to the 
relationality of the story.  She separates uniqueness from substantiality: 
 Our thesis, once more, is that the etymological root that 
the terms uniqueness (unicita) and unity (unita) share does 
not flatten them out into a homogenous substance, but 
rather renders them signs of an existence whose life-story 
is different from all others precisely because it is 
constitutively interwoven with many others.‖ (Cavarero, 
2000, p. 71).  
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 For Cavarero, the unity of a human life, on which she insists, is provided 
by the related story of the life, and the relationality of the life: the function 
of narrative is clearly to produce unity.  
I do, however, have further difficulties with Cavarero‘s thesis with 
respect to the narratable life.  Cavarero erases difficulties in the interest of 
unity, whereas for me unity is often imposed on, or read into, the stories of 
the less powerful by the more powerful.   For example, she warns briefly 
against the risk of ‗cultural colonialization and instrumental appropriation‘ 
before analysing Elsa Joubert‘s The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena. 
(1985, discussed in Cavarero 2000, pp. 64-5) She deals cursorily with the 
power relation between the white literate story taker and the black 
illiterate story giver.  She is aware of the ‗risk‘ that this story may appeal 
to those who speak the Afrikaans language, but do not know how to read 
it.  She suggests that Joubert solves this problem by putting on a theatrical 
performance of the tale for the family and friends of Poppie Nongena. 
Although this is well intentioned, it seems unlikely that the performance 
would overcome the problem.  A distance was created as Poppie Nongena 
was transformed from a black maid, who provided an autobiographical 
and oral story to the ‗story-taker‘ who was literate, into the subject of a 
biographical novel.  The theatrical performance would have been 
intelligible to non-readers of Afrikaans, but Poppie Nongena had still been 
transformed from being a worker, a daughter and a friend to being part of 
a white woman‘s literary oeuvre.  Here the story of the black maid is given 
unity at all costs by the ‗story-taker‘.  Cavarero does not acknowledge the 
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‗smoothing‘ effect of story-giving to one‘s employer.  Cavarero‘s concern 
with the language in which the story is related masks a disregard for the 
possibility of hidden, incongruous narratives within the published 
narrative.  Another example can be found in Cavarero‘s stories of two 
ordinary Milanese women, Emilia and Amalia. (pp. 55-7) Cavarero does 
not hesitate to claim that Emilia is attached to her life-story written by her 
friend because it contains the unifying truth.  She does not consider that 
there may be aspects of herself that Emilia does not choose to reveal even, 
or especially, to her friend, nor that the story itself may not be important to 
Emilia.  It may be the simple act of friendship that matters, irrespective of 
what words are on the paper that she carries in her purse. 
In the second part of her book, Relating Narratives, entitled 
‗Women‘, Cavarero turns to the occluded woman.  She draws on Muriel 
Rukeyser‘s poem ‗Myth‘ in which Oedipus asks why it was that he did not 
recognise his mother. The sphinx admits to having misled Oedipus: 
‗But that was what made everything possible‘ said 
Oedipus. 
‗No,‘ she said. ‗When I asked ―what walks on four legs in 
the morning, two at noon, and three in the evening?‖,  you 
answered, ―Man‖.  You didn‘t say anything about woman.‘ 
‗When you say ―Man‖ ‘ said Oedipus, ‗you include women 
too.  Everyone knows that.‘ 
        She said, ‗That‘s what you think.‘  (Rukeyser, 1984, p. 498, 
quoted Cavarero, p. 49) 
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Sheer arrogance caused Oedipus to make the common error of including 
women within the category ‗man‘.  Before his physical blinding, Oedipus 
figuratively blinded himself from recognising who he was.  His incest is a 
direct consequence.  While men are concerned with the universal, 
 there is a shade of truth in the stereotype that women have 
an aptitude for the particular … in women‘s stories the 
accidental and the particular are alive and well. (Cavarero, 
2000, p. 53)  
The uniqueness of a life story corresponds to such particularity.  The 
particular person so damagingly ignored by Oedipus was, of course, his 
mother, Jocasta.  Failing to recognise his mother seems to go beyond 
‗ignoring the particular‘ as noted by Cavarero.  An unspoken and 
unacknowledged familiarity with the person of one‘s mother is a basic 
expectation of lives as normatively lived in our culture.  For an adopted 
child, like Oedipus, the depth and intimacy of the relationship may 
sometimes be displayed in the intensity of the desire for such recognition.  
For those cared for by mothers, adoptive or biological, recognising and 
being recognised by one‘s mother, is important to self-understanding. 
In her final section, ‗Lovers‘, Cavarero stresses the narrative 
reciprocity of lovers.  She entitles her chapter, ‗Eros and Narration‘, thus 
singling out one kind of love.  She refers to mother-love, as a comparator, 
to suggest that the ‗who‘, the person loved, is as unique to the lover as the 
child, the person loved, is unique to the mother.   In placing mother-child 
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love as an exemplar of loving the ‗who‘, Cavarero re-confirms the point 
she made through the myth of Oedipus: to learn who he is and thus to 
escape from the misleading universal, Oedipus needs to know who is his 
mother. The mother-child relation is at the origin of the story, and at the 
start of a uniqueness which emerges from relationality.  Cavarero 
examines, inter alia , Alice Toklas and Gertrude Stein, and Orpheus and 
Eurydice.  She demonstrates how, in loving each other, two narratable 
selves appear to each other in their uniqueness and provide ontological 
affirmation for each other.  The lover seeks to tell her/his story to a 
listener who shapes the story as a way of enacting a loving relationship.  
Such narrative reciprocity is not confined to figures from literature. The 
scenes of storytelling range ‗from gossip to the family feast, from the 
meeting of friends to conversations with strangers, and especially in 
friendship and love.‘ (2000, p. 126)  
Cavarero places emphasis on the ‗interweaving‘ of unique stories, in 
contrast to Ricoeur who expresses our ‗entanglement‘ in each other‘s 
stories.  This term ‗entanglement‘ perhaps conveys better the potential 
complications of stories.  For Jocasta, as for many women, there may be 
secrets that affect the lives of those with whom one is entangled, but 
which are not revealed to them.  As I have argued elsewhere: 
Given the complications of most women‘s lives, how many 
of us would entrust the vagaries of our fortunes to the 
discretion of another?  Those in weaker positions have 
much to gain by having a hidden self.  Perhaps we do not 
 249 
entirely recognise ourselves in the other‘s narration, 
however gifted or close to us the storyteller may be. 
(Mitchell, 2001, p. 85) 
The shaping listener whom Cavarero does not stress is the mother.  
She focuses on Eros rather than on mother-love, which equally well may 
call out narrative reciprocity. Curiously, a quotation from Oedipus which 
Cavarero provides earlier makes this point: 
She is my mother; my sisters are the Seasons; 
My rising and my falling march with theirs. 
Born thus, I ask to be no other man 
Than that I am, and will know who I am. (Sophocles, 
Oedipus the King, quoted Cavarero 2000, p. 11) 
 
In the second line, Oedipus makes clear exactly the interweaving in a 
loving relationship that Cavarero endorses.  As Cavarero puts it, his 
uniqueness comes from being ‗born of a mother ... who, by giving birth to 
him, has generated the seasons of his existence, … ' (2000, p. 11).  
Sophocles‘ phrase, ‗My rising and my falling march with theirs‘ expresses 
poetically the imbrication of a mother‘s life in her child‘s, and the child‘s 
life in its mother‘s.  Though more rarely acknowledged than the stories 
told in romantic love, the story of our mother‘s life, while we are yet 
dependent, has influence, as does her version of our lives.  For adopted 
children the story of their birth-mother is, often entirely or at least 
partially, unknown.  The picture is complicated.  Adoptive children do 
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frequently seek out details of their biological mothers, but at the same 
time not having that information, or not acting on it to form a relationship 
with their birth-mothers, is a viable alternative. A secure identity can be 
formed without this knowledge.78  Jackie Kay‘s poem, ‗The Adoption 
Papers‘, discussed below, suggests that the absence of narrative can be 
more bearable than the narrative.  (Kay, 1991) 
Cavarero‘s argument suggests that Oedipus is an extreme example 
of the ignoring of the mother typical of the relation of life-stories.  
Cavarero points out that in losing the event of his birth Oedipus lost his 
story.  Characteristically life-stories begin, ‗I was born at …; my parents 
were …. ‘  Already in the phrase, ‗I was born‘ the labour and the presence 
of the mother are lost, as they were lost, in a more extreme way, to 
Oedipus.  Ironically Oedipus, famed for his romance with his mother, 
provides an emblematic example of the erasure of the mother which 
begins so many ‗great lives‘.  Although Antigone and Ismene enter the 
stage at the end of Oedipus the King, Jocasta dies without telling them her 
story.  Both daughters can be read as shaped by their mother, but this 
requires reader/listener thinking the myth through motherhood, rather than 
through the silencing hostility and revenge of the Theban court. 
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 There is a further dimension in recent decision to allow children who are born from 





Antigone has been important for the concept of ‗woman‘ in 
philosophy.  I precede my reading by briefly alluding to Battersby‘s use of 
Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s writing on Antigone as part of her project of 
outlining a female subject position.  For Hegel, Antigone represents 
woman in her purest form.  I make no claim to engage with the huge 
debate, stimulated by Hegel, over the law of the state and the law of 
kinship, nor with psychoanalytic readings of the text.79  For Hegel, 
Antigone‘s most significant relation is to her brother.  Battersby shows 
how for Hegel, ‗Antigone‘s position as the ―other‖ of patrilineal society is 
a necessary polarity within the development of (male/human) spirituality.‘ 
(1998,  p. 111) 
For Hegel, it is Sophocles‘ portrayal of the sister/brother 
relation that reveals the essence of woman most clearly.  
Antigone‘s tie is to ‗blood‘: to the family and 
(spiritualized) nature, in ways that put her outside the 
customs and ethics of the state or Greek polis…. Hegel 
supposes that woman‘s bondage to ‗blood‘ keeps her 
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 In Stately Bodies Cavarero notes that ‗In Irigaray‘s work Sophocles‘ Antigone receives 
constant critical attention and passes through various interpretive phases … . In her 
Speculum essay [1985a] … Antigone‘s identification with her mother is linked to her 
nullification of self within a maternal desire turned prevalently towards the son.‘ 
(Cavarero 2002, p. 203, n. 5)  My aim by contrast is, primarily, to read into the myths, the 
story of the mother of daughters.  I see the mother as a mother, rather than as a site of 
maternal desire.   
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obedient to sacred law in ways that leave her outside the 
duties that are imposed on males. (p. 110) 
Antigone represented ‗woman‘ in her purest form and was 
characterized as the ‗everlasting irony in [the life of] the 
community.‘ (Battersby 1998, p. 153 including quotation 
from Hegel, 1977, §475, p. 288)  
Battersby also discusses  Kierkegaard‘s Antigone in which Antigone‘s  
most significant relation is to her father.  He reworks the myth in a chapter 
of Volume 1 of Either/Or entitled ‗The Tragic in Ancient Drama reflected 
in the Tragic in Modern Drama.‘ (1987, 139-164) Kierkegaard portrays a 
modernized Antigone, through the voice of the aesthete A., who presents a 
contrast. The Greeks ‗suffered sorrow, but accepted their family or city as 
the unchangeable horizon of their lives.‘ (Kierkegaard, 1987, p. 143) The 
Greek Antigone rests in her fate.  The modernized Antigone, as reworked 
by Kierkegaard, holds the secret of her father within her, alone, and with 
anxiety.   Her secret knowledge prevents her from marrying her beloved.  
Only when she dies can she tell her beloved her reason for refusing 
marriage.  Kierkegaard‘s Antigone fits neither the Greek model, nor the 
modern model. Battersby explains,  
Kierkegaard‘s modernized Antigone is neither ‗modern‘ 
nor ‗ancient.‘  Her destiny is not just a matter of fate; her 
feelings are not just ones of ‗sorrow.‘  But she feels pain 
for something that is not her own fault as she tries to take 
responsibility for the ‗sins of the father.‘  As such Antigone 
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is singular: both inside and outside the norms of full 
personhood which are characteristic of modernity.  
(Battersby, 1998, p. 254) 
Battersby uses Kierkegaard‘s writing on Antigone to think through 
‗falling outside the norms of individuality and the ethics of personhood.‘  
(Battersby, 1998, p. 155)  Thinking the concept of ‗woman‘ has broken 
open such norms and ethics.  In later sections I refer to Kierkegaard‘s 
insights on secrecy. 
Cavarero discusses Antigone in Stately Bodies. (Cavarero, 2002, 
pp.13-97) I begin by following her in presenting Antigone primarily as a 
daughter. I emphasise her re-interpretation of the importance of Jocasta 
for the unfolding of the tragedy.  I add reflections on Jocasta. I do not 
ignore the incest which darkens the relationship between these women, 
but neither is it a centre of my attention. 
In my re-reading I have shifted Sophocles‘ descriptive context in 
that I have not focused on Creon, the king, nor the death of Haemon, his 
son and the fiancé, but on the lives of the women.  The characters in 
Antigone are entangled in other parts of the myth not acted in this play.  
Ancient as they are, they enlighten us about female experience. 
The Daughter’s Story 
The first section of Cavarero‘s Stately Bodies is entitled, ‗On the 
Body of Antigone.‘ (Cavarero, 2002)  She shows the centrality of the body 
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of Polyneices to the tragedy, and the importance of the body to the quarrel 
between Antigone and Creon.  Rather than interpreting Antigone‘s 
obligation to her brother in terms of a clash between her sense of family, 
and the demand that she should obey Creon‘s edict, Cavarero provides an 
explanation of Antigone‘s love for, and sense of duty to, her brother in 
terms of their ‗co-uterine generation‘ in Jocasta‘s womb.  In attending to 
the norms of life of the ancient Greeks, and showing the importance of 
female lineage, she brings the mother forcefully into Sophocles‘ play.  
Once Antigone and Polyneices are thought of from the perspective of the 
body, their mother is instantly called to mind, since it is having shared her 
body that is essential to their bond.80  Cavarero points out that although the 
family is,  
 indicated sometimes with the term domos, it is rooted in 
the notions of genos or philia , or rather in the concept of 
that consanguineous chain linking those who belong by 
birth to a common breed, and who therefore share not only 
the same house, but also the same blood inscribed in 
generation. (Cavarero, 2002, p. 26)  
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 Today, of course, we are not governed by the same sets of norms as the ancient Greeks, 
and may well not accept that we have duties to those to whom we are related by ‗co-
uterine generation‘.  However, Cavarero‘s insight throws a new light on many brother-
sister dramas, such as Shakespeare‘s Twelfth Night; or Jane Austen‘s sets of sisters in 
Pride and Prejudice, or Sense and Sensibility.   A contemporary example of the force of 
the brother-sister relation was the angry outburst of Charles Spencer at his sister, Diana, 
Princess of Wales‘s, funeral in September, 1997. 
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 In her emphasis on the power of generation and on the blood tie, Cavarero 
wrenches the idea of the mother away from the bedevilling subordination 
to house and household, and places her as a creative and unifying 
presence.  Cavarero insists: ‗it can only be Jocasta, the mother, who 
initiates the blood lineage‘; ‗it is blood generated by the mother that 
polarizes the tragic action‘; ‗It is the power of blood that moves Antigone‘ 
(p. 27).  She vividly reminds of ‗a birth that links each and every body to 
the carnal, internal and bloody recesses of the female womb.‘ (p. 32) In 
tragedy, and in history we are used to tales of blood being tales of battle, 
tales of blood spilt, of gashes and bleeding wounds.  By contrast, Cavarero 
recovers the creative power of blood.  Blood has a different significance 
considered from the point of view of the female.  Cavarero gives the clue 
in her idea of blood lineage, but I take the idea further.  Blood, for those 
who menstruate, is monthly evidence of the potential of their wombs.  The 
menstruating woman is far more familiar with blood than most men.  
Miscarriage brings a huge and alarming flow of blood.  Delivery can be 
accompanied by loss of blood.  The after-birth is a bloody mass of flesh.  
For most women, blood is denotative of our generative power.  
I welcome Cavarero‘s recuperation of the importance of the concept 
of the blood of the female line in ancient Greece, and I build on it in my 
reading of the stories of the mythic daughter, Antigone, and her mother, 
Jocasta, below.  However, this particular significance of hereditary blood 
should be understood within the norms operating in ancient Greek society.  
Today, the image of ‗hereditary blood‘ is overlaid with other meanings. In 
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a later section I show a daughter perplexed and damaged by allusions to 
her blood. 
Cavarero presents Antigone as a daughter looking back towards her 
mother.  She suggests that the daughter‘s self-sacrifice is in order to carry 
out the mother‘s desire.  For example, Antigone refers to Polyneices as 
‗my mother‘s son‘. (l. 466)  Integral to Antigone‘s tragedy is that she is 
unable to look forward as mothers do, to new births, but is condemned to 
concern herself with the past, with seeking justice for acts already 
committed.  Her sense of herself as female is intimately bound up with her 
sense of herself as her mother‘s daughter: 
Antigone is, of course, not unaware that she was born a 
woman, because, aside from her sexing as female, which is 
read within the social order as the determination of her 
subordinate role, her action arises precisely from the fact 
that she was born of a mother‘s womb.  For her, in fact, the 
significance of being born a woman, and that of being born 
of a woman, are linked by the symbolic code of the 
generative female body.  These facts also link her, with ties 
stronger than blood, to that brother she buries precisely 
because they share the same mother.  She acts in spite of 
the polis and outside the pre-established representation of a 
womanhood whose foundation she locates elsewhere, and 
which needs no further public confirmation. (Cavarero 
2002, p. 43) 
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Kitto (the translator of the edition of Antigone I am using)81 notes that 
Antigone‘s extraordinary declaration of loyalty to her natal family has 
been questioned on the grounds that it qualifies her objection to leaving a 
body unburied.  It also offers a calculating attitude to the duty to the 
family which is sometimes seen as Antigone‘s main motivation.  (Kitto in 
Sophocles 1994, Note, p. 160) Antigone says: 
For had I lost a son, or lost a husband, 
Never would I have ventured such an act 
Against the city‘s will. And wherefore so? 
My husband dead, I might have found another; 
Another son from him, if I had lost 
A son.  But since my mother and my father 
Have both gone to the grave, there can be none 
Henceforth that I can ever call my brother. (ll. 906-13, 
Antigone, Sophocles, 1994, ) 
However, the words ring true of the absolute judgments of the 
inexperience of youth.  Never having had a husband or son, Antigone 
might well imagine them to be replaceable.  Moreover, as she is 
continually drawn back by the power of the shared birth from her 
mother‘s womb, the uniqueness of her bond to her brother(s) is indelibly 
marked in her. 
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 This edition, referred to in the bibliography of Stately Bodies, was used by Cavarero‘s 
translators, Robert de Lucca and Deanna Shemek, though not by Cavarero herself who 
used her own translation. 
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At the end of Stately Bodies Cavarero includes an appendix which 
draws on Maria Zambrano‘s fantasy of an experience of maternity for 
Antigone, entombed in the cave. (Zambrano, 1989)  Zambrano interprets 
Antigone‘s tragedy as maternity denied.  She supposes the shade of the 
mother crosses the daughter‘s body, so that she, the young virgin, may 
‗feel the weight of being a mother.‘ (Zambrano 1989, p. 63, trans. 
Cavarero 2002,  p. 192) This shade is not Jocasta, but the mythical Great 
Mother and the Earth.  Zambrano focuses on the ‗revelation‘ of birth.  As 
Antigone is primarily concerned with the body – the body of her brother, 
her own fated body – she had a close awareness of her birth, and thus of 
her mother.  As Antigone has remembered the body, she has remembered 
her mother, and, in Zambrano‘s vision, her mother reveals maternity to 
her.  The Sophoclean focus on the male dead body of Polyneices enables 
us to forget the mother.  A counterbalancing focus on the woman‘s body 
immediately brings back the mother/daughter dyad. 
The shade of maternity provided by the mother for the daughter 
here is reminiscent of Cavarero‘s earlier depiction of the relation between 
mother and daughter in In Spite of Plato (1995) where she reinterprets the 
myth of Demeter.  Here Cavarero writes of the relation between mother 
and daughter as the ‗figure of maternity already complete on both sides, 
the generator and the generated.‘ (1995, p. 90)  Cavarero suggests that the 
daughter who remains solely a daughter, does not lack maternal power.  It 
is rather the patriarchal order that prevents the backward gaze of the 
daughter on her mother.  There is a disturbing claustrophobic edge to 
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Cavarero‘s picture.  She claims that women‘s desire to be a mother is pre-
ordained in patriarchal codes, and suggests that the daughter could keep 
her gaze on her mother, find her sense of rootedness from her mother and 
thus become rooted in a free subjectivity.  The desire of Demeter is for her 
daughter to be what she is, a girl, not the wife of Hades. Cavarero is keen 
to ‗forbid the identification of the ―substance‖ of being a woman with the 
act of generating alone.’ 82 Her idea is rather to stress mother-daughter 
rootedness ‗in a horizon of similarity‘. (1995, p. 64) When a daughter 
becomes a mother she frequently becomes closer to her mother, not 
infrequently overcoming a previous estrangement.  The desire for sharing 
motherhood is a frequent female response to birth.  Yet, against Cavarero, 
it might also be argued that difficulties between mothers and daughters 
need to be recognised.83  The idea of the girl with her gaze eternally fixed 
on her mother is restricting, for both mother and daughter.  The mother 
has a life beyond maternity.  The daughter will not remain eternally a girl.  
She may well move on by resisting her mother, whether or not she has 
children.  The mothers I discuss below in the work of Jackie Kay and of 
Andrea Levy, are both grieved by their daughter‘s leaving home, but there 
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 Italics in original. 
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 I allude to difficulties in the mother-daughter relationship in my introduction.  Hazel 
Barnes writes of her mother: ‗It would be false to say that I did not love her, but strongly 
negative emotions were there as well.  From the beginning our relations were troubled, 
and the tension between us intensified with time; it was still there beneath the surface 
even in later years when we consciously avoided conflict.‘ (Barnes 1997, pp. 20-21) Such 
a mother-daughter relationship is at least as common as the devoted relationship which 
Cavarero advocates.  
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is no suggestion that the daughter is in the wrong.  Cavarero‘s view closes 
off resistance and a focus on the future for both women.  A more open 
view of their relationship can be combined with a recognition of their 
continuing significance for each other. 
The Mother’s Story 
         Although Jocasta does not appear in Antigone, Sophocles would 
have expected his audience to know her story.  The Greeks were familiar 
with legends of the house of Labdacus.  Kitto makes clear that although 
plays were performed over three days as a competitive festival in Athens, 
the three surviving plays by Sophocles set at Thebes and 
focussing on the family of Oedipus were not designed to be 
performed together sequentially. (Kitto, Introduction to  
Sophocles, 1994, p. xi)   
 It is misleading to suppose that the audience would see Jocasta in 
Oedipus the King on one day, and then follow this with seeing her 
daughters in Antigone the next.  The links between the plays are thematic.  
However, as Ruth Padel points out: ‗The tragedian … invited members of 
his audience to make vivid for themselves the family‘s history, time past 
and now invisible.‘ (1992, p. 344)  I begin by considering Jocasta from 
Antigone‘s viewpoint, and then think of her as she appears in Oedipus the 
King.  The presence-in-absence of Jocasta in Antigone is an aspect of the 
audience‘s imaginative response to the play.  Jocasta can be viewed as a 
motivating force behind Antigone‘s death-defying ‗burial‘ of her brother.  
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Beyond this, Cavarero emphasises the excessive motherhood of Jocasta – 
‗so much a mother, in fact, that she is mother not only of her last four 
children, but also of their father.‘ (2002, p. 27)  Cavarero uses a forgiving 
simile for Jocasta, which recalls the germination of plants.  She compares 
her incestuous family to ‗successive bodily off-shoots of one flesh‘. (p. 
27)84 In a striking aside, she alerts us to the imbalance between the 
attention paid to the ‗crime‘ of Jocasta in marrying her son ‗while 
millennia of history keep silent about the paternal rape of daughters‘. (p. 
27) 
Recognising, of course, that Jocasta is a figure from myth, I now set 
aside her incest which has been the target of so much thought, and place 
Jocasta in context, and in contemporary expectations of motherhood.  
Such is the silence of mothers, that in The Greek Way of Life: From 
Conception to Old Age, Robert Garland begins by warning the reader that 
there is no ancient Greek testimony from women patients during 
pregnancy or delivery, nor from a female biologist or gynaecologist. 
(Garland, 1990) The focus of medical writing was on conception and 
birth, not contraception, from which Garland deduces that the Greeks were 
preoccupied more with the difficulty of achieving live births, than with 
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 At a Centre for Literature and Philosophy Conference at the University of Warwick in 
May 2004, entitled The State He’s In: Political Philosophy and the Figural, Cavarero 
stated in discussion of her book that Jocasta was ‗terrible, awful‘.  Thus my reading of 
her simile does not accord with her intention in using it.  This illustrates Ricoeur‘s 
emphasis on the importance of the reader, discussed above, receiving the text differently 
from the way the writer intended it to be read.  
 262 
preventing such.  It is of course possible that there was considerable 
concern with, and knowledge of, contraception, but this was a woman‘s 
topic and did not find its way into medical writing.  In the extant male 
texts, there is evidence of a fear of childlessness, and sterility was 
regarded as a divine punishment. (Garland 1990, p. 36)  The expected age 
of the mother at conception came early in life: 
While the effect which either pre-menarcheal or early post-
menarcheal sexual relations may have had on fertility 
cannot be gauged, there is little doubt that the early age at 
which many girls first gave birth greatly increased the risk 
of infant mortality, since those who became pregnant 
within two years of menarche put both themselves and 
their child at high risk. (Garland, 1990, p. 26) 
Jocasta must have produced her five children at a precariously young age, 
and a precariously mature age.  The preoccupation with male fertility may 
well have obscured for the Greeks, the durability of Jocasta‘s successful 
child-bearing. 
The narrative of Jocasta‘s suicide is normally interpreted as a 
response to the (undoubted) horror at the incest in which she had been 
unwittingly engaged.  A sub-text to her story lies in her response to the 
exposure of her first born son on the mountainside.  I begin by exploring 
the practice of exposure, and then return to Jocasta, as she appears in 
Oedipus the King.  Garland makes clear that for us to assume (with Plato) 
that exposure was an accepted and little grieved for method of abortion, 
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revealing cultural difference between us and the Ancient Greeks, is too 
swift a judgment. (Garland 1990, pp. 59-105)  It seems at least plausible 
that it was as hard for a Greek family to dispose of its baby as it is, or was, 
for families in modern day China.  The Greeks did not actually kill 
unwanted babies, apparently because had they done so they would have 
incurred blood-guilt.85  Instead they practised ekthesis or apothesis which 
Garland translates as exposure. (Garland, 1990, p. 84)  They employed a 
midwife or household slave to carry the baby outside the residential area 
and leave it to the mercy of the elements.  This implies a repugnance to 
murder, and sense of divine control over life and death.  The picture is 
complicated.  Exposure was not a practice limited to poorer families.  It 
also served to obviate problems of dividing the inheritance in too 
numerous families.  The categories at risk were girls; deformed or sickly 
infants; illegitimate offspring; offspring of slaves.  Plato prescribes 
exposure of defective children in The Republic (Plato, 1961, 5.641) but 
recognises the potential of tenderness to the infant in the Thaetetus:  
Or do you think your infant must be reared in any case and 
not be exposed?  Will you bear to see it examined and not 
be upset if it is taken away, even if it is your first-born? 
(Plato, 161a, 1961, quoted in Garland, 1990, p. 88) 
A traditional part of the myth of the exposed child is the inability of the 
person charged with the deed actually to perform it.  The slave or midwife 
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 Similarly Creon seeks, unsuccessfully, to avoid blood-guilt by not actively killing 
Antigone, but only entombing her with a small supply of food.  
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helps the Gods to care for the child by placing it where it will be found.  
Garland even suggests that the idea of a society that tolerated exposure 
may be a dramatic fiction.  He points out that ‗not a single real-life 
instance of exposure is documented for Classical Athens‘ although such 
cases form the key to works of literature. (Garland, 1990, p. 92) 
In Ancient Greece, the father was the owner of the child.  Jocasta, 
particularly given her assumed youth, had no choice but to endure his 
removal from her.  Her maternal feelings are not explored by Sophocles. 
The removal is seen as the key to the plot.  Jocasta simply reports: 
As for the child, it was not three days old 
When Laius fastened both its feet together 
And had it cast over a precipice. 86 (ll.72-5, Oedipus the 
King, Sophocles, 1994, ) 
Jocasta‘s mood here is not one of sorrow, but of indignation at Oedipus‘ 
belief in the ‗crafty prophet‘.  The years that had gone by, the solace of the 
birth of her subsequent four children, and the extremity of her situation 
may explain Jocasta‘s tone.  Later she allows compassion to creep in.  
Referring to the prophecy she says: 
For that was clear: 
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 Kitto notes that the Greek indicates a trackless mountain. (Sophocles, 1994, p.167)  
This fits well with the ambivalence of the action of exposure.  A trackless mountain is 
less fatal than a precipice.  
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His [Laius‘] son, and Mine, should slay him. [Laius] —He, 
[Oedipus] poor thing, 
Was killed himself, and never killed his father. (ll.854-6, 
Oedipus the King, Sophocles, 1994) 
 
We can easily imagine the pause for a sharply remembered grief from her 
youth indicated by the long dash in the text.  Silence replaces the story.  
The brevity of Jocasta‘s  reference ‗poor thing‘ for her baby, indicates to 
me a familiar sorrow, which no longer calls out an outpouring of emotion, 
but is a contained blow to the heart, no longer narratable. 
Jocasta‘s distress must have been increased by the wound inflicted 
on the baby.  The pinning of the ankles – Sophocles expresses this as ‗the 
fetters clamped upon your feet‘ (l.1034) – was unique. (Garland, 1990, p. 
92)  It is evidence of the cruelty of Laius, and flies in the face of the 
saving notion that the child is to be left to the care of the gods.  The 
compassion for her baby that we can imagine in Jocasta finds an echo in 
the tale of the servant charged with disposing of him.  When Oedipus asks 
him why he did not fulfil his charge, his complete and adequate reply is: ‗I 
pitied it my lord.‘ (Oedipus the King, 1.1178)  The speed with which 
Jocasta realises that Oedipus had survived the exposure shows that she 
was well aware of the practice of giving the abandoned child a chance to 
live by placing it where it might be found. (ll.1050-1068) She realises fast 
what has happened and her concern is to prevent Oedipus‘s realisation: ‗O 
may you never learn what man you are!‘ (l.1068) 
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In the majestic narrative of the death of Jocasta and the self-blinding 
of Oedipus, Jocasta at last refers to her earlier tragedy.  The messenger 
reports: 
[She] called on Laius, these years long dead, 
Remembering their by-gone procreation. 
―Through this did you meet death yourself, and leave 
To me, the mother, child-bearing accursed 
To my own child.‖ (ll.1244-48, Oedipus the King, 
Sophocles, 1994) 
As she approaches her own death she remembers the husband of her 
youth, and the child of her youth.  The sadness of the mother whose 
creativity is thwarted is contained in the curious phrase, ‗by-gone 
procreation‘. In Kitto‘s translation, the simplicity of the word ‗by-gone‘ 
contrasts starkly with the biblical weight of the idea of ‗procreation‘.  In 
her final reproach to the dead Laius, she identifies herself not as wife or 
queen, but uniquely as ‗mother‘.  Her sorrow is not solely for her 
incestuous union, and its off-spring, but also for the injury to her first-
born. 
There is a fleeting shadow of the mother struggling with, and being 
defeated by, the injury to her children in the moving figure of Eurydice, 
Creon‘s wife, the mother of Haemon, in Antigone.  In a few lines, 
Eurydice evokes intense pity in a brief speech in the play: 
my hand was on the bar 
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that holds the gate, to draw it; then there fell upon my ears 
a voice that 
spoke of death … 
I am no stranger to bad news. (ll.1185-1191, Antigone, 
Sophocles, 1994) 
At the close of the play, Eurydice‘s suicide is reported.  She could not bear 
the double death of her sons.  The death of her first-born, Megareus, not 
named until the end of the play, is obliquely referred to earlier. The death 
of her second son Haemon makes her life unbearable.  Jocasta, does not 
appear in Antigone as a character. The only mother who speaks is 
Eurydice.  Presumably the Greeks at the festival, familiar with these 
stories, could hear the echo of Jocasta‘s lament, and of her fate, in 
Eurydice‘s words and in her suicide.87 This ancient image of the woman 
with her hand upon the gate, ready to suffer and retreat, is an apt 
illustration of the eclipsed figure of the mother, and of a silenced maternal 
grief. 
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 The translator, Kitto, notes that the suicide of Eurydice was rare in tragedy  in that she 
stabbed herself.  He states that most females commit suicide by hanging themselves. 
(Sophocles, 1994, p. 164)  That the suicide of such a minor character should take so 
unusual a form, increases my suspicion that it is partly intended as a reminder of 
Jocasta‘s suicide.  The view of suicide of the ancient Greeks was different from the view 
which became prevalent in the Christian era.  For the Greeks, suicide was seen rather as 
choosing to die at the appropriate time.  Nevertheless, the suicide of a mother, caused by 
her children‘s misfortunes, is a tragic event.  
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Differences in Mothering 
Wittgenstein writes, ‗for if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all [games], but similarities, relationships 
and a whole series of them at that.‘ (P.I.66)  He advises us to look not for 
an essential sameness, but for resemblances.  I now change the scene and 
provide three contemporary narratives of mothering which illustrate 
differences in mothering:  a narrative of adoption; a narrative of family 
life; and a narrative of home-school relations.  I move away from the act 
of birth (which is so much part of Cavarero‘s perspective), to mothers 
engaged in the activity of mothering as the children grow up.  The time 
shift enables the social and economic context of mothering to become 
evident.  I do not use these stories to suggest that the experience of these 
particular mothers is a universal experience. 
Cavarero‘s emphasis on a unitary story of a life is complicated by 
reading her work through The Adoption Papers by the Scottish Nigerian 
poet Jackie Kay (1991).  For Cavarero the blood tie between mother and 
daughter is a source of strength, an impulse to action.  Kay explores 
attribution of blood as a mark of racism, and the painful lacunae caused by 
a daughter‘s lack of blood relation with her mother.  Whereas Cavarero 
writes of a story told to a shaping listener, for Kay the roles of narrator and 
listener overlap and merge into each other.  In The Adoption Papers Kay 
presents the voices of a Glaswegian infertile adoptive mother, a daughter, 
and a birth mother interwoven in the text.  The voices are indicated to the 
reader by different typefaces but are even more distinguishable by their 
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different contents and tones.  The series of ten short poems in chapters are 
made up of their three voices reflecting on the birth, and neonatal illness 
of the daughter, and then on the daughter‘s schooldays and the possibility 
of her meeting her birth mother when she is twenty-six.  In an intricate 
structure, Kay mixes time periods in the thoughts of her characters, though 
the three parts are dated 1960-61, 1967-1971, 1980-1990.  The birth 
mother and the adoptive mother are white.  The father and the daughter are 
black. Although, as I indicate below, silence plays a significant part in 
Kay‘s partly autobiographical poems, the artistry with which she has 
created them suggests the countervailing therapeutic effect of narrative.  I 
select aspects of the poems which throw light on the concept of narrative 
identity. 
The opening poem ‗The Seed‘, brings together narrative detail and 
mixed reflections on the maternal body. (Kay, 1991. p. 11) The birth 
mother thinks of the brevity of the moment of conception: ‗the time, the 
exact time/ for that particular seed to be singled out‘, as contrasted with 
the ‗slow weeks‘ of pregnancy.  This is interspersed with the adoptive 
mother expressing her longing for the discomfort of carrying a child, and 
for the pain of childbirth.  Kay thus draws attention to the amazing 
chanciness of conception, and to the sense that the infertile woman‘s very 
body has been denied an experience that is regarded as characteristic of 
the female. The chapter closes with an allusion to the father by the birth 
mother: ‗He couldn‘t leave Nigeria … / His eyes intense as whirlwind/ the 
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music he played me‘. (p. 12) Kay brings in the physical joy and passion of 
conception. 
The second poem introduces the daughter‘s voice as she seeks her 
mother‘s name and her own original name from the Records Office.  She 
relates the few sparse details of her mother‘s life that she receives in ‗a 
slim manilla envelope‘. Such a bureaucratic disclosure is a far cry from 
Cavarero‘s exploration of the self-discovery of the mythic figures of 
Ulysses or Oedipus. 
The tone changes in the third poem.  Kay introduces issues of 
family resemblance and of race.  She provides an ironic description of the 
home appraisal visit of the social worker to the adoptive mother‘s home.88   
There are ‗no babies‘ until the adoptive mother says: ‗oh you know we 
don‘t mind the colour./Just like that, the waiting was over.‘ (Kay, 1991, p. 
14) Kay moves on to contrast the excitement of the adoptive mother 
picking up the daughter with the shame and grief of the birth mother.  
This casts a flickering light on the next poem which juxtaposes the 
daughter‘s phone calls to trace her mother, ‗If she wants to meet me that‘s 
fine if she doesn‘t /that is also fine‘, to the adoptive mother‘s dream that 
the birth mother appears at the door.  In the related dream the adoptive 
mother notices that the birth mother looks like the daughter, – ‗she looks a 
dead spit‘ – and then the birth mother takes the baby. (p. 19) The physical 
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 Single parenthood was more unacceptable in the early 1960s than it is today, and 
adoption more common. 
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resemblance which we often accept unquestioningly as part of the binding 
together of the family is part of a haunting absence for the adoptive 
mother.  In a light touch, the daughter closes the chapter by setting the 
‗few genes, blood, a birth‘ of her birth mother against ‗the mother who 
stole my milk teeth/ate the digestive left for Santa.‘ (p. 20) The domestic 
details reveal the years of care ... .  Kay also alludes here to the unspoken 
relationality between mother and daughter. 
The comfort of the unspoken is no longer available in Part 2 which 
engages with the schooldays of the daughter, and provides a challenge to 
the traditional narrative of the mother.  The language changes to 
Glaswegian as the daughter says:  ‗After mammy telt me she wisnae my 
real mammy/I was scared to death she was gonnie melt‘. (Kay, 1991, p. 
22) The adoptive mother protests against the charge that the child is not 
her own: ‗she‘s my child, I have told her stories/wept at her losses, 
laughed at her pleasures, /she is mine./… all this umbilical knot business is 
nonsense‘. (p. 23) The frail defensive tones of mother and daughter alike 
indicate to the reader the weight of conventional expectation.  It can be  
damaging to insist on a blood relation between mothers and daughters.  
The racist history of attribution via blood is followed up when the 
daughter, unable to dance correctly, receives the reproach from her 
teacher: ‗I thought you people had it in your blood.‘  As the daughter, 
reflecting, aptly asks: ‗What is in my blood?‘  Her schooldays are threaded 
through with casual racism to which she responds by allying herself with 
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Angela Davis.89 (p. 27) The birth mother‘s voice enters with a counter 
balancing reminder (sadly unheard by the daughter) of the glamour of the 
father: ‗Olubayo was the colour of peat/when we walked out heads 
turned.‘ (p. 26) The adoptive mother and daughter recover from the 
onslaught of the categorisation of the public narrative in the manner so 
well known to mothers and children, by sitting together in the armchair 
and having tea and cake. 
The last part begins with the re-emergence of the birth mother, 
assailed by memories and fears, now that the daughter is legally old 
enough to discover her story.  Kay addresses the issue of blood in the 
grown-up daughter‘s voice.  The daughter has no answer to medical 
questions about her blood family.  She tries to set it aside: ‗the blood does 
not bind confusion‘; is only menstrual flow; comes from her finger; but 
she still wants to ‗know my blood‘.  She phones her grandmother, but then 
retreats.  Kay‘s poem ends with all three women not telling their stories.  
After she moves out, the adoptive mother restrains her worry over losing 
her daughter: ‗Getting myself into a tizzy‘, and silently reassuring herself, 
‗Closer than blood /thicker than water. Me and my daughter.‘ (p. 32) The 
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 Angela Davis is currently Professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the 
University of California, Santa Cruz.  She is a political activist and a philosopher.  In her 
writing in the 1980s she adopted a Marxist position through which she perpetuated a low 
valuation of reproductive labour.  In her later work, she has contributed towards 
understanding how racism has been specifically manifested in black women‘s lives, 
including an ‗important critique of the implicit racism present in some white feminist 
work on the problem of rape.‘ (Jagger and Young, 1998, p. 480)  
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rhyme of ‗water/daughter‘ suggests, but she does not relate, her anxiety 
that her link to her daughter is too weak, not bound by blood, and that the 
daughter may revert to her birth mother.  In anguish, the birth mother 
throws the photo of her baby into a well,90 signifying a deep and silent 
loss.  The daughter dreams of meeting her birth mother, but a dream of not 
meeting inserts itself.  The daughter‘s final words – ‗There is nothing left 
to say. / Neither of us mentions meeting again.‘ – show that the notion of a 
letter from her birth mother is now entering the fantasy which has 
sustained her.  It is too painful.  After so long, words will not cover the 
gap.  The story cannot be told. 
Secrecy is not explored by any of my three theorists of narrative, 
MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and Cavarero, but it is often a powerful force in 
family life.  In her novel set in a British Jamaican family in the second half 
of the twentieth century, entitled, Every Light in the House Burnin’, 
Andrea Levy depicts a poor family for whom secrecy is a way of life. 
(Levy, 1994)  Such secrecy has two aspects:  secrecy from the society of 
North London beyond the family; and secrecy within the family.  The 
narrator‘s voice is that of Angela, the youngest of four children, now a 
professional photographer.  The novel is written in a realist style, with   
the action switching between Angela‘s childhood and the time of the death 
of her father.  Angela writes: ‗How can you explain your family 
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the well on discovering that they are pregnant.  
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conventions – the secrecies, the codes, the quirks, to someone who‘s never 
lived them?‘ (Levy, 1994, p. 228) 
The parents have adopted a policy of keeping ‗as quiet as possible 
in the hope that no-one would know they had sneaked into this country‘, 
(Levy, 1994, p. 88) although we are told that ‗Dad‘ came over amongst the 
first post-war Jamaican immigrants, who arrived on the ship, Windrush, in 
1948.  In general, the family seem accepted in their neighbourhood, 
without conforming to all the English domestic rituals.  In a revealing 
aside, Angela notes that her mother still walks as though she has the 
Jamaican sun beating down upon her.   She remains quietly Jamaican in 
the way she walks, while not being confrontational about her origins.  
There is only one full description of a racist incident in which the 
children‘s playmates suddenly turn on the four Jamaican children with 
abuse.  The mother insists that they confront the situation, and stands at 
her door, arms folded, while her children venture outside again to play. 
Yet, the novel conveys the sense that the family are living under 
the continual threat of incurring racism.  When a (rare) visitor asks about 
the difficulty of ‗coloured people‘ getting jobs and accommodation, the 
father replies ‗we don‘t have any trouble. We just keep ourselves to 
ourselves.  Don‘t let anyone know our business, you know.‘ (Levy, 1994, 
p. 126)  In such a situation, being asked to tell one‘s story is perceived as 
an invasion of privacy.  When a district nurse asks Angela‘s mother 
questions about her life, she bitterly resents it, and finds a reason to 
dispense with her services.  As Caroline Steedman points out, Cavarero 
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ignores the forced narration of their stories by so many impoverished 
women seeking official assistance. (Steedman, 2001, p. 45)  Whereas 
Cavarero insists on our desire to hear ourselves narrated, to hear our 
stories, Levy depicts a situation in which the mother has no desire to tell 
her story.  Levy‘s ‗Mum‘ does not express the desire to be a narratable 
self, but rather a secret un-narrated self.  Perhaps she lives with the break 
in her experience between her life in Jamaica and her life in England as 
simply that, a break.  Perhaps she does not conceive of her life as a unity, 
in the way that Cavarero suggests is created by narrative, and therefore 
would be averse to a falsifying unifying narrative.  In the instance Levy 
describes, ‗Mum‘ is able to avoid disclosure, but life stories may be 
elicited by harsh necessity.  It is an attribute of the powerful to be able to 
put others to the question.  The enthusiasm for the story ignores the uses 
of silence for the oppressed. 
The distrust of words, of the usefulness of making a narrative of 
experience, is equally evidenced in the secrecy within the family.  In a 
striking incident, the father reveals, when Angela is twenty five, that he 
had an identical twin, with whom he lost touch.  She writes:  
This conversation was brief, but condensed.  First, I have 
an uncle in this country.  Second that he‘s my dad‘s 
identical twin, and lastly, that he is dead.  I had learnt more 
about my dad in those few minutes than in most of the 
years that got me to that point. (Levy, 1994, p. 237)  
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Such secrets are, of course, very different from the dramatic secret of 
incest in Sophocles‘ Antigone, which was so important to Kierkegaard‘s 
reworking.  Yet A.‘s91 (maybe ironic) description of the reassuring quality 
of holding a secret ‗close to the chest‘ is appropriate here: 
Perhaps nothing ennobles a person so much as keeping a 
secret.  It gives a person‘s whole life a significance, which 
it has, of course, only for himself; it saves a person from all 
futile consideration of the surrounding world.  Sufficient 
unto himself, he rests blissful in his secret; this might even 
be said though his secret is a most baleful one. (E/O, p. 
157) 
As a man in low-grade employment, ‗Dad‘, had little to call his own.  
Once he had lost touch with his twin brother, perhaps the significance of 
his distant existence, of their identical appearance, of the exceptionality of 
being a twin, meant more to him than it would have done if it had been a 
shared narrative.  The unshared knowledge could have been more 
precious than public knowledge.  In his case the ‗surrounding world‘ was 
the world of white English society.  It could have been a source of 
strength to him to keep this secret, any secret.  The fatal nature of ‗Dad‘s‘ 
illness is never acknowledged to the father.  This is an example of 
Kierkegaard‘s baleful secret.  Levy‘s novel makes clear that ‗Dad‘ is not 
well-treated in hospital.  ‗Mum‘ and ‗Dad‘ existed in a world of secrets.  
In keeping this last secret, the nature of ‗Dad‘s‘ illness, from each other, 
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 ‗A.‘ is the aesthete, Kierkegaard‘s mouthpiece in Either/Or .  
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‗Mum‘ and ‗Dad‘ were maintaining their world, sufficient to themselves, 
against the personal exposure integral to being treated in hospital. 
The relation between the mother and daughter rests on the 
unspoken.  She greets the disappointing news that Angela is not moving 
with them to their new home with silence. When the father is depressed by 
his illness he attempts suicide. The mother, in extremis, tells her daughter: 
‗―He took the painkillers – the paracetamol,‖ … there was a silence.  My 
mum looked round at me and then turned quickly back to the sink and 
began washing dishes with urgency.‘ (p. 178) Silence is the usual response 
to bad news. She pretends not to hear.  The depiction of the mother is 
convincing and familiar.  In our society, many mothers express their 
feelings through rampaging through domestic tasks, rather than in a 
‗therapeutic‘ narrative.  Silence is a common response to painful events, or 
unwanted memories.  For those whose voices are discordant, amongst 
whom are mothers, secrecy is a vital strategy. 
My final narrator provides a direct link to Wittgenstein. In The 
Everyday World as Problematic, Dorothy Smith adopts the perspective of 
a standpoint feminist to relate the stories of some Canadian mothers. 
(Smith, 1988)  Her strategy reveals a gap between ‗where we are and the 
means we have to express ourselves and to act‘, since 
the concerns, interests and experiences forming ―our‖ 
culture are those of men in positions of dominance whose 
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perspectives are built on the silence of women (and others.) 
(Smith, 1988, p. 19) 
 She agrees with Wittgenstein that seeking essences – such as illustrated in 
the idea of true narratives – beyond or beneath the ordinary use of 
language is a misleading philosophical practice. ‗Wittgenstein opposed the 
philosophical practice of lifting terms out of their original home (seine 
Heimat) and their actual uses in order to explore their essence.‘ (Smith, 
1988, p. 188) She takes the further step of arguing ‗that the way terms are 
used in their original context, including their syntactic arrangements is 
―controlled‖ or ―governed‖ by its social organisation.‘ (Smith, 1988, p. 
188)  Smith writes of particular women in order to show how narratives of 
female experience are already determined by the male world into which 
these descriptions fit.  She adds to our understanding a sense of the social 
structure and relations in which narratives are necessarily placed. My 
interest is to show that the idea of a coherent narrative may leave 
unnoticed important parts of women‘s experience which come to the 
surface by taking the viewpoint of the mother. 
 I precede example of mothering from Smith by drawing on Sandra 
Harding‘s ‗Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology‘ (1993) to provide a 
context my use of Smith‘s study.  I go on to show how my advocacy of the 
standpoint of the mother both resembles and differs from positions taken 
in standpoint theory, before returning to Smith‘s narrative.  
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  Harding begins by tracing the intellectual history of feminist 
standpoint theory to ‗Hegel‘s reflections on what can be known about the 
master- slave relationship from the standpoint of the slave‘s life versus 
that of the master‘s life … ‘  (Harding, 1993, p. 53)  She notes that in 
Marxist theory the Hegelian insight was developed into the standpoint of 
the socially oppressed, which reveals more than the standpoint of the 
socially privileged. For the standpoint theorist, knowledge claims are 
always socially situated.  In failing to interrogate their advantaged social 
situation dominant groups suffer a disadvantage in accessing knowledge, 
particularly knowledge of social relations.  Harding emphasises that 
members of dominant groups cannot easily change their perspective.  
Their activities both organise and set limits on their understanding of 
themselves and their worlds.  By contrast the activities of those at the 
bottom of social hierarchies can offer starting points from which a 
different view of humans‘ relations with each other and with the world 
they encounter can come to light.  The term ‗activities‘ is important.  
Nancy Hartsock insists that a standpoint is ‗not simply an interested 
position (interpreted as a bias) but is interested in the sense of being 
engaged.‘ (1995, p. 70)   
   Introducing specifically feminist standpoint theory, Harding turns 
to Dorothy Smith‘s later investigation of the relation between power and 
knowledge: The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of 
Knowledge. (1990, pp. 54-6) Here, Smith emphasises that women‘s many 
different lives and different experiences are invaluable for generating new 
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critical questions about both women‘s and men‘s lives, and the causal 
relations between them.  Smith thus engages with developments in 
standpoint theory in which it attends to the diversity of women‘s 
experience.  Smith points out that women‘s work of caring for bodies 
(domestically, emotionally, sexually) is invisible to men who are 
immersed in the world of abstract concepts. ‗Starting thinking off‘ from 
the site of such work will break the silence which surrounds both the 
women engaged in these practices and the practices themselves. 
I differentiate between a standpoint and a viewpoint.  I understand a 
standpoint as more fixed, and a viewpoint as more flexible.   My 
engagement with Kierkegaard leads me aver that there is no one correct 
viewpoint.  Although Kierkegaard ironically plays with a variety of 
viewpoints, he undermines the notion of a viewpoint when he writes ‗I am 
just as little, precisely just as little, the editor victor Eremita, as I am the 
Seducer, or the Judge.‘ (Kierkegaard, 2000a, p. 243) Like Kierkegaard I 
am wary of taking up a particular fixed standpoint.  For me, meanings are 
not seen as such, they are flexible, in the process of becoming. 
 
Working within the symbolic, I am more interested, in a 
Wittgensteinian way, in a multiplicity of points of view leading to a 
multiplicity of language games, than in a Marxist analysis of relative 
positions of power.  My writing on the mother acknowledges, but does not 
depend on, a contrast between the mother‘s viewpoint, and that of those in 
more powerful positions than hers.   
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Yet, I agree with Smith, who takes a sociological perspective, that 
the ways terms are used, the ‗homes‘ of words, are ‗controlled‘ by the 
social structures into which such use fits.  The focus of my work is not on 
critiquing oppressive social structures, but I recognise the powerlessness 
of mothers in some social structures, as revealed in mothers‘ exclusion 
from some language games, and in their marginalisation in others.  I 
challenge such powerlessness by placing the mother in different language 
games, and making her experience as a mother central to philosophical 
narratives in which she had played only a minor or metaphorical role.  I 
agree with standpoint theorists that engaging with the activities or 
practices – in Wittgensteinian terms the forms of life – of those who are 
often overlooked generates new critical questions, and in my terms, 
different stories, and stories of differences.  I attend to the nexus of  power 
relations in which the language games of mothering take place in that I do 
not insist on a coherent narrative in which the mother fits seamlessly into 
the social structure in which she finds herself.  I employ a Wittgensteinian 
therapy to overcome philosophical silences around mothers. Working 
within sociology, Smith writes of taking different standpoints to break 
silences around female practices. 
  
Let me return to my example, taken from Smith, of a narrative of 
mothers of school-age children.   In Chapter 5, of The Everyday World as 
Problematic, Smith exemplifies her focus on the critical edge of feminist 
standpoint epistemology by asking illuminating research questions starting 
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from the site of the work of the mothers of a group of school-age children.  
She does not intend to generalise from her small group, but to identify 
how ‗institutional practices of the school penetrate and organise the 
experience of different individual women as mothers.‘ (Smith, 1988, p. 
187) Such institutional practices are seen, or partially seen, by the 
mothers. By contrast, the understanding of those who create and live 
within such practices are limited in that they do not engage with the 
mothers‘ practical activities, although these are engendered by the 
institution.   
Dorothy Smith seeks out the gap between the official perspective 
and the mothers‘ perspectives by providing a detailed analysis of 
interviews revealing the work of particular mothers in relation to their 
children‘s schooling.  Her contention is that the process of education, of 
transforming the child from an individual in a private setting into an 
evaluated and graded social being, presupposes the social organisation of 
the work of mothers, which is unspoken and unseen.  It is of course easy 
to see the contribution of the mother from the perspective of the school, 
and this contribution is publicly recognised, more frequently now than in 
the early 1980s when Dorothy Smith was writing.  Her aim is to make 
appear the line of fault between female experience and the expression of 
that experience.  She shows how the organisation of the form of life of the 
mothers of school age children whom she investigates is a product of 
processes in which they have no part, but of which they are necessarily 
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aware, and to which they continually, and for the most part, willingly, 
respond. 
An example is the organisation of the school day. (Smith, 1988, pp. 
187-193). In the interviews, both Smith herself and the mothers ‗naturally‘ 
talked of ‗getting the kids off to school‘, of lunch-time, after-school 
etcetera. The educational programme, demarcated by the male public 
authorities, had an enormous influence on the rest of the mothers‘ lives, 
including on their opportunities for talking with their children, and on the 
style of these conversations.  
The male public authorities are the dominant group absorbed in 
educational policy making at an abstract level, and thus unable to see the 
work of the mothers in caring for the bodies of the children through 
providing lunch etcetera … , nor how their work impacts on the mothers‘ 
work. Because they are not asking the relevant critical questions of 
themselves, the male public authorities do not provide an arena in which 
the mothers‘ voices might be heard.   
Smith‘s questions from a different perspective allow the mother‘s 
work to become visible.  She notes that the mother adopts the school‘s 
sense of the importance of the timetable.  A child is sent to school with 
homework unfinished rather than be late for school. (Smith 1988, p. 192). 
The mother‘s understanding of, and observance of, the conventions is 
crucial, but because it is implicit in their practice, it is suppressed in 
language.  It does not form part of the conventional narrative.  
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Through taking the standpoint of the mother, Smith is able to 
provide new insights into the process of the management of homework.  
The authorities presuppose that the mother (normally) has the time to give 
to homework management, but also that she has a sophisticated 
understanding of the line between helping with, and doing, the homework.  
The apparatus of education controls her interaction with her child.  She, 
like the education authorities, focuses on standards to be achieved, levels 
to be reached: 
The child moves back and forth between the home setting 
in which she is embedded in particularising relationships, 
and the school setting in which she is being inducted into a 
standardized curriculum and impersonal procedures that 
evaluate her performance. (Smith, 1988, p. 199) 
As the child moves back and forth so the mother moves between one 
frame of reference and another as she relates to her child.  The social 
relations with the school are structured for her through notes on 
homework, reports, and parents‘ evenings. (Smith, 1988, pp. 199-200) In 
engaging with the school, the mother engages with a set of structures that 
are only partly revealed in the language games in the public domain.  Her 
work of negotiating the tasks that take up her time  – of being available for 
child or teachers, of reaching an understanding of what is required by the 
society of which she is a member –  are not open to view but require a 
particular engagement with the activities of the mothers to become 
apparent.  
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Experiencing the everyday world as a mother need not bring overt 
awareness of these defining structures.  The mothers in Smith‘s study do 
not reflect on the demands the structures of education bring upon them.  
Ignoring the existence of these structures, and their effect on mothers, 
does however entail an incomplete understanding of mothers‘ activities in 
relation to their children‘s education.  A difference of experience is 
suppressed if the standpoint of the mother is not taken.92  The narrative of 
home-school interaction, which plays a large part in many mothers‘ lives, 
is filled out and slanted in a different direction by the concrete practical 
questions which give rise to Smith‘s study. Smith can be read in terms of 
changing the ‗homes‘ of the words used by the mothers she interviewed.  
As a more expert judge of the language games of education of 
schoolchildren, the researcher sees homes of education discourse 
differently. 
Conclusion 
A narrator reflects her own position into the world which she 
creates in narrative, whether relating her own experience or that of others.  
In some way she participates in the narrative related.  I reflect my own 
                                                 
92
 A survey from the Equal Opportunities Commission, Working Fathers: Earning and 
Caring reported in The Guardian, 13 January 2003 has discovered that men in the U.K. 
are now spending far more time with their children than when Dorothy Smith was 
writing.  The findings are that the time men spend with their children has increased from 
less than  fifteen  minutes a day in the mid-1970s to two hours on the average weekday, 
and six and a half hours a day at weekends by the late 1990s.  This, of course, reduces the 
work of mothers, but their standpoint remains important.  
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position in that I highlight the mother where she had not previously been 
highlighted, but I see her also as the authors of the sources I draw on see 
her.  Such a reflection enables a multiplication of reflections which merge 
in and out of each other.  In that telling a narrative offers the perspective 
of the author, it invites counter-narratives, which evidence the mutability 
of the narrative form.  I weave together narratives and counter-narratives. 
The truths of narratives do not lie in their fidelity to events or people.  
These are not unitary truths but kinds of variable truths-in-the-telling that 
offer plurality.   
I problematise the mother as a narratable self.  I challenge the 
claim that telling, or hearing one‘s narrative has the function of producing 
unity of identity.  I provide examples to throw doubts on the ideas that we 
all have a desire for narrative, and on the narratability of experience.  I 
illustrate the significance of untold narratives.  I illustrate that the narrative 
form is open-ended in a way that allows for a shifting essence of the figure 
of the mother.  I suggest that a narrative, seen as one among a multiplicity, 
offers understanding of a web of maternal relationships, each resembling 
the others in some ways: ‗and the result of this examination is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.‘ (P.I.66)  
In examining the narrative form, I adopt strategies to overcome the erasure 




  In my thesis, I create a space for the language games of the mother 
in philosophy.  My thesis is original in placing together Wittgenstein‘s 
ideas of how language works, and arguments for the philosophical 
significance of the embodied and relational figure of the mother.  I move 
through the paradoxes of silence and speech, and of the forgotten emblem, 
towards a repositioning of the language games of the mother in 
philosophy.  I show how the mother may be seen so that she becomes 
significant within philosophy; but I also want to show how philosophy 
may be seen differently if the mother is included in it.  I situate my ideas 
within the project of feminist philosophy.  I am not simply making a truth 
claim, but through uttering the language games of the mother as I weave 
together feminist philosophy and the writing of Wittgenstein and of 
Kierkegaard, I bring into existence a different feminist philosophical 
figure of the mother. 
My thesis provides openings for future work on the mother.  In 
discovering her through Wittgenstein, I have worked on and within the 
‗labyrinth‘ of language. If consideration of the mother becomes normal, 
the mother could perhaps be discovered in different ways through other 
major philosophers.  Equally my work paves the way for future work on 
Wittgenstein.  In insisting on Wittgenstein as a philosopher of 
resemblances, I make space for further re-readings.  My alternative ideas 
on identity are created from a versatile pattern of thoughts not confined to 
the identity of the mother.  Different elements could be accented – 
 288 
different philosophical ideas could be generated, as I will emphasise 
below.   
 Let me return to my thesis.  I build from the female towards the 
mother.  I draw attention to, and speak through, the silencing of the figure 
of the mother.  A critical employment of narrative is integral to my 
argument.  The mother‘s place in language games begins snarled up in the 
essentialism/anti-essentialism debate.  By engaging with Wittgenstein, I 
release myself from this debate.  I discover the mother‘s place as a holding 
point in language games around women.  From this point the lacuna 
between language and experience which began as part of a critique of 
Wittgenstein, grows beyond its application to Wittgenstein, to reveal 
truths about speech, and about writing, in which silences are part of a 
variety of easily overlooked maternal meanings. Through narratives, I 
move towards recovery of such meanings.  The question of the placing the 
mother in language games leads to the theme of female shadows. Female 
shadows are a haunting presence in the texts of Kierkegaard, which 
become emblematic of the emergent relational self, the undeniably 
different self of the mother relating to her child.  Disembodied shadows 
merge into a concept of active embodiment.   
Wittgenstein advises: 
 In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. ‗But it must be 
like this!‘ is not a philosophical proposition.  Philosophy 
only states what everyone admits. (P.I.599)   
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I follow his advice in that I do not conclude by insisting that the figure of 
the mother must be as in any of the ways I have depicted her.  However, I 
resist Wittgenstein in that I suggest that in stating what everyone admits, 
philosophy forgets the figure of the mother.  In reconceptualising the 
mother so that she has a space, if not a place, in philosophy I highlight her 
where she had previously been obscure.  Through bringing the mother into 
different philosophical contexts, different language games, I add to, and 
change her meaning within some of the conversations of philosophy.  If 
the ‗work of a philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a 
particular purpose‘, (P.I.127) my task is to bring reminders of the mother 
into language games in which she formerly played little or no part.  In 
persuading the reader to look differently I aim to engender a therapeutic 
Gestalt shift.  I do not seek to make an unarguable deduction from 
established premises.  I offer a truth-in-the-telling, an evanescent 
performative truth, rather than a fixed truth.  The performances I conjure 
are those of writing and reading.  
John Wisdom advocates a Wittgensteinian philosophical approach 
of reflection by analogy, or parallels.  It involves seeing the value of 
proceeding from particular case to particular case. To demonstrate this 
procedure he favours narrative examples. He suggests that the conclusions 
reached may not be within the limits of conventional usage, but may be 
either borderline or paradoxical. (Wisdom, 1991, p. 77) Whilst I 
demonstrate below that these insights are relevant to my methodology, the 
idea of the borderline needs careful handling here.  My claims are 
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borderline only in that I do not so much argue against previous truths 
discovered by the philosophers whose work I draw on, as add in 
suggestions of the female which come from the borders of their work, and 
yet influence how the whole is seen.   
Veronica Vasterling raises the political question of finding room for 
alterity and plurality. (Vasterling, 2003)  She insists on the value of 
discordant new voices.  She points out that human beings have a 
long period of assimilating the meanings, norms, 
explanations, knowledge, and stories that circulate and are 
transmitted in the family, school, and society of which we 
are part. (Vasterling, 2003, p.154) 
 Bringing the figure of the mother out of the home, out of the homely, and 
into philosophical debates on mind and body, on the relation between self 
and other, involves working against the grain of such assimilations.  
Politicising the figure of the mother is uncomfortable work.  Rather than 
being supported by the authoritative teachings of tradition, the mother falls 
within the groups that Vasterling describes as being subordinated to the 
tradition. (2003, p.168)  As I demonstrate, such subordination takes the 
form of silencing, marginalisation, allowing only a borderline importance.  
The way in which we approach borderlines matters.  If a colour is 
relegated to the murky undistinguished greys, its trajectory and its context 
are diminished.  If greys and blues are shown as resembling each other, an 
azure grey can find its place alongside the Titian blues, and change how 
we see other greys and blues.  As Wittgenstein puts it: ‗I don‘t try to make 
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you believe something you don‘t believe, but to make you do something 
you won‘t do.‘(cited in Rhees, 1970, p. 43), I do not try to persuade the 
reader of new beliefs, but to persuade her to see family resemblances 
between language games, customarily divided in philosophy.93  
I draw attention to a female relation to language as different from a 
male relation to language, and thus to female experience mediated 
differently through language.  In the hermeneutical arc between writer, 
text and reader that Ricoeur describes, ‗the final brace of the bridge [is] 
anchorage of the arch in the ground of lived experience.‘ (Ricoeur, 1981, 
p. 164)  I ground my writing in my contextualised, lived experience as a 
woman and a mother in the society of which I am part.  I address issues 
relevant to mothers with different lived experience.  I have worked to 
construct a bridge from my experience, and that of diverse women and 
mothers, to the philosophical reader.  In so doing, I test experience, as 
related, (or partly related), through and against philosophical texts.  Thus 
the lacuna between experience and language games that Scheman 
identifies is crucial. 
  Notwithstanding this lacuna, Wittgenstein‘s view of language can 
work against the male idea of the universal and against a chaotic 
fragmentation, to allow a space for women, in all our many differences, 
into the philosophical picture.  In examining the position of the mother 
                                                 
93
 John Wisdom suggests that ‗Instead of Venn‘s diagrams, one might use painted circles 
that fade out towards the edges.‘ (Wisdom, 1991, p. 39)  
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within the symbolic, my work remains rooted in ordinary language.  In its 
very definition of a mother, ordinary language acknowledges that the 
mother has a distinctive body, and a distinctive relation to embodiment.  
However, I change the language games of the mother‘s body so that they 
become expressive of an embodied choice.  I argue for a different 
philosophical understanding of the body, which remembers the body 
which gives birth and nurtures.  I demonstrate awareness of other uses of 
the term ‗mother‘ and how the term is learnt, by presenting the mother 
who loves her child as an ordinary virtuous mother.  In this way I keep 
within the normal experience of being mothered, and of mothering. 
 An ‗übersichtlichen Darstellung’ of the problem of essentialism 
within mainstream philosophy, and of the problem of essentialism within 
feminist philosophy leads me to unravel these problems by linking this 
concept with that of family resemblances in Chapter 2.  I argue for an 
understanding of Wittgenstein as thinking of the norms and practices in 
which we engage, and which are evident in our language games, as 
changing and fluid, as one practice shades in and out of resemblance with 
another, and creates a new norm in so doing.  I also resist Wittgenstein 
here bringing in a narrative from Scheman which raises the acute problem 
of those who engage in practices, and inhabit a form of life, but are not at 
home in either the practices or the form of life, and are unable to express 
their discomfort in the language games available. (Scheman, 1996a)  Her 
narrative draws attention to a potential gap between experience and 
language which entails that experience remains hidden.  The shadow 
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remains, haunting the philosophical discussion.  In placing together 
Luntley‘s reading of Wittgenstein, and Scheman‘s reading, I suggest that 
while Luntley valuably suggests the agent who makes judgements and in 
so doing, creates new norms and practices, Scheman‘s narrative reminds 
us of unspoken presences. (Luntley, 2002) In adding to the meaning read 
by Naomi Scheman on to the narrative of Torch Song Trilogy, in my 
further reading, I welcome the significance of her resistance to 
Wittgenstein.  I am influenced by Scheman‘s idea of a shifting ‗diasporic‘ 
essence to identity. 
This leads on to my discovery of a place for the mother as a limiting 
case in the language games around women.  I bring in the type specimen 
approach from botany. I do not claim a true inner essence to mothering, 
but a significant place for the language games of mothering in language 
games about women.  I counter the forgetting of the mother which means 
that neither the practices nor the relationality of the mother play a 
noticeable part in philosophical (or feminist philosophical) discussions of 
identity.  I insist on the mother as embodied, and on the power of the 
narrative form. 
I move on to examine whether there are openings for women in 
Wittgenstein‘s writing. I begin by protesting that Wittgenstein, who 
criticises philosophers for subsisting on a one-sided diet of examples, 
himself suffers from the same limitation in that he does not include 
examples relevant to women. Thus, a woman reading as a woman finds 
herself excluded.  However, I adopt strategies to open this closed door; to 
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turn this imposed silence into speech.  My strategies include substituting 
female language games for male language games, and adding in de 
Beauvoir‘s account of her emergence into language, and the mother as 
teacher of language described by John Wisdom.   I disclose the figure of 
the mother talking with her child as a veiled support to Wittgenstein‘s 
‗natural‘ account of language learning. I find Wittgenstein‘s omission of 
women does not debar me from using his concepts.  Curiously, 
Wittgenstein who at first appeared to impose a silence upon me, becomes 
the thinker who helped me find my way to speech.  The therapy of his 
method is more powerful than the absence of relevant instances.  
Wittgenstein‘s concept of a form of life which underlies language 
games depends on the idea of practices which make up such a form of life.  
I add in a discussion of maternal practices in order to raise a maternal form 
of life. I discuss what is normatively built in to the figure of the mother, 
and challenge the conventional symbol of the mother by introducing 
Cavarero‘s reading of the Demeter myth, which restores the power of the 
figure of the mother.  I emphasise how Wittgenstein, especially in his 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, draws attention to the way practices 
are seen. Wittgenstein looks at the practices of ‗primitive‘ people 
differently from Frazer, and sees different meanings in these practices.  
This prompts me to look at the practices of philosophy differently, and to 
see openings for the mother.  Like Wittgenstein, I examine the role of the 
words, gestures and ceremonies within language games – Wittgenstein 
sees a use different from Frazer‘s, I add to his changed use. Each use 
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brings a new meaning.  By showing different uses of female concepts 
which bring along new meanings, I develop Crary‘s Wittgensteinian 
insight that although meaning is not fixed independently of use, use does 
not necessarily fix meaning. (Crary, 2000) 
Novel to my approach is my engagement with Kierkegaard. I think 
together Wittgensteinian forms of life and Kierkegaardian existence-
spheres.  My intention in bringing in the philosophy of Kierkegaard is to 
provide an alternative symbol of the self, and a distinctively female 
subject position, drawn from a re-reading of a philosopher important to 
Wittgenstein, who, like Wittgenstein, was writing against the main 
philosophical tradition of his time.  Kierkegaard addresses questions of 
gendered subjectivity and explores psychological interiority.   
Wittgenstein is concerned with the relationality of language games; 
Kierkegaard is concerned with the relational self in the process of 
becoming.  Following Kierkegaard‘s indirect lead through his 
pseudonyms, I reveal the importance of examining the viewpoint from 
which we understand an existence-sphere, in order to introduce female 
viewpoints, which I bring from the edge of the text and make central to 
my writing.   
Thinking about subjectivity raises a different picture of the self, 
which I suggest through the theme of shadows, in Plato‘s cave and in 
Kierkegaard‘s Silhouettes. Battersby‘s writing on a Kierkegaardian idea of 
the self, communicated indirectly, offers a route to my ideas of a maternal 
self.   I suggest shadowy insubstantial selves, who are, through a strange 
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contradiction, known by their bodies, their physicality.  I argue for a 
relational, ‗morphing‘, maternal self with blurred outlines.  I cannot shine 
a direct light on these shadows or they disappear, so I approach them 
through narratives.  
Stimulated by Battersby‘s ideas, I move on to re-read 
Kierkegaard‘s Gjentagelse (repetition, retake) of Plato‘s Symposium, 
entitled In Vino Veritas.  I re-read this text as illuminating differences of 
the self as mother.  My focus on such differences entails that the pregnant, 
birthing and breast-feeding mother (as distinct from the mother of older 
children), obvious around us but philosophically little noted, plays a large 
role in my writing.  I introduce the work of Young, where I find a 
phenomenological expression of the embodied experience and 
relationality integral to being a mother.  Thus, I detail a different use of the 
term ‗body‘ in philosophy, focusing on the mother‘s practices which 
create and sustain another life.  I raise the question of what difference it 
would make if philosophy did allow significance to these female activities. 
 A memorable shadow is that of Sarah, a Skyggerid, (shadow 
outline), introduced in Kierkegaard‘s Fear and Trembling.  I use her silent 
watchfulness, which casts a peculiar light on the biblical tale, to indicate 
how the virtuous mother both nurtures and relinquishes the child she 
loves.  The terrifying drama of the tale of Abraham and Isaac reveals, 
away from the limelight, a mother‘s love.  Sarah‘s love is distinctive in the 
intensity of her physical connection to the child, which is threaded through 
with the demand from the future, which entails that she give up the child. 
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In each narrative, I blur boundaries between selves, and between forms of 
love. Having focused so much on writing the mother‘s body, I close by a 
reminder of the impossibility of the task.  Somehow, the mother eludes the 
symbolic. In my discussion these narratives, I wrench the focus of 
philosophical discussion of love away from sexual love to mother-child 
love.  
Throughout I argue for parallel female language games.  I bring in 
female examples and instances resembling those used by male 
philosophers.  In moving from particular case to particular case, I offer 
sets of instances which resemble each other.  For example, I move from 
Cavarero‘s Demeter to Kierkegaard‘s Sarah, prising open the text to let in 
the mother.  In working from particular instances, I demonstrate my 
wariness of universals, showing how a Wittgensteinian ‗family 
resemblance‘ approach helps me avoid both the traps of the universal and 
a ‗contemptuous attitude to the particular case‘. (Stern 1992, p. 369) 
In my final chapter, I discuss how the narrative form, which I use 
warily, enables me to express the shifting essence of the mother and the 
diversity of mothers; and to acknowledge the silences which are part of the 
mother‘s story. I discuss narrative theory in the work of MacIntyre, 
Ricoeur and Cavarero. Cavarero writes: ‗The scission between 
universality and uniqueness, between philosophy and narration, signals 
from the beginning a masculine tragedy‘. (Cavarero, 2000, p. 53) Cavarero 
makes this point in her discussion of the tragedy of Oedipus, which she 
interprets as caused by his absorption in the sense of himself as an abstract 
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subject. She notes that as women are estranged from the traditional self-
representation of the subject, they are not tempted by abstraction, but 
rather favour narration. Whilst differing from Cavarero‘s view of narration 
as conveying the uniqueness of the subject, I agree on the significance of 
the scission between philosophy and narration.  Like Cavarero, I see in the 
restoring of the philosophy of narration an opportunity for what she terms 
‗a feminine art‘. (2000, p. 54)  In drawing on narratives and in making a 
trajectory towards a discussion of the narrative form, I resist the 
‗masculine tragedy‘. Though I recognise the strength of the idea of 
narrative identity for expression of subjectivity, unlike Cavarero I 
challenge acceptance of narrative by bringing in the power of secrets and 
silences.  I suggest that narrative identity is more successful for those with 
successful stories.  A unified narratable self can be a daunting chimera. 
 I provide examples which create imaginative parallels between 
mothers in dissimilar situations, and from contrasting genres of literature.  
I do not seek to create contiguity between my chosen narratives, but to 
create in the reader a sense of a variety of missing meanings restored. My 
narratives come from different spaces within literature – from Greek myth, 
from a London mother, from Nigerian-Scottish poetry, from Canadian 
sociology.   
And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of 
the investigation.  For this compels us to travel over a wide 
field of thought criss-cross in every direction. (P.I.Preface)   
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I respect the fissures and breaks in language that difficulties of life, and of 
expression of psychological interiority, demand.  I argue that the 
Kierkegaardian fragmented self, which is in the process of becoming, 
resonates more with some female experiences, than the self as author of a 
coherent story.  I draw attention to the dangers of assuming that we all 
have a desire for a story, or the wish or ability to remember our stories. 
Yet, the narrative form appeals in its fluidity, its therapeutic power to 
encompass discontinuities and unspoken gaps.  It invites different 
perspectives and resists closure.  I acknowledge the transformational 
power of narrative, what Bell has termed the alchemy of narrative. (Bell, 
2004) My quest is not to search to double base metal into gold, but to 
double the text to create a space for the mother through re-working the 
symbols on the page.  I work not with shiny metal but with open-textured 
cloth.  I re-stitch narratives in order to persuade the reader that the pattern 
of the presence of the mother, once imaginatively seen, is difficult to 
erase.  The mother appears, even looms large.  But I also indicate tears in 
the tapestry in that I indicate the secrets and silences into which the 
mother slips.  In my readings, narratives are always complicated by signs 
of absences.  
My readings of Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, and of narrative theory, 
are rooted in the antecedent thinking of Scheman, Battersby, and 
Cavarero, whose feminist ideas do different work in the thesis from the 
ideas of the male philosophers.   I engage in feminist philosophy not to 
play games with words, but to explore and create female meanings, to 
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suggest varying truths.  As I illustrate throughout, a symbol has a 
performative force.  In use, a symbol becomes a double, or shadow of 
reality, which conjures meaning. As Wittgenstein writes: ‗Only in the 
stream of thought and life do words have meaning.‘ (Wittgenstein, Zettel 
1967, 173.) The point of my discussions is to elicit meanings, to persuade 
the reader of different meanings through investigating and changing 
language games in the female and maternal stream of thought and life.  I 
add to feminist philosophy by taking the term ‗mother‘, rather than the 
more general term ‗woman‘ as the norm of personhood.  I suggest that the 
absence of the mother from male philosophy has a significance different 
from, (not more than) the significance of the absence of the woman.  I 
develop and turn feminist philosophical arguments by foregrounding the 
mother.  I illustrate this by revisiting the three feminist philosophers with 
whom I have been in dialogue throughout my thesis.  
Scheman has inspired me in her creative use of Wittgenstein.  In 
revisiting issues that trouble feminist philosophy, such as the problem of 
essentialism, she uses a Wittgensteinian approach to free her into new 
ways of asking questions.  She takes from Wittgenstein the idea of putting 
philosophy itself in question, and thus produces her own different kind of 
relation to philosophy.  Like Wittgenstein, she is impressed by the power 
of examples, but she uses a different kind of example.   A case in point is 
her writing on the experience of transsexuals, or of those who, in her 
words, have a ‗diasporic identity‘.   Scheman works with the notion of a 
shifting essence to identity, and an identity with a blurred outline.  My 
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position is close to Scheman‘s as I bring these ideas into my picture of a 
flexible figure of the mother, stimulated by the type specimen method 
used in botany.  I am also influenced by Scheman in expressing such ideas 
of identity through narratives.  Such narratives are not just making truth 
claims.  They create a different symbol of the self.  
In resisting Wittgenstein, Naomi Scheman disturbs the 
Wittgensteinian close fit between language and experience.  I uncover 
such a lack of fit not in those who we might anticipate to have difficulty 
feeling ‗at home‘ in their use of language, since they may well be in a 
marginalised position in society, but in mothers who, from a conventional 
perspective, seem to be in a settled position in society.  In this way I adapt 
and move on from Scheman‘s ideas to reveal what may be hidden in the 
ordinary.  I tread a careful path in keeping within the range of the 
ordinary, and ordinary language, whilst resisting a quietist reading of 
Wittgenstein, and a conformist understanding of the mother.  In describing 
the ordinary mother, I imply simply that being a mother is an ordinary 
widespread experience, and the language of mothers is spoken and heard 
in our ordinary lives.  In describing the language of mothers through and 
against Wittgenstein‘s approach, I make clear that mothers do not simply 
passively inhabit a given form of life, but are active and engaged in 
changing the shifting immanent norms of our form of life.  Mothers 
continually create and alter language games, as I do in creating new 
questions for philosophy in this thesis.  
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The work of Adriana Cavarero provides a strengthening feminist 
fibre in the weaving together of the philosophical language games in each 
of my chapters. Cavarero asks whether the mother is completely occluded 
in the history of philosophy.  She employs the method which has 
influenced by work, of reading against the grain, and of working with the 
remaining traces of the female.  Cavarero‘s writing is important to me as 
her startling re-reading of the Demeter myth first made me see a 
possibility of bringing the mother into philosophy.  I make a parallel 
between my work and her work on Plato, in which she turns his 
predominant negativity towards, and exclusion of, women into a site for a 
feminist re-reading which empowers women. Cavarero insists on 
embodiment, an insistence which I have echoed in my depiction of the 
figure of the mother.   I also find very powerful Cavarero‘s opposition to 
(male) universals.  She turns, through the legend of Oedipus, the 
traditional philosophical question ‗What is man?‘ which raises a universal, 
to the question ‗Who?‘, which leads to a narrative, beginning with birth.   
Cavarero emphasises the importance of the mother-child relationship to 
knowing who you are.  She writes of the individual‘s need to know who 
his mother is.  I write from the mother‘s point of view.  
For Cavarero, uniqueness emerges from relationality, related in 
narratives.  I focus less on uniqueness, and more on a different narrated 
relationality, as I am concerned with the relational figure of the mother, 
whereas for Cavarero the scenes of storytelling are wide-ranging. When 
Cavarero writes of the power of the mother – Demeter, Jocasta – 
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sabotaged in male philosophical and literary texts, I agree with her, but I 
am wary of the drama of her writing.  I fear that the theatrical footlights 
shine up and the shadow is lost.  I take issue with some of Cavarero‘s 
ideas on identity.  I suspect the idea of the shaping listener as likely to 
conceal a hidden, unnerving power relation.  I aver that mothers are 
frequently reluctant to, or unable to, tell their stories, or create for 
themselves a unique narratable identity.  Nonetheless, Cavarero provides 
an opening for me to portray the muted but insistent significance peculiar 
to the figure of the mother. 
Both Cavarero and Battersby are ontologists concerned with a 
relational identity.  My concern is with language. I have drawn from 
Battersby the idea of moving away from the autonomous (male) individual 
towards a Kierkegaardian relational self, and of a body which can generate 
as paradigmatic of the self.  I give a greater emphasis to the birth mother‘s 
relation to the child than does Battersby.  I move away from Battersby‘s 
work by linking it to the question of writing the experience of the mother 
whose body creates, carries and nurtures the child.  Whereas Battersby has 
written on the reality of relationality between fluid emergent selves, I 
write on the language of relationality between the mother and child.  My 
flexible figure of the mother, with ‗mobile edges‘ is not defined through 
her properties, but is discovered in the flexibility of narratives.  
Ricoeur reminds us that although as it is written a discourse 
becomes fixed, at the same time it achieves ‗emancipation with respect to 
the author‘, so that what the text says matters more than what the author 
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meant to say. (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 201) The reader is free to reactualise the 
text in ever new contexts, as she makes the text her own.  (p. 185)  I make 
the texts I have discussed my own through my readings and re-readings, 
and I hope that my reader will make my text her own in new contexts.  
Already I am such a reader.  If I began this story now, it would be a 
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